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SOME years ago I chanced upon the record of Stratford 
Canning. The discovery was made during the process of 
gathering material for a novel on the period of the Crimean 
War. The more I read of this man and his work the further 
I was led in my search, and so great did my fascination 
become that I felt impelled, eventually, to share with others 
what I had learned about him. 
For a substantial part of the first half of the nineteenth 
century Stratford Canning was Her Brittannic Majesty's 
Ambassador to the Ottoman Sultan. In this role he played a 
significant part in the drama of high-level diplomacy and 
exercised a singular influence on the intertwined history of 
Europe and the Near East. He had, according to Winston 
Churchill, 'a wider knowledge of Turkey than any other 
Englishman of his day,' and he was hailed by Tennyson as 
"the voice of England in the East." To the Turks he was 
Buyuk Elchi—the Great Ambassador. 
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In spite of these accolades he is today virtually unknown 
to otherwise well-informed laymen. When one considers, hy 
way of contrast, the notoriety accorded many far less influen­
tial personages of the Victorian era, his disappearance from 
history, so to speak, assumes almost the proportion of a 
mystery. If for no other reason than to do him justice it 
seemed worthwhile to me to attempt this book. My motives 
go beyond that simple goal, however, for I consider it nearly 
impossible to achieve a good understanding of nineteenth-
century European history and its relevance for our own day 
without specific reference to Stratford Canning, his ideas and 
his work. 
I have written this study primarily for the intelligent 
layman who likes to be informed as much as is reasonably 
possible. The sweep of history encompassed by the terminal 
points of Stratford Canning's career is so vast that I have 
elected to offer a substantive account of his work rather than 
to construct a formal and detailed personal biography. With 
that end in view I have tried to avoid, without sacrificing 
historical authenticity, the obscurantism and picayune con­
cerns one sometimes finds in the professional monograph. The 
bones of historical evidence in this area have already been 
cleanly picked, but much of the intellectual nutrients are 
stored in warehouses not readily accessible to the layman. I 
have tried to present a fare chosen from among the products 
of recognized scholarship. Where there are sufficient variants 
of opinion I have tried to justify in my notes the particular 
flavor I have chosen. 
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Beyond the particulars of Stratford Canning's life but 
through the medium of his career I hope to reveal a chain of 
ideas and events which have had a permanent bearing on 
human history. In that process I hope, also, to indicate the 
role of skilled diplomacy in human affairs; especially do I 
wish to demonstrate the necessity of what is often suspiciously 
referred to as 'secret" diplomacy. There is no argument over 
the fundamental premise that in a democratic society the 
people as a whole must exercise ultimate control over foreign 
policy, even if only through a parliamentary medium. There 
are, nevertheless, a host of intermediate prudential decisions 
which should be left to competent statesmen to work out, and 
these workings should be free from the glare of journalistic or 
parliamentary publicity, no matter how well-intentioned such 
publicity might be. Failure to observe this rule of practical 
wisdom has more than once involved humanity in great 
tragedy. Tentative opinions openly reported too easily become 
irretraceable postures of national pride. When this occurs 
reason seldom holds her sway among the nations. 
In preparing this study I have depended heavily on certain 
sources which deserve special mention. Chief among these is 
the monumental biography of Stratford Canning written by 
one of the great archivists of the nineteenth century, Stanley 
Lane-Poole, in 1888. This work, printed in two volumes 
totaling nearly one thousand tightly packed pages, is a major 
source for the history of Stratford Canning and his times 
chiefly because Lane-Poole had access to the unpublished 
manuscript memoirs written by Canning after his retirement 
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from public life. From these manuscript memoirs Lane-Poole 
excerpted hundreds of lengthy citations, and, in addition, he 
copied a host of private letters from Canning to his mother, 
sister, brothers, and friends. By 1930, when E. E. Malcolm-
Smith began to restudy the life of Stratford Canning, she 
found that the complete manuscript memoirs as well as many 
of the private letters had disappeared. By diligent cross­
checking, however, with private papers of other individuals 
and the official archives of the British Museum, the Public 
Record Office, and the British Foreign Office as well as with 
official archives in Vienna, Paris, and elsewhere, she con­
cluded that Lane-Poole had copied faithfully and well. 
Hence, all references in this study to the memoirs are to the 
manuscript memoirs of Canning as recorded in Lane-Poole's 
Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning. In 1933 
Miss Malcolm-Smith published her Life of Stratford Canning, 
which was shorter but had the benefit of more research into 
documents made public long after Lane-Poole's work. Both of 
these biographies are long out of print, however, and each of 
them labors under the burden of having been written for 
English readers and presumes a familiarity on the part of the 
audience with details of English domestic politics as well as 
with usages and mores which may be unclear to the modern 
American student. On the political background of the 
Crimean War, Professor Harold Temperley's Britain and the 
Near East: The Crimea has achieved an aura of almost 
scriptural authority, but even this work is now past the 
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quarter-century mark and was written before the staggering 
events of the Second World War, to say nothing of the cold 
war of the fifties and sixties. With the help of all this scholar­
ship I have attempted to look back at Stratford Canning's 
world from a perspective that is now longer and wider. 
I am indebted to many people for whatever degree of 
success I have achieved. I owe a special debt of gratitude 
to Adeline Corrigan of the Cleveland Public Library for the 
initial encouragement to pursue this goal and for the acquisi­
tion of my first research material. I am also obligated to 
Sydney N. Fisher, Professor of History at the Ohio State 
University, for professional encouragement and advice and 
for his efforts in interesting the Ohio State University Press 
in my work. James Hafer, of the Newark, Ohio, Public 
Library was always at my command in procuring material 
from the Library of Congress and elsewhere, as was Mrs. John 
Gibney, of the staff of the Denison University Library in 
Granville, Ohio. T. Edwyn Dickerson, of Newark, Ohio, 
deserves special mention for his invaluable help in checking 
not only literary error but unwarranted deductions from 
historical evidence at hand. 
The officers of the Ohio State University Press have 
exhibited unusual patience and understanding, and I trust 
that these virtues will be duly rewarded. 
More than anyone else, of course, my wife, Antoinette, is 
responsible for the completion of this work. Without her 
complete and unselfish co-operation it could never have come 
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into being. Only those who have been through similar 
experiences will know the full extent of this debt. 
Finally, all shortcomings in this book are matters of personal 
responsibility alone. 






STRATFORD CANNING belongs to the group of indi­
viduals who might properly be described as catalysts of history. 
These are persons who, though they did not rule nations nor 
lead mighty armies nor crystallize in their own being the evo­
lution of epochal social or religious movements, just as surely 
helped to shape their own times and influence the future. 
It is quite true that the history of the nineteenth century can 
be written without reference to Stratford Canning; it is 
equally true that the story will be incomplete without him. 
The details of much of the change wrought in that era would 
have been far different from what they were had he not been 
on the scene. The opinion might even be hazarded, further­
more, that the substance of many changes would have been 
other than it proved to be. The final judgment as to the 
extent of his influence is probably beyond historical compe­
tence, but whatever that judgment might be there is little 
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doubt but that he left the mark of his character and per­
sonality on Europe and the Near East. 
Stratford Canning sprang from a family stock that had 
long combined what were to be the dominant traits of nine­
teenth century England—mercantile interests and government 
service. One of his forebears, Sir William Canynges, is listed 
as being a bailiff of Bristol in the middle of the fourteenth 
century. Another was Lord Mayor of London in the fifteenth 
century. In the seventeenth century one branch of the family 
was rewarded by James I with a manorial seat in Ireland, 
and the stock was invigorated with the blood of Deny and 
Wicklow. It was from this Wicklow strain, and from the 
Stratfords of Baltinglass (his great-grandfather had married 
one Abigail Stratford in 1662), that Stratford Canning took 
his direct root and bore his given name. 
Originally the Cannings had been wool merchants in the 
west country, but the move to Ireland had tended to remove 
them from the channels of trade to banking and factorage 
and later to law. This ancestry notwithstanding, an observer 
of Stratford Canning's infancy and boyhood would have had 
dismal forecasts for his future. There had been an abrupt 
decline in the family fortunes by the time of his birth. 
His grandfather, the first Stratford Canning, must have 
been a most stern and tyrannical patriarch. Two of his three 
sons rebelled and were disowned in early manhood. Thus 
disinherited, these two young men gravitated back to the 
land of their progenitors and there, in England, attempted to 
THE GREAT AMBASSADOR 
establish themselves as best they could. The older of the 
two was a counsellor, but he died penniless in 1771, leaving 
behind him an infant son, George—the future Prime Minister. 
The younger, the second Stratford Canning, married the 
daughter of a Dublin merchant, Mehitabel Patrick, and was 
able to secure a partnership in a small London banking firm 
which became known as French, Burroughs, and Canning. 
Stratford and Mehitabel Canning were scarcely settled in 
their own London home when they were constrained to take 
over the parental responsibility for their baby nephew, George. 
His mother had turned to the companionship of a reprobate 
actor after the death of her husband and abandoned him. 
In spite of their own struggles with a growing family the 
uncle and aunt were able to send this boy to Eton and thus 
start him on the road that was to lead to Parliament and 
the Prime Ministry. It was a debt that George Canning never 
forgot and one which he had an early opportunity to repay, 
for the second Stratford Canning died in 1787, a bare six 
months after the birth of his fifth child, and just when his 
business was beginning to prosper. 
This fifth child of Stratford and Mehitabel Canning was 
a boy, and he was also named Stratford Canning. He was 
born in the family house in St. Clement's Lane on the fourth 
of November, 1786. His prospects were bleak, as his father 
had never been able to amass a fortune to provide an inherit­
ance for his sons, and the family was never far removed 
from poverty. Mehitabel Canning was a resourceful woman, 
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however, and kept her children—four sons and one daughter-
together. She was able to eke out a respectable living from 
her husband's business and thus maintain a pleasant home. 
The infant son, Stratford, soon became the special responsi­
bility of Cousin George, although the latter was but a youth 
himself. Even when the young widow was forced to give 
up the London house and move to Wanstead in Essex, at 
the outskirts of Epping Forest, George Canning was a constant 
guest. 
It was not only his sense of responsibility that made George 
Canning a constant visitor. It was a pleasant place to come 
to, for in spite of the rigors of her life Mehitabel Canning 
kept a lively household; and George's friends were always 
welcome as well. Young Stratford's earliest recollections in­
cluded memories of the brilliant conversation of Charles Fox 
and Sheridan and Hookham Frere among others who fre­
quented the house, all of a type to make the young Stratford 
Canning dream of things far beyond the confines of his own 
home. 
Babyhood was not unduly prolonged in those days, and at 
the age of four he had already been enrolled in a neighbor­
hood dame school where he received the rudiments of formal 
instruction. Then at six he was, in his own words, removed 
to "the sterner discipline'' of Mr. Newcome's school for boys 
at Hackney. Here he remained for three more years until 
Cousin George thought it time for him to be entered at Eton. 
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The occasion was a memorable one for Stratford Canning. 
The twenty-five-year-old member of Parliament brought his 
nine-year-old protege straight to the provost's lodge lest the 
academic authorities have the slightest doubt as to the identity 
and quality of the young scholar being entrusted to them. 
The rising star of George Canning assured his little cousin the 
privilege of sitting to table at the provost's that first night and 
a warm introduction to the headmaster of the lower school 
on the next morning. Upon his patron's departure, however, 
Stratford was quickly relegated to the lowest depths of public 
school life. He was forced, like all beginners at Eton, to 
endure the near servitude to the "upper formers'' while he 
struggled to conform, at the same time, to the strict classicism 
of the scholastic regimen. In later life he was to observe that 
while the system had its obvious advantages in producing 
strong-minded and self-disciplined scholars, the excesses to 
which the procedure was often carried could destroy all the 
good effected. 
Nevertheless, the ten years he spent at Eton prepared him, 
as similar years did many others, for the arduous tasks of later 
life. They provided him with the mental tools he was to 
use for fifty years of service on the world scene. They gave 
him, too, his means of private recreation, the writing of 
poetry, which would carry him through many a lonely and 
desperate hour. Here, too, he saw much of the great and 
near great, as Eton was a favorite spot for George III and 
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its students were welcome guests at Windsor on Sunday 
afternoons. 
Even more attractive for the youthful Stratford Canning 
were the visits to Parliament where he could watch his 
idols, Pitt and Fox, and Cousin George, in action. These 
were exciting men in exciting times. Revolution had gripped 
France and its tumult echoed in the Houses of Parliament 
in the form of angry debate over what course England should 
follow. There were defenders of rank and privilege who 
argued that England should rush to the aid of the discredited 
French aristocracy. Pitt, the Prime Minister, resisted the 
tide again and again, and it was not until the French Republic 
reached out over the borders of France and attempted to seize 
the Low Countries that he bowed to the demands for war. 
The resulting conflict brought strain and fear as the stature 
of Napoleon Bonaparte seemed to grow with each passing 
month. So while the young student at Eton explored the 
world of knowledge, he was more captivated by the world 
outside, and the most vivid memory he took with him from 
these days was the picture of the great hero, Nelson, with 
Lady Hamilton at his side, strolling about the grounds of the 
school and smiling at the scholars. 
When Stratford Canning was admitted to King's College 
at Cambridge in the summer of 1806, Nelson was gone, Fox 
was gone, and so, too, was Pitt. The armies of Napoleon 
marched across the continent from Gibraltar to the Elbe, from 
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the North Sea to the heel of the Italian boot. The Peninsula 
Campaign was but a germ in the mind of Sir Arthur Welles­
ley, and England stood virtually alone. From his throne in 
Paris the Emperor had begun to bestow their respective 
kingdoms on his brothers; the Spaniards cowered in fear; 
Austria had been humbled along with Prussia; and Alexander 
of Russia waited nervously for the blow to fall upon him. 
For a brief period after the death of Pitt the Tories were 
out of office and the country was administered by a rough 
coalition dominated by the Whigs under Lord Grenville. 
It did not long survive, however, and early in 1807 the 
Tories reorganized the government and formed a Cabinet 
in which George Canning was named Foreign Secretary. It 
is not surprising that the young Cambridge scholar Stratford 
Canning was given part-time employment as a precis writer 
at the Foreign Office. 
The relative freedom enjoyed by scholars matriculating at 
the great English universities offered no obstacle to the pursuit 
of such work, but the young man was soon to be faced with a 
choice that would greatly affect his future career. That 
future, he had already decided, would be spent in Parliament 
and, he hoped, would culminate in a ministerial post, after 
the example of his now famous cousin. That cousin, he 
was certain, would inevitably head a government as Prime 
Minister, and it can be surmised that Stratford Canning 
secretly dreamt of sharing governmental responsibility under 
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such leadership. It would have been the normal dream of any 
alert, intelligent young man reared in the circumstances and 
surroundings that had been his. 
In consequence of these aspirations it was with some 
hesitation that Stratford Canning faced up to a suggestion 
from George in the summer of 1807 that he accept appoint­
ment as second secretary to a British embassy to the Danish 
court in Copenhagen. He acceded to his cousin's urgings 
only upon assurance that the assignment would be brief. 
Ostensibly Stratford Canning wondered about absenting him­
self from the university for such a period of time, but in 
reality he debated the possibility that such an engagement 
might serve to divert him from the course he had already 
charted for himself, or that it might be construed as a willing­
ness to be diverted. These fears George Canning countered 
with arguments that must have been sufficiently compelling, 
for Stratford agreed to go, at any rate. In spite of his an­
nounced fears he then left the university without bothering 
to go through the formalities of making arrangements for his 
absence. This departure really marked the end of his formal 
education even though he managed to get back for another 
term or two. Years later Cambridge finally saw fit to reward 
him with a degree in return for his services to the Crown. 
The mission to Copenhagen was one necessitated by the 
lengths to which England was driven in order to counter 
the intrigues of Bonaparte. Relations between England and 
Denmark had been severely strained because of a bold and 
unprecedented action against the neutral Danes that George 
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Canning had been forced to resort to in the spring of 1807, 
almost immediately after his entry into the Foreign Office. 
Intelligence reports from the continent had indicated that 
Napoleon was about to seize the sizable Danish fleet in an 
effort to break the British blockade of the Continent. George 
Canning had thereupon spurred the Cabinet into ordering 
the British admirals to enter the Baltic and secure the sur­
render of this fleet or, failing that, to destroy it. The Danes, 
of course, with Napoleon at their back, had not seen fit to 
acquiesce without a show of resistance. The resulting action 
had led not only to a seizure of the fleet but to an occupation 
of Copenhagen by British forces. It had been a purely practical 
action against a neutral nation without a shred of legality, 
yet it had proved to be a master stroke in the maneuvering 
between the two mighty antagonists. Subsequent revelations 
show that even before the British fleet had reached the 
Baltic Napoleon had informed the hapless Danes they would 
soon have to choose between himself and his enemy across 
the Channel.1 
Now that the deed was done George Canning hoped to 
convince the Danes to save themselves by a formal alliance 
with England, and he sent a mission to Copenhagen to 
propose that course to them. The chances for success were 
not great, but, on the other hand, a failure to accomplish the 
objective would cause no additional difficulty. 
This was the first excursion into the world of diplomacy for 
Stratford Canning. He had not yet reached his twenty-first 
birthday when the mission sailed at the beginning of October, 
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1807. His role was, of course, completely subordinate, but it 
was in this period that he began to write what would prove 
to be an almost countless number of notes, letters, and essays. 
They were articulate and descriptive, with rare insight into 
people and events. They were written to his mother, his 
sister, his brother William, an Anglican vicar (later to be 
Canon of Windsor), and to several friends of his days at 
Eton and Cambridge, including Henry Wellesley, the son 
of the Marquis of that name and nephew of Sir Arthur, 
the future Duke of Wellington. Important and revealing, 
too, are those written to Joseph Planta and David Morier, 
young colleagues at the Foreign Office and collaborators of 
future days. 
Throughout these early letters Canning returns constantly 
to the theme that this is but a passing phase in his life, but 
a taste of England's burden in the outer world, so to speak, 
and that he will soon be back at loftier pursuits. Yet one 
can almost read in them an effort to convince himself that 
this is not the life he seeks; only an intense interest in and 
awareness of what was going on around him could have 
dictated those letters. To quote from them here is beyond the 
scope of this work, since he makes no pretense of discussing 
great issues or events, preferring rather to describe cities, 
houses, and palaces, kings, governors, and princes, and to 
compare courtly modes and social customs. They are obser­
vations neither pretentious nor assuming. 
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The embassy of Mr. Merry to the Danes was as unsuccess­
ful as it promised to be; indeed, it was never officially received, 
and its members saw more of the Swedish court at Halsing­
borg and Stockholm than they saw of Denmark. But for 
Stratford Canning it was the seed that started a long and 
great career, even if, at the time, it seemed neither romantic 
nor exciting. 
By the end of the year he was back in England. "The 
next six months," he wrote in his memoirs, "were spent either 
in London or at Cambridge; in London for the performance 
of my official duties at the Foreign Office; at Cambridge in 
keeping terms, attending lectures, drinking milk-punch, which 
was then in fashion at all the colleges, and exercising my 
unfledged wings at a spouting club for eventual flights in 
oratory.'' 
Idyllic as such a life may sound, it would probably have 
not satisfied him for very long. Fortunately, he had little 
time in which to grow bored, for he continued in the same 
passage: "Before we had reached midsummer a new prospect 
opened for me abroad—one so alluring for youth and its 
natural aspirations that I looked to it with eagerness and 
delight, though not quite forgetful of my late miseries at 
sea, nor by any means inclined to relinquish permanently 
the more congenial position I had obtained at home."2 
The new prospect was another suggestion from his cousin 
that he go abroad on a second temporary assignment, that of 
 14 THE GREAT AMBASSADOR
secretary to Robert Adair, the newly posted Minister to the 
Sublime Porte in Constantinople. "We reckoned" Canning 
reminisced years later, " on being free to return after 
a few months, and I was, therefore, allowed to retain my 
office at home, though, of course, without receiving the salary 
assigned to it. I had also to keep a good half of my terms at 
the University."3 
1. Winston Churchill, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples (4 
vols.; New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1957), III, 315. 
2. Stanley Lane-Poole, The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford 
Canning (2 vols.; London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1888), I, 36-37. 
3. Ibid., p. 39. 
II

BRITISH foreign policy during the Napoleonic Wars was 
based on the nation's stark need to survive in face of the 
overwhelming power amassed by her enemy on the Continent. 
Unable to come to grips with the French military machine 
on land and, indeed, lacking the trained manpower to do so 
through much of the period, Britain was forced to use 
her maritime supremacy to guard the perimeters of the 
Continent and throttle as best she could the further expan­
sion of the Bonapartist empire. Additionally, Pitt and his 
successors sought every opportunity to harry the enemy within 
the borders of his greatly expanded dominion. Whenever 
Napoleon rested from his campaigns and turned his attention 
to domestic matters British agents on the Continent were 
ready to seize upon each sign of restiveness or rebellion in the 
conquered provinces. Coalitions or alliances, based on the 
promise of English help, were formed almost haphazardly 
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with any country or faction showing even the faintest hope 
of emerging as a real threat to French overlordship. 
More often than not these ''revolts'' would die a-borning 
before more than a token of English aid had arrived. Again 
and again the ally of yesterday would be forced to declare 
itself the enemy of today. Thus, for example, the Dutch, 
who had sought help in 1794 only to see British troops 
thrown from their soil, found themselves waging a naval 
war against England by 1797. When the French Royalists 
seized Toulon in 1793, they saw their hopes smashed by the 
departure of an English fleet which had no troops to land. 
Spain, destined to be rescued finally by Wellington, sent 
her fleet to battle Nelson at Cape St. Vincent. Austria and 
Russia, after a brief league with England, were soundly 
beaten at Austerlitz and made to declare themselves to be 
in a state of hostility with their former friend. 
The sequence of alliance and misalliance, moreover, had 
a double-pronged effect. On the one hand, it eventually 
caused London to doubt the real intention of the rebelling 
power. On the other, it created a fear, on the Continent, 
that a British alliance was tantamount to a kiss of death. 
By the mid-point of the long struggle the possibility of viable 
partnerships had become extremely slim. 
The uncertainty and confusion of the times were never 
more strikingly illustrated than in the case of the tripartite 
relations between England, Russia, and the Porte in the years 
1806-9. Russia had been England's best and surest ally during 
most of the conflict. Toward the end of the year 1807, how­
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ever, even she had been humbled, and the Peace of Tilsit 
had bound her to the Napoleonic cause. The English 
ambassador had been dismissed from St. Petersburg in Decem­
ber of that year and relations between the former allies had 
been broken. 
Unfortunately, at Russian behest, England had previously 
lent the force of its fleet to the perennial struggle of the czars 
against the Turks. Hostilities between the Czar Alexander I 
and the Sultan Selim III had arisen over a dispute regarding 
the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. 
These provinces were under the suzerainty of the Ottoman 
Sultan, but by earlier treaty arrangements between Russia and 
the Porte the Czar had certain rights respecting their adminis­
tration. In 1806, as Napoleon was maneuvering against the 
Russians, he had prevailed upon the Sultan to abrogate the 
existing arrangements. His machinations had the desired 
effect of drawing off Russian troops to occupy the provinces 
in question, thereby weakening the forces facing him in the 
field. England, in a desperate counterstroke to bolster her 
beleaguered Russian ally, had sent her Mediterranean fleet to 
Constantinople and had demanded that the Sultan adhere to 
the original treaty stipulations. The Turks, however, casting 
a wary eye at the obvious imbalance of power, had chosen to 
ignore the British gesture and to heed, instead, the more 
immediate threat from France. As a result, normal relations 
between London and the Porte had ceased, and the British 
ambassador had departed from Constantinople in 1807. After 
the Peace of Tilsit, then, England found herself in the 
 18 THE GREAT AMBASSADOR
paradoxical situation of being in a state of hostility both with 
Russia and with Turkey while they were in conflict with each 
other. Had it not been for the terrible consequences at stake 
the confusion might have been comical. 
The inanity of this position, and the uprising against 
the French on the Iberian peninsula with its promise of 
eventual land operations against Napoleon, spurred London 
into attempting a rapprochement with the Turks. With this 
end in view George Canning dispatched an able diplomat, 
Robert Adair, to Constantinople in mid-1808. Stratford 
Canning was sent along as secretary to Adair. 
The purpose of the Adair mission was to restore normal 
relations between the two countries, not only as an end 
desirable in its own right, but as a means of future security 
for the Turks as well. As the English Cabinet read the 
portents they felt certain that Napoleon's dreams of world 
empire did not countenance the continued existence of the 
Ottoman Empire once the rest of Europe was brought to 
heel. This concept Adair was instructed to impress upon 
the Porte with all possible vigor. 
By force of circumstance the journey to Constantinople was 
one of leisurely pace. Overland travel was, of course, com­
pletely interdicted; and the sea passage was a distance of 
almost three thousand miles. The voyage was subject, not 
only to the ordinary delays of weather and provisioning, but 
also to the necessity of awaiting naval protection. Although 
Napolean had no fleet in being, privateering was rampant, and 
the Mediterranean was swarming with seaborne scavengers of 
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all types. More than that, all available English seapower was 
concentrating in the harbors of Portugal and southern Spain. 
The British admirals were understandably loathe to spare the 
necessary convoy required for safe passage to the Bosporus. 
In spite of all the obstacles, however, the embassy set sail 
from Portsmouth early in July on board a thirty-gun frigate 
and made fair progress down the Atlantic. 
At Cadiz and again at Gibraltar they dallied for a time 
and listened to the rapidly unfolding plans for operations on 
the Peninsula, operations whose romance and glamor appealed 
to all the younger minds aboard and evoked in many a desire 
to stay and fight alongside their martial brothers. Stratford 
Canning was not immune to these emotions and was sorely 
tempted to quit the foolishness of Turkish diplomacy in 
favor of more direct participation in the struggle, but he had 
given his word and he stifled the temptation. 
The diplomats were delayed for another month at Palermo, 
and although the inaction was painful it was compensated for 
by new sights and wonders. No one so steeped in the classics 
as an old Etonian could fail to be moved by seeing with his 
own eyes the glories of Agrigento and Segesta, the temple of 
Minerva at Colonna, and a host of other places hallowed by 
lines of Virgil and Horace. Canning's letters home at this 
time are filled with literary and mythological allusions and 
bear eloquent testimony to his great joy. They reflect what 
were to be the last carefree days of his youth. 
Not until the latter part of October did the little fleet of a 
frigate and two brigs reach Tenedos and the approaches of 
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the Dardanelles. There they learned of the initial victory of 
British arms in Portugal and, slight though it was, they 
celebrated the news lustily, as Canning reported in a letter 
to his friend, Wellesley: " we are indebted to your 
gallant uncle for them [the victories] Our little fleet 
did honour to the occasion by making as much noise 
as their guns would permit, and so much was my patriotic 
ardour inflamed that I volunteered, in spite of wind, rain, 
thunder and lightning, to go up to the Dardanelles and put 
the Pasha there in mind of our conquests in Egypt by telling 
him how the French, all terrible as they are, had been drubbed 
in Portugal."1 
However, he had to postpone his gloating, for he had not 
yet learned the manner in which the Turks dealt with the 
infidels from the West. This initial approach to Ottoman 
officialdom got him no further than a meeting with the Pasha's 
Greek dragoman, or interpreter, whom he first described as 
a 'secretary." This individual's appalling ignorance of the 
world situation so irritated Canning that in the rash and 
intemperate exuberance of youth he informed the hapless 
fellow, upon failing to arouse his interest with the report of 
the victory over the French, that the British had undoubtedly 
bottled up the Russian fleet in the Tagus as well! Only then 
did he succeed in making the dragoman's eyes light up—tragic 
testimony, in Canning's mind, to the brute level of existence 
in the Sultan's domains. "Yes, the animal, insensible as he 
was," he observed in the same letter to Wellesley, "hated the 
Russians, because his masters the Turks hated them, . and 
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though there was nobody, as usual, standing by ready to 
bastinado him if his supple face did not exactly express what 
his master expected, yet so strong was the force of habit that 
he could not even in absence move a muscle otherwise than 
he would have done at the feet of the Pasha." 
The Turkey to which the Adair mission had come was, so 
far as law and administration were concerned, basically the 
same empire that had struck terror into the heart of Medieval 
and Renaissance Europe. It lacked only the virility and 
grandeur of that empire of Suleiman the Magnificent which 
had reached from Belgrade to the Persian Gulf, from Mesopo­
tamia to Tunis and Algiers. In the centuries following that 
zenith of glory the sultans had kept too close to the confines 
of the palace and the harem. By this time the vassals of the 
Sultan had become unruly and rebellious, his army almost 
nonexistent, and the administration corrupt. The lifeblood of 
the Empire was running out, and that it continued to exist 
at all was merely an accident of the times: the preoccupation 
of the European Powers with their own conflicts and their 
consequent inability to agree on its dissolution and partition. 
The hard core of former Ottoman power, the Corps of 
Janissaries, was now nothing more than a praetorian guard, 
self-seeking and dedicated to its own preservation, with no 
concern for the borders and frontiers of the Empire. 
The reigning Sultan, Mahmud II, held his throne only 
at the sufferance of these Janissaries. They had recently 
murdered his Grand Vezir, and he himself had come to the 
throne by violence shortly before that. Even during the time 
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the Adair mission was proceeding to its destination, there had 
been violence and bloodshed in the streets and environs of 
Constantinople. A palace revolt had destroyed the would-be 
reformer, Selim III, in May of 1807, and the Janissaries had 
placed the victim's cousin in power as Mustapha IV. Then 
an anti-Janissary coalition had, in turn, deposed Mustapha in 
July of 1808 in favor of his brother, Mahmud. The leader of 
this coalition had assumed the office of Grand Vezir and had 
attempted to resume the modernizing work of Selim III. 
A late resurgence of Janissary power ended in the death of 
the Vezir, however, and had there been another surviving 
male of the Ottoman dynasty Mahmud II would undoubtedly 
have lost his life as well. As things stood, the new Sultan had 
learned a vivid lesson of the dangers of reform or attempted 
reform.2 
In view of the turmoil and fear surrounding the throne 
and affecting all those near it, the British negotiators had no 
easy time making contact with the Porte. Haliki Pasha, the 
governor of the Dardanelles, eventually received the embassy 
because he needed the services of a European doctor, but for 
weeks they were refused permission to enter the Straits while 
Haliki listened and procrastinated as only a Turk could. 
Everything had to be referred to the capital, but no word 
ever returned. Only when the patience of the British emis­
saries was perceptibly near an end were they allowed to 
proceed some distance up the Straits where they were assigned 
a ramshackle, deserted villa of sorts as a residence. It appeared, 
however, that all the preliminaries they had gone through 
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outside the Straits were about to begin all over again in an 
attempt either to wear down their patience or to extract 
further concessions from them. Adair had decided, by this 
time, that the period for patience had come to an end. He 
was firmly convinced that the Turks wished to talk but were 
hoping that the British desire for negotiations would lead to 
greater than usual promises. This was the Porte's traditional 
method of bargaining: to vacillate until there was no hope of 
further concession. Over and above this barrier, the French 
envoy at the Porte was throwing every possible obstacle in the 
path of successful discussions. The French recognized full 
well the import of the mission. 
At length Adair sent a message to the Porte which stated 
that if no more progress were made he was under instructions 
to terminate his mission and withdraw. To back up the force 
of his words he ordered the captain of the ship to trim the 
vessel for sea. The sight of the British ship with sails unfurled 
and anchor drawn did the work of "twenty conferences,'' as 
Adair put it, and brought the Turkish plenipotentiaries to 
serious talk. Finally, on the fifth of January, 1809, the Treaty 
of the Dardanelles was signed. It restored peace between 
England and the Ottoman Empire. England recognized the 
inviolability of the Straits, and Turkey, for her part, withdrew 
the restrictions against British commerce, thus driving a wedge 
in Napoleon's continental embargo against England. 
This was Stratford Canning's first experience in dealing 
with the diseased Empire of the Sultan. From it he learned 
a first principle of Ottoman diplomacy, namely, that the Turks 
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would delay decision for as long as the other party would 
tolerate delay, and that they respected people dealing from a 
position of strength far more than they respected those imbued 
with tolerance and good will. 
His first impressions of the Turks were, accordingly, hardly 
calculated to engender feelings of sympathy toward their 
lot: a sickness which he ascribed to their own faults. In a 
summary of his views which he wrote to George Canning 
in the spring of 1809, he paid tribute to the personal qualities 
of the people as a whole. As for the leadership, he wrote, 
"But the government is radically bad, and its members, who 
are all alive to its defects, have neither the wisdom nor the 
courage to reform it. The few who have courage equal to 
the task know not how to reconcile reformation with the 
prejudices of the people. And without this nothing can be 
affected." And his prophecy follows: "Destruction will not 
come upon this empire either from the north or from the 
south; it is rotten at the heart; the seat of corruption is in the 
government itself."3 
It was the perceptiveness revealed in letters such as this, 
combined with the fine reports of his superior, that was 
thwarting his ambition for public service at home. The 
Foreign Office did not have an endless reservoir of people 
well-equipped for diplomatic service, nor was it a simple 
matter to move them about when they were available—as 
witnessed by the slow progress to Constantinople of the 
Adair embassy. A young man who showed ability and 
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alertness was not going to be ignored by George Canning, 
especially not one to whom he felt a close personal tie. 
Stratford Canning was being marked for service. 
Immediately after mutual ratification of the treaty Adair 
was formally accredited as the Ambassador to the Sublime 
Porte, and Stratford Canning was certified as Secretary of 
the Embassy. Along with this certification came a latent com­
mission as Minister Plenipotentiary which was to take effect 
upon any prolonged absence of the Ambassador. In a private 
letter of July 30, 1809, accompanying this commission, George 
Canning made it abundantly clear that this was a merited 
reward and not in any way to be construed as a process of 
nepotism: "I have great pleasure in sending you your appoint­
ment of minister plenipotentiary; although I hope you may 
not soon have occasion to make use of it. I feel myself 
justified on public grounds in doing, what, on private grounds 
alone, you know me well enough to know I would not do, in 
your favour "4 
The Foreign Secretary's expressed hope that his young 
cousin would not be too soon thrust into a position of severe 
responsibility must be taken at face value, but it is not 
presuming too much to suppose that he did see that the 
probability of such an event was close at hand. The Court 
of Vienna was beginning to show signs of restiveness under 
the French yoke, and Adair was already in secret contact 
with agents in Vienna to ascertain the true nature of the 
stirrings. Were they to erupt with any real promise immediate 
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liaison would be in order, and Adair was the only diplomat 
of standing who could fill the demands of such immediacy. 
He would have to transfer to Vienna. 
If this pattern of the future was merely a probability in 
the view of George Canning, it had become a foregone con­
clusion to Adair himself. He had actually broached the matter 
to Stratford Canning as early as February or March before 
his formal accreditation as Ambassador to the Porte had taken 
effect. The Ambassador had apparently paid no heed to 
Canning's clear desire not to receive the appointment, for 
it was on Adair's recommendation, rather than George Can­
ning's preference, that the arrangement was made. Canning's 
reluctance was based on the grounds that such a develop­
ment would needlessly delay his own return home. 
Once the plan of succession, so to speak, was put into 
effect Canning had little choice but to acquiesce in the 
judgment of his cousin and the constant urging of his imme­
diate superior. Nor, once the fait accompli was accepted, 
is it surprising that his reluctance over the agreement gradually 
changed to a feeling of anticipation, especially when the 
hoped-for Austrian uprising actually occurred. He stated his 
reaction with disengaging frankness in his memoirs: "Young 
as I was I could not be insensible to a prospect at once so 
near and so flattering, nor does it surprize me even now that 
when the promised land proved to be a mirage, some feelings 
of personal disappointment mingled with those of sorrow for 
the down-dashed fabric of European delivery and British 
glorification."5 
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The mirage referred to was the swift and terrible French 
reaction. Napoleon smashed the Austrians at Wagram and 
then forced upon them the humiliation of Schonbrunn. Not 
only did the Hapsburgs have to recognize the hegemony of 
Bonaparte but, in addition, they had to turn over to him as 
his empress the Princess Maria Louisa, one of their fairest 
daughters. 
This catastrophic turn of events actually proved to be a 
blessing in disguise as far as the subsequent career of Stratford 
Canning is concerned. Had the fortunes of war developed 
in favor of England at this time they would have undoubtedly 
led to the earlier downfall of Napoleon, and in the subsequent 
return to peace Canning could not have looked for anything 
but relegation to a rank more befitting his age and experience. 
As it turned out, the new setback cemented the position of 
Bonaparte ever more firmly, kept Russia in a proper state of 
fear and subjection, and isolated England that much more 
completely. 
The Austrian defeat also resulted in Adair's continued 
residence in Constantinople, but the shock and tragedy of it 
all weakened his health considerably. It was not long before 
he begged to be relieved of his post. 
A further tragedy followed in the wake of the Austrian 
fiasco, and it was one which affected the personal fortunes of 
Stratford Canning most intimately. The rivalry in the Cabinet 
between George Canning and Castlereagh, the Minister for 
War, exploded in a volcanic eruption of blame and recrimi­
nation culminating in a predawn duel between the two in 
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which Canning was wounded. T h e volatile Foreign Minister 
submitted his resignation to the Prime Minister, the Duke of 
Portland, and it was accepted as the only solution to the 
ministerial impasse. 
It must be remembered that the lapse of time between the 
occurrence of events in England and the advent of the news 
in Constantinople was considerable, encompassing a period 
of two months or more. W h e n a similar period is allowed for 
a return of mail from that remote corner to London, one can 
see that it often required a third of a year, at least, merely 
for an exchange of views. As a consequence, attitudes and 
judgments which had a basis in reality when committed to 
writing were oftentimes reduced to the level of moot questions 
by the time they reached their destination. Stratford Canning's 
acceptance of his ministerial commission, for example, and his 
mental adjustment to the eventual departure of Adair were 
founded largely, if not wholly, on the presumption that a 
friendly and guiding hand would be at the helm of the 
Foreign Office. Scarcely had he resigned himself to the whole 
design when, as a matter of fact, George Canning was 
actually out of office and a radical alteration of circumstances 
had taken place. 
T h e deposed Foreign Minister, though, was by no means 
blind to the disastrous consequences which this bewildering 
upheaval could have for his protege, and his first thoughts 
were for the budding diplomatist at the Porte. By personal 
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letter and by marshaling the assistance of his nephew's friends 
at the Foreign Office and elsewhere, he contrived to shower 
a veritable rain of appeals upon Constantinople importuning 
Canning to be neither rash nor romantic, but to stay where 
he was and do the duty England required of him. As much 
as the youth was enamored of a parliamentary career, just so 
much was the seasoned M.P. aware of its merciless uncer­
tainties; and he sent what he called his 'most positive 
injunctions'' to the other to remain where he was. "I may 
or may not, he advised his nephew, "have it in my power 
at some future time to take you by the hand again. If not, 
you have a profession in which you may be useful to your 
country and do credit to your friends and to yourself, and 
you must not lightly abandon it." 6 
Stratford Canning's response to these pleas proves that 
they had their effect, but they also reveal the reluctance with 
which he yielded to them against his own desires and also 
in the face of some obvious disadvantages of a more practical 
nature. His final letter on the affair bears extensive quoting 
for the picture as he saw it. He wrote to George Canning on 
the eighth of January, 1810: 
I have at length had the satisfaction of receiving your 
two letters of 9 and 20 October last. They reached me on 
the 23rd ultimo [December], together with a large packet 
from Planta containing a full account of the late eventful 
history in which you have had so large a share. You will 
THE GREAT AMBASSADOR 30 
have perceived by my last letter of 14 Novr. that we had 
long been in possession of the principal facts, without 
knowing that they were correct 
You did me but justice to suppose that the first impulse 
of my heart, upon learning the circumstances of your resig­
nation, would be to give up the employment which I 
received at your hands. Not that I could so far forget my 
duty as to run away from my post without permission; but, 
had you left me to myself, I should have lost no time in 
writing for leave to return to Enaland: not as an act of 
flattery by which I might claim merit in your eyes; but 
merely to gratify my own feelings by doing my utmost to 
testify the opinion which I entertain of the late events. 
In this instance your injunctions have a right to out­
weigh my own feelings. Therefore as you have advised me 
in such decided terms to prolong my stay here, I have no 
intention but to follow that advice, as far at least as acquies­
cence in it is consistent with the end for which I understand 
you to have given it. That end cannot be any other but my 
interest. Now though it is certainly my interest not to 
offend your successor by betraying any unwillingness to 
serve under his directions, I think you will agree with me 
that it is very far from being to my advantage to remain 
here after I shall have once secured the rank of minister 
plenipotentiary by actual service in that situation. I will not 
dwell upon the disadvantage of being for so long a period 
thrown out of all society and cut off from my friends of 
my own age at the very time of life when alone by habits 
of intimacy and continual intercourse the most useful con­
nexions are formed and strengthened; nor upon the peculiar 
state of this Court, which presents to a foreign minister no 
one compensation for the numberless causes of inconven­
ience and disgust by which he is hourly overwhelmed. 
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There is another circumstance which you may not be 
aware of, that makes it impossible for me to reside here, 
even should I be permitted to do so. The expenses of this 
Mission are so great that Mr. Adair finds even the appoint­
ments of Ambassador insufficient to the support of them. 
They are besides of such a nature, so indispensable, so 
permanent, and so little dependent upon the will of the 
Minister, that I almost despair of being able to reduce 
them materially below their present mark. To bring them 
within the allowance of a minister plenipotentiary is out 
of the question. I shall in consequence be obliged either 
to incur private debts to a considerable amount, or to have 
recourse to the unpleasant expedient of drawing largely 
upon Government for extraordinary expenses. Will it not 
therefore be most prudent for me to get away from this 
place as soon as I can do so, without appearing to withdraw 
myself abruptly from the service of the Government? With 
this view I will stay here quietly till Mr- Adair goes; after 
his departure, which will probably be about the end of 
February, I will take an early opportunity of writing for 
permission to return to England simply on the score of 
health. I venture to persuade myself that you will 
not disapprove of the conduct I propose to adopt, which 
though not in exact conformity to the letter of your injunc­
tions as I believe most strictly so to the spirit of them 
I shall be very anxious until I am assured by your own 
words that you are contented with the manner in which 
I intend to act.7 
Canning's assessment of this very practical problem indi­
cates that even at this time he was anything but a dreamy-
eyed youth. Later on in that same year he alluded briefly, but 
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cleverly, to the same idea; but this time he was writing to 
Richard Wellesley, whose father had succeeded George Can­
ning at the Foreign Office! With a touch of good-humored 
envy he first contrasted his own lot with that of his friend 
who was about to take a seat in Parliament: 
I shall, for the present, abstain from reproaching you 
for not having acknowledged a lengthy epistle which I sent 
to you many months ago Indeed I can readily excuse 
you, when I consider how much your thoughts must have 
been occupied by the immediate prospect of going into 
Parliament . I, too, after four months of anxiety and 
putting off, am in the act of passing into a state of responsi­
bility, which one can hardly do in times like these without 
certain feelings of apprehension. Mr. Adair has been de­
tained here since the end of February by several 
unexpected events. His departure is now fixed for the 
middle of next week [July 12, 1810], and then my diplo­
matic labours will begin in earnest. How long they are to 
last, I know not: that depends upon the noble Marquis your 
father. But I most sincerely hope not very long, at least 
in this part of the world. This climate has made several 
rude assaults upon my health . . one of the advantages 
of this place is that there is not a physician in it above the 
rank of dog-doctor. Another is that the expenses of the 
Mission are enough to ruin a much richer man than I 
am . I thank you for your wish that I could meet 
you in the House of Commons; perhaps the day may come; 
I am disposed to hope it.8 
A few days after writing this letter he escorted Robert 
Adair to the water's edge and bid him a fond goodbye. So it 
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was that by a convergence of factors almost entirely beyond 
his own control, and in spite of his own desires, Stratford 
Canning's diplomatic career was born. He had no inkling of 
how long that life would be. On July 12, 1810, he remained 
alone in Constantinople. At the age of twenty-three he was 
"the voice of England in the East."9 
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Ill

THERE are few men who could long have weathered the 
dismal and tragic atmosphere that enveloped the new British 
Minister at the Sublime Porte. England was at war, nomi­
nally, with every nation within the sweep of a French bayonet. 
Her king, George III, had lapsed into his final madness; the 
Prince Regent and his royal brothers were a disgrace to the 
Crown and to the nation; her finances were nearing their end 
and her commerce gasping for life. In Portugal Wellington's 
holding action made him seem more a victor than he was, 
for he could do nought but maneuver for position and hus­
band what, in his own words, was "the last army England 
has.1' This tenuous English grasp on the continent plus a 
lingering friendship with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
were scarcely any more of a domain than the infinitesimal 
area of the British Embassy at the Porte ruled over by 
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His Excellency, the Minister Plenipotentiary, Mr. Stratford 
Canning. 
As if to dramatize the stark isolation of his country the 
British Minister had also to face the bleak conditions sur­
rounding him in Constantinople. The Christian suburb of 
Pera, wherein the "palace" of the British Embassy was located, 
had shortly before been ravaged and gutted by fire. The 
Embassy building itself was of stone and had withstood the 
flames, but its outbuildings were gone, and it stood naked 
and alone amid a landscape of destruction. Stratford was 
shunned by all but a handful of the foreign diplomatic society 
and virtually ignored by the Turks. His secretary and friend, 
David Morier, a stripling of his own age, was often far 
removed on necessary business of state in Persia or Meso­
potamia or elsewhere in the myriad corners of the Levant, 
thus depriving him of the companionship and friendly conver­
sation that might have compensated somewhat for all the rest. 
If in spite of all this he might have looked forward to at 
least a regular flow of dispatches and counsel from his su­
periors at home, he could have accepted the situation as being 
part of the fortunes of war. Even here an unfortunate chasm 
had developed between Whitehall and the Embassy at the 
Porte. Lord Wellesley seldom seemed to think of the plight 
and need of his subordinate in the East, and the young 
Minister was singularly devoid of instructions and guidance. 
While it may be reasoned that London, with all its problems 
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in Europe, the Americas, and India, saw no occasion for high-
level diplomacy in the Levant, there were, nevertheless, 
countless daily problems which obstructed the work of its 
only major outpost in the East. 
" I was thereby empowered for the time being to act 
with full authority on behalf of my government," Canning 
inscribed in his memoirs. "The instructions under which I 
had to act were simply those addressed to the late ambassador, 
in so far as they remained in vigour. They could not of 
course be followed without due attention to fresh experience 
and change of circumstances. No provision had been made 
in them for my particular guidance when left alone, and it 
is remarkable that during the whole term of my independent 
service, I received no further directions on any but the most 
ordinary matters. This is the more strange as our Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Lord Wellesley, enjoyed so high a reputa­
tion for talent and activity. To the best of my remembrance 
the most important despatch addressed to me by him related 
to some manuscript copies of classical works supposed to have 
been stored away in the Seraglio. I concluded that the great 
man overlooked so insignificant a youth as myself 
Whatever may have been the cause of this apparent neglect, 
I thought it the more incumbent on me to shun no responsi­
bility which the exercise of an unshackled judgment might 
entail if I ventured in urgent cases to steer rather by the 
stars than by compass. The electric telegraph had no existence 
in those days. Steam had not been practically applied to 
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navigation our despatches came as they went, by 
sea In one instance no official communication reached 
me in the space of fifteen weeks.'' 
"A correspondence," he noted with regard to his responsi­
bilities, more occasional than regular had to be kept up with 
various points. Our consuls in the Levant were not so numer­
ous as they are now, but their dependence on the Embassy 
was greater. They had to report on passing occurrences, to 
transmit intelligence from quarters more remote, and to 
receive instructions from the ambassador, or his substitute 
Communications were to be carried on with our 
admiral in the Mediterranean, with his delegate in the 
Archipelago, with the governor of Malta, and with the com­
mander of our troops in the Ionian islands. I had also to 
feed a correspondence with Vienna and Petersburg through 
such by-channels as might still be used in secret for mutual 
information."1 
Almost all of the news that reached London from the 
eastern part of Europe and the Levant filtered through the 
listening post at Constantinople. The failure to maintain 
better liaison is inexplicable, unless it be laid to stupidity, as 
it probably deserves to be. In response to one urgent query, 
for example, the best that London could give in reply was 
an earnest plea to all its foreign service posts that the per­
sonnel use larger and better envelopes to enclose their reports! 
Criminal and inexcusable as the desertion was, it never­
theless played a positive role in shaping the future of Stratford 
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Canning. In the first place, any thoughts he may have had 
of asking to be relieved were probably discarded by him as 
being futile. The time that would elapse before the requisite 
arrangements could be made would, in all probability, be 
about as long as would be required to produce a transfer or 
reassignment in accordance with ordinary procedure. At any 
rate, Canning seems to have left the matter to that. More 
importantly, the void forced him to develop his own talents 
at an unusual pace. Left to his own devices by his govern­
ment, cut off from his diplomatic colleagues by circumstance, 
slighted by the Turks because of his youth and the precarious 
position of his country, he was thrown back on the one cer­
tainty left to him: his unbroken faith in eventual English 
triumph. 
Building on this conviction, he was obliged to acquire 
habits of self-reliance and self-confidence in his judgments 
which, when joined to an alert, native intelligence, became 
the hallmarks of his career. With an ardor that older heads 
would quite likely ascribe to the imprudence of youth, he 
plunged more than once into situations and commitments a 
more experienced diplomat might have hesitated to engage in. 
Even in his first trials of diplomacy, he showed an ability to 
perceive the central problem, and he left nothing to chance 
in clarifying it or solving it in accordance with his own lights. 
He could be patient where patience was required, and it was 
often required to an almost limitless degree, but he could not 
be diverted. 
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Such clarity of mind and determination of will were sorely 
needed by anyone attempting to treat with the Turks of his 
era. As intimated above, the administration of the Ottoman 
Empire was an irritating mixture of medieval pride and fanati­
cism combined with moral no less than material weakness. Its 
sovereign, the Sultan, reigning with the borrowed prerogatives 
of the Caliphate, was unlimited by any law save the strictures 
of the Koran.2 Yet, for all his authority, he was bound to the 
cloister-like isolation of the Seraglio by immemorial custom 
and tradition. The daily administration of the Empire and its 
relations with the outside world were in the hands of the 
Divan, or Council of Ministers, headed by the Grand Vezir, 
the "alter ego' and prime minister of the monarch.3 As far 
as internal order was concerned, it was a government in name 
only, since it had little authority outside the environs of the 
capital. Local government was in the hands of the provincial 
rulers—the pashas and beys—while a great number of feudal 
landlords, the derebeys, were as sacrosanct in their own 
domains as independent princes.4 
"The old political system of Turkey had worn itself out," 
the new British minister observed. "A depreciated currency, 
a disordered revenue, a mutinous militia, dilapidated for­
tresses, a decreasing population, a stagnant industry, and 
general misrule, were the monuments which time had left 
of Ottoman domination The tottering empire was 
beset from without and from within: Russia, France, Austria, 
and even Persia had by turns contracted the area and drained 
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the resources of the empire. From the corrupt monotony of 
his seraglio the Sultan had to send forth his firmans, his 
emissaries, his bands of irregular soldiery, or, it might be, his 
naval armaments, against an invading enemy, a rebellious 
chief, or an armed insurrection. Several great families, several 
unsubdued tribes, and here and there an over-powerful pasha 
had succeeded in braving and circumscribing the imperial 
authority. The Mamelukes still prevailed in Egypt. The most 
important part of Syria was under the sway of a Christian 
Emir. Ali Pasha of Janina exercised royal power in the 
provinces bordering on Greece, and Greece itself, excited by 
Russia, was preparing to burst the fetters Servia, 
Montenegro, and the Danubian Principalities were all more 
or less in league with Russia, and the Porte, at war with that 
formidable Power, had everything to apprehend from the 
Russian forces concentrated upon her northern frontier. The 
Sultan's fleet was manned with Christian Greeks from the 
island population of the Archipelago; the Barbary powers were 
scarcely even in nominal dependence on the Porte "5 
Small wonder, then, that an empire so constituted was 
arrogant toward the weak, and obsequious toward the strong, 
that the young English effendi bore little weight and was 
accorded little respect in contrast with his French counterpart. 
Small wonder, too, that his overtures were greeted with 
patronizing smiles, his representations received with perfunc­
tory nods, and that in one audience with the Reis Effendi 
(the Foreign Minister) he was told to lower his voice. 
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Canning had found ample reason to raise his voice. He 
had come to the Reis Effendi on this particular occasion to 
demand redress for a clear violation of neutrality which the 
Porte was indulgently tolerating to the detriment of English 
commerce. The eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean waters 
were swarming not only with French-commissioned privateers 
but with pirates of all creeds and nationalities. Again and 
again these maritime scavengers sallied forth from the protec­
tion of an island or harbor—and there were hundreds of such 
hiding places available—to pounce upon some helpless and 
unsuspecting British merchantman. They would seize the 
ship and bring her back to port, where the cargo, and some­
times the ship itself, would be sold or otherwise disposed of— 
all without benefit of admiralty court and in complete disre­
gard of the recognized law of nations. 
Privateering, of course, as distinct from piracy, was a recog­
nized and legal instrument of war. The disposition of the 
prizes in a neutral port, however, and the usage of neutral 
ports as bases of attack and havens of protection against retali­
ation and recapture of prizes was not legal. It was clearly 
incumbent on the neutral power to take measures sufficient 
to insure legal procedure on the part of the belligerents. 
Hardly a week went by without the report of some viola­
tion, some depredation of British property, reaching Stratford 
Canning's ears. 
Almost immediately on his accession to the position of 
authority at the Embassy he made his first approaches on the 
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question, respectfully calling the attention of the Porte to the 
existence of such violations and seeking a cessation. The 
protocol of the Ottoman court, it is well to note, was not 
devised to facilitate the approach of an envoy to the proper 
ministers of government. All ordinary business had to be 
transacted through the agency of an interpreter, or dragoman, 
who had to be personally acceptable at the Seraglio and at 
the Porte, as well as to the particular foreign government in 
whose employ he functioned. These dragomans, or go­
betweens, were really a privileged caste in the capital. They 
were invariably either Greeks or Italians whose forebears had 
long lived within the confines of the Golden Horn. Originally 
the institution had served as a most wonderful instrument, 
a compromise between Moslem hauteur and the demands of 
international intercourse. 
Theoretically, a Moslem could never treat with an infidel— 
the despised giaour—as an equal; yet it was necessary to find 
some method of dealing with the European monarchies, espe­
cially as Ottoman power began to decline relative to the 
strength of the Western nations. The dragoman was the ideal 
answer. He could bring the messages of his masters to the 
court of the Sultan where, as circumstance and Ottoman 
dignity required, he could be abused—even killed in some 
cases—or, depending on the favors sought from his employers, 
he might be treated most handsomely—all this, of course, 
without detriment to the dignity of either side. The extreme 
harshness had largely disappeared by Stratford Canning's day, 
but the theory remained. For all practical purposes the system 
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had become a most admirable means of vacillation and pro­
crastination for the hard-pressed Turks. The endless possi­
bilities for using up time in sending the dragoman back and 
forth from embassy to Porte with official exchanges, while a 
word was changed here or a phrase deleted there, was a 
method they found most appealing. Add to this the necessity 
of securing appointments and arranging audiences and one 
can form some idea of the amount of patience required of an 
eighteenth- or nineteenth-century diplomat in Constantinople. 
This was the sole medium of communication open to 
Stratford Canning while almost daily British ships were being 
seized, British wealth was being consumed, and, in some 
flagrant instances, whole crews were disappearing into ap­
parent slavery. The situation was similar to that faced by 
the Americans in the matter of the Barbary pirates; but 
British affairs were not simple enough to allow the same 
kind of direct reaction. Canning was limited to the time-
honored mode of Ottoman procedure. Only when the end 
of negotiations was in sight or when the direst emergency 
had arisen was it permissible for the foreign envoy, be he 
ambassador or minister, to seek a personal meeting with the 
Reis Effendi. Even more difficult were the opportunities of 
contact with the Grand Vezir, and never was the Sultan 
himself violated by the presence of so lowly a being except 
for formal audiences of presentation or leave-taking. 
To most outsiders and casual visitors the sytsem was banal, 
corrupt, and totally suspect. Corruption there certainly was, 
but the practice had many advantages, not the least of which, 
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as Canning was to discover, was that the delay and evasion 
occasioned hy it could become a two-edged sword, to be 
employed by its intended victim as well as by its instigators. 
He was to avail himself of the opportunity often in the years 
to come. Then, too, the casual observer often lost sight of one 
other important aspect: the institution had become a matter 
of family tradition and pride. The individual dragoman had 
found himself bound by a proud code. He was aware that a 
reputation for honesty brought longer life and, eventually, 
greater wealth than chicanery and bribery; Moslem and 
Christian alike could be fooled—but not often. 
Thus began the long and honorable association between 
Stratford Canning and the Pisani brothers, Frederick and 
Stephen, sons of an old and respectable family. They served 
through long years as his chief dragomans, and never once 
did he suspect them of misrepresenting his position to the 
Porte. Soften his words they might, or postpone the delivery 
of an insult to either side, as they saw fit, but never did they 
alter the real substance of his notes to the Porte nor of the 
replies sent back to him through them. 
It was through Frederick Pisani that the British Minister 
began the protracted negotiations leading to an amelioration 
of the distressing conditions afflicting British commerce in the 
Levant. They were to occupy a period of almost two years. 
A journal which Canning kept of the proceedings reveals the 
uninterrupted series of notes, memoranda, protests, etc., he 
directed to the Reis Effendi, one Buyuklu Oglu Mustapha, 
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whom he describes variously as "ignorant," "obstinate,'' ''nega­
tive, " among other such terms of esteem. 
As early as December, 1810, when it was apparent to him 
that only a display of real intent on the part of the English 
could win the necessary respect from the Turks, he presumed 
to request the commander of the British Mediterranean fleet 
to send additional patrol vessels into the waters of the Archi­
pelago. Stratford further suggested that these ships should 
operate under orders to retaliate in kind against the enemy. 
In making the request the young Minister manifested his own 
realization that he was not battling against Turkish obstinacy 
alone but also against French intimidation at the Porte. His 
opposite number in the French Embassy was being just as 
insistent that the Turkish government take no action to inter­
fere with the operations of French privateers, under threat 
of offending the Emperor Napoleon who stood far more 
prepared to exercise a restraining influence on the Sultan 
than did the embattled English. 
The admiral at Malta courteously side-stepped this first 
move of Canning's by pleading lack of instructions from the 
Admiralty and his current inability to spare more ships than 
those already operating in the theater. Rebuffed but not 
dismayed, Stratford turned again to diplomacy. He spent 
more months in discussion but accomplished little besides 
evoking expressions of regret and promises of redress. Finally 
he began to seek personal audiences, in which he did raise 
his voice, and in no uncertain terms. When this, too, met 
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with little response—other than being told to lower his voice 
and not to allow his face to become so red—he reverted to the 
more direct diplomacy of a show of force. Instead of approach­
ing Malta on the question, he sent an order directly to the 
local British commander in the Aegean. Fortunately, that 
individual was also at the end of his patience, and at the 
Minister's direction (the order was sent, incidentally, on the 
eve of Canning's twenty-fifth birthday, November 3, 1811) 
he entered the harbor of Napoli di Romania and exchanged 
fire with a French privateer. The English were serving notice 
that the three-mile limit which was protecting the illegal 
traffic would not be indefinitely honored, not when it was 
being unilaterally observed in favor of the French. 
Characteristically, this action made the Turkish ministers 
sit upright on their cushions and regard this impertinent 
youth with something more than the curiosity they had here­
tofore granted him. Though it did not end the problem 
immediately, the beginning of the end was in sight. The 
first exercise of his own judgment in a delicate issue proved 
to be a success. The outcome crystallized his self-confidence, 
more than all the counsel and guidance he ought to have 
been receiving could ever have done. 
The determination he showed here was not the sole reason 
for the Turkish change of heart. Far more than he realized, 
they were beginning to count on him in another and far more 
important matter. They wanted him to continue a course of 
action which they knew he had initiated, one much more to 
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their liking and in their interest, and so they made moves 
to satisfy him on the issue of neutrality. At any rate, an 
appropriate firman was issued outlawing the offending prac­
tice. British merchant captains at least had an argument to 
present to Turkish officials, and British warships could de­
mand the assistance of local authorities in righting illegalities. 
1. Lane-Poole, op. cit., I, 91-93. 
2. The precise nature of the Ottoman Sultan's title and claim to the 
Caliphate is a matter of some difficulty, traceable, in the main, to the fact 
that there is no exact counterpart in Western civilization. In discussing 
the ideal concept of Islamic society, Wilfred Cantwell Smith points out: 
"The underlying notion is of
 a society in motion. In relation to this the 
individual must not get out of step, must not turn deviationist; while 
group leadership is responsible for seeing that the whole venture knows 
and follows the right direction. In order that it know there is the body 
of ulama, the mufti (the religious scholars); in order that it follow, there 
is, ideally, the khilafah (imamah) [caliphate]" (Islam in Modern History 
[Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957], pp. 20-21). 
Historically this leadership which pointed the way to follow was vested 
in elected successors of the Prophet. The Caliph was the leader of the 
muslim ("the followers"). In a short time he became the leader of the 
Islamic state with the initiation of Moslem "'empire," first under the 
Ommayad, and then under the Abbasid Caliphates. The succession of 
factional disputes in the years following Mohammed's death soon brought 
about the demise of the elective principle and the gradual substitution, 
early in the Abbasid dynasty, of the Byzantine principle of hereditary 
succession. This tendency had begun under the Ommayads, and resistance 
to it actually paved the way for Abbasid power; but soon the Abbasids 
themselves turned to the practice. "In an adroit propaganda campaign 
throughout Islam the Abbasids posed as the champion of each disgruntled 
group, thereby benefitting from the shifting sands of Arab politics and 
establishing themselves as the royal family in possession of the Caliphate" 
(S. N. Fisher, The Middle East [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959], 
p. 83). The original Caliphates, however, had the benefit of being able 
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to claim either 1 blood tie with the Prophet or a lineal succession from 
one of his immediate disciples. 
By the time the Ottoman Turks established their hegemony over the 
Middle East the last vestiges of the Abbasid Caliphate existed in a weak 
claimant to the hereditary title, the Caliph al-Mutawkkil. He was im­
prisoned by Selim I and later permitted to return to Cairo, where he died, 
in the middle of the sixteenth century. "It has been claimed," Fisher 
notes Cop. cit., p. 206), "that he transferred his caliphal authority to the 
Ottoman ruling family before he departed; and in later years the Ottoman 
sultans based their use of the title of caliph and the exercise of its power 
on this incident." Historians differ on when the Sultans began to claim 
or exercise the prerogatives of the Caliphate. The question is not pertinent 
here for we are concerned not with the theoretical aspect of the title but 
rather with the de facto situation that existed when Stratford Canning 
began his career at the Porte. Even Bailey, who disputes the connection 
between the Sultanate and the Caliphate, admits that "Traditionally, then, 
the Sultans did possess the power of the ancient caliphs in addition to 
that which they claimed as head of the Ruling Instituiton" (op. cit., 
p. 21). In the nineteenth century, then, it was commonly accepted in 
the West that the Sultan was also the Caliph. Hence Stratford Canning 
could write as late as 1880, "Caliph as well as sovereign, he commands 
the consciences as well as the persons of his Mahometan subjects" (The 
Eastern Question [London: John Murray, 1881]). 
What was the origin of this Western misconception? Toynbee gives a 
satisfactory explanation within an extended discussion of the Caliphate 
(op. cit., VII, 11-27). He quotes Sir T. W. Arnold, The Caliphate 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924) as follows: "This confusion was due 
to the misinterpretation of both the history and theory of the Caliphate 
by insufficiently instructed Western observers, who drew a false analogy 
between an Islamic institution which they failed to understand and a 
Western institution with which they were familiar. They equated the 
Caliphate with the Papacy; explained it as a 'spiritual' office in the 
Western sense (an abstraction which was quite foreign to Islamic thought); 
assumed that the double title of Sultan-Caliph implied a personal union 
of the 'spiritual' and 'temporal' powers in the Ottoman Padishah . . . 
Their error obtained wide currency in the West (except among scholars 
without influence in international affairs) and even among Muslims who 
had received a Modern Western in place of a Classical Islamic education." 
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Faced with continual contraction of their political sovereignty the Ottoman 
Sultans found their "spiritual" sovereignty a source of additional strength 
vis-a-vis the Western powers and hence did nothing to upset the idea. So 
successfully did they exploit this mistaken concept, even among their own 
people, that the revolutionary government of Mustapha Kemal, when it 
abolished the political entity of the Sultanate on November I, 1922, saw 
fit to declare in the same law that the office of the Caliphate (the spiritual 
office) still resided in the house of Osmanli and elected a member of that 
house to the office. When the office of Caliph was finally abolished in 
1924, there were severe repercussions throughout the Moslem world. Thus 
had the original Western mistake come full circle! 
3. For a good, concise description of the governmental organization of 
the Ottoman Empire, cf. Fisher, op. dt., pp. 209-17, and Bailey, op. cit., 
pp. 10-13. The center of power was the Sultan who reigned in his palace 
or Seraglio. Of almost equal importance (and at times more, depending 
on the character of the monarch) was the Sublime Porte, or government 
building presided over by the Grand Vezir and other ministers. Here 
met the Council, or Divan, which was variously expanded to include lower 
officials—both civil and religious—as occasion warranted. When it was so 
expanded it was called simply the Council. 
4. Cf. Bailey, op. cit., pp. 13-16; see also C. W. Crawley, The Question 
of Greek Independence (London: Cambridge University Press, 1930), 
Appendix VI(d), for » table showing in great detail the administrative 
organization of the Ottoman Empire both in the capital and in the prov­
inces. Note also that Crawley shows the Sultan-Caliph at the apex (see 
note 2 of this chapter). 
5. Lane-Poole, op. cit., I, 49-50. 
IV

ALL during the time in which he had been occupied with 
the vexations of Aegean piracy, Stratford Canning felt that 
he was doing no more than his obvious duty. If the repre­
sentatives of His Majesty's Government could not lift a finger 
to protect the basic rights of English commerce, there would 
be little value, in his opinion, to their functioning in any way 
whatsoever. Consequently, the forthright stand he took on 
the matter did not appear to him to be either dramatic or 
remarkable. 
He also conceived it to be his duty to align his efforts at 
the Porte with the general outlines of British foreign policy. 
He was mindful of the fact that in dispatching the Adair 
mission in the first place, George Canning's intention had 
been not only to restore peace between London and the Porte, 
but to break, or at least weaken, the Franco-Russian entente. 




That the continued pursuit of their mutual goals would 
inevitably bring Napoleon and the Czar into conflict in 
the East was obvious to every European statesman. Bona-
parte's dream of becoming a latter-day Alexander the Great 
was in direct opposition to the Russian goal of restoring a 
Christian Empire of the East with the Romanov eagle perched 
above the waters of the Bosporus. England's best interests lay 
in hastening the collision. 
Ambassador Adair, therefore, had been instructed to point 
out to the Turks the malevolent designs of each of the two 
great continental powers. As the lesser of two evils, he was 
to urge peace with Russia, based on the grounds that even 
if the Sultan were to find himself capable of holding off the 
Russians for the time being, his forces would be so weakened 
that they would fall an easy prey to the Corsican, who was 
a danger either as friend or foe. 
Turkey, however, was just as suspicious of Russian "friend­
ship" as England wanted her to be of a French partnership. 
In order to counter these Turkish fears of her northern 
neighbor, Adair's first hope had been to construct a tripartite 
alliance between Austria, England, and Turkey. A restored 
and strengthened Austria would have been a sufficient guar­
antee against further Russian incursions along the Danube. 
The Porte, then, could make peace with Russia under the 
protection of that coalition. That hope, of course, was wrecked 
by the Treaty of Schonbrunn, and when both Adair and 
George Canning were shordy thereafter removed from the 
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active scene, their plans were evidently consigned to the 
archives of the Foreign Office. The English Cabinet appar­
ently expected to be able to accomplish nothing along those 
lines, for they would surely have replaced Adair with a 
seasoned diplomat. 
The London ministry, however, was not considering the 
statesman-to-be who had stepped into Adair's shoes. Stratford 
Canning assumed, since he had no notice to the contrary, 
that he was in turn bound by the instructions given to his 
former superior. The mutual benefits that peace would bring, 
moreover, to Turk and Russian alike, made the immediate 
pursuance of that objective appear even more logical. 
Indeed, the hoped-for falling out seemed to have already 
begun. Hard upon the heels of Schonbrunn had come the 
whispers and rumors of French designs upon Russia. The 
catapulting of the sometime-sergeant Bernadotte to the line 
of succession to the throne of Sweden had made Czar Alex­
ander take hard notice of his "ally's" intentions. Neither did 
the preference of an Austrian archduchess over a Romanov 
candidate for the Empress of the French serve to endear 
Napoleon to the Czar. Finally, the plans announced by 
Napoleon for Poland seemed an undue invasion of the 
Russian sphere of influence. All in all, it was becoming 
increasingly clear that the Russian troops deployed along the 
Danube would, in the near future, find far more important 
employment elsewhere. There appeared to be no better time 
for the Turks to look for an advantageous peace. 
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The British Minister to the Porte was soon to find out that 
logical analysis was not the same thing as judicious synthesis. 
However expedient peace might appear to a third party, the 
difficulty of overcoming national pride and prejudice, the 
tendency of each of the antagonists to hope that one more 
campaign would improve its bargaining position, and the 
mutual suspicion engendered by long years of conflict—all 
hindered a real exploration of the path to peace. The Turks, 
despite the weakness of their position, were obstinate, and 
the Divan was prone to magnify the slightest successful 
skirmish into a victory of momentous proportion. 
Notwithstanding this intransigence, Canning could at least 
talk to the Turks, whereas he had no official liaison with the 
Russian court. Further complications arose from the fact that 
Russian troops had made real progress in the campaign of 
1810. They had cemented their positions in the Principalities 
and were established in several places on the Turkish side of 
the Danube. The Czar and his ministers were understand­
ably loathe to give up the advantages thus obtained. As 181 o 
drew to a close, an impasse had resulted in the relative posi­
tions, with the Russians planted in Bulgaria but showing signs 
of being able to go no further and with the Turks unable to 
take to the offensive but dreaming of vast new levies appearing 
from nowhere in the spring. Mutual stubbornness was playing 
directly into Napoleon's hands. 
It was at this juncture that the twenty-three-year-old 
Canning decided to step into the picture more actively. He 
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had learned that Russian finances were straining under the 
double jeopardy of conducting a war against an avowed 
enemy, the Sultan Mahmud, and preparing at the same time 
to ward off the pending attack by an ostensible ally, the 
Emperor of the French. Stratford Canning's source of infor­
mation lay in the friendship he had established with the 
unofficial Neapolitan minister at the Porte, Count Ludolf. 
This diplomat was, naturally, in contact with the Duke of 
Sierra Capriola, the envoy of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
at St. Petersburg. Between them these gentlemen had con­
trived to let the Russian court know of the efforts being made 
by the British Minister at the Sublime Porte to convince the 
Turks to bring to an end what was becoming a ruinous drain 
on their feeble resources. In the same unofficial vein they 
were able to acquaint Canning, in December of 1810, with 
the Czar's intention of sending to Bucharest a representative 
empowered to function as plenipotentiary in any exchanges 
considered desirable by the Porte. The bid for Canning to 
try his hand at mediation was clear. It was to be followed 
by eighteen months of protracted and devious diplomacy. 
The privateering question, one must remember, had already 
been brought into the foreground, and Stratford Canning's 
seeming insolence had already rankled the Reis Effendi. 
When, on top of this, the young Englishman ventured to 
broach the matter of treating with the Russians, even to the 
point of making some concessions to them, it is no wonder 
that he was accused of being a czarist agent! The Porte even 
gave heed to French-inspired rumors that a secret treaty was 
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being drawn up between England and Russia by which 
Britannia would once again woo Muscovy at the expense of 
Turkey. The Reis Effendi went so far as to hint that the 
Sultan, if he could not expect English help against the 
Russians in the form of a naval demonstration in the Black 
Sea, might well turn to France and Austria for such help. 
Canning's reply to this form of pressure was as daring as 
it was masterful. He reminded Buyuklu Oglu Mustapha that 
British aid had been offered when Mr. Adair was on the 
scene but had been turned down by the Porte for fear of 
French reaction. He cautioned the Turks that they could not 
hope to treat with a victorious Bonaparte nearly so well as 
they could with a victorious Russia, a Russia held in restraint 
by the benevolent influence of England. In effect he disposed 
of the challenge by accepting it. 
This unlooked-for reaction had its desired effect, for al­
though the Reis Effendi remained cool toward Canning for 
some time, he nevertheless allowed the dragoman to report 
to the English envoy that the Sultan was sending a plenipo­
tentiary to the Turkish camp in the area about the mouth of 
the Danube. So by March 15, 1811, Monsieur Italinski, on 
behalf of Czar Alexander I, and Ghalib Effendi, representing 
Sultan Mahmud II, were physically near enough to each other 
that a meeting could be arranged as soon as one side could be 
induced to make the necessary approach. 
The battle was by no means over; it had just begun, and 
there would be many obstacles thrown in the path of the 
British Minister. In addition to the piracy issue, there were 
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incidents such as the disposition of the Spanish Embassy 
building. It had been seized by the French envoy, Maubourg, 
on behalf of a representative newly sent to the Porte in 
the name of King Joseph, the Bonaparte puppet in Spain. 
Canning protested violently to the Porte that this was an 
unjust usurpation of the property of the Spanish people and 
an affront to their English allies. His objections were so 
strongly worded and so vigorously entered that, once again, 
he was reminded to keep his voice lowered and his visage 
free of a ruddy wrath. T h e Turks were coming to know his 
temper but were not prepared to accept it at this early date. 
Quite to the contrary, the Reis Effendi threatened to ignore 
him and go over his head to London. Canning thereupon 
let this matter drop, and the action attests to his good sense 
and ability to distinguish essential from nonessential. The 
obvious prudence he demonstrated also gives the lie to allega­
tions made against him later on that he let his temper rule 
his reason. He was content to make his point against the 
illegality of the procedure and let the matter rest. 
This was not the only attempt that Maubourg made to 
frustrate Canning, for the Frenchman clearly foresaw the 
consequences that British mediation could have. Unlike 
Canning, however, Maubourg had constant guidance from 
his government. He could, and did, moreover, enlist the 
additional services of the Austrian internuncio at the Porte 
to thwart every move the young Englishman made. All 
through the negotiations Maubourg attempted to throw suspi­
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cion on the motives of England, and, more positively, he 
showered an endless series of alternating threats and promises 
upon the Porte and the Seraglio. 
Again and again Canning appealed, in vain, for some 
direction, some expression of confidence in its Minister by 
the London government in order to sustain his efforts. He 
kept Lord Wellesley completely informed as to his actions, 
but never received either commendation or disapproval. In 
desperation, at one point, he begged the Foreign Secretary to 
reprove him if he had gone too far.1 To all his pleas there 
came only silence or, at best, routine and irrelevant messages. 
Lane-Poole puts the total dispatches from London to Constan­
tinople at sixteen during the period from the summer of 181 o 
to the spring of 1812.2 None of them was pertinent. To 
counter personal letters of cajolery to the Porte from Napoleon 
himself, Canning had nought to offer but the warnings his 
own reason drew from the sad experiences of other govern­
ments who had been similarly trapped. Against the threats 
emanating from the proven might of France, he could place 
only the promise inherent in the minuscule successes of 
Wellington. 
In St. Petersburg, too, French diplomacy worked against 
him. Up to almost the very eve of the 1812 campaign there 
was always the real possibility of Franco-Russian rapproche­
ment as Napoleon sought to gain by trickery the ends for 
which he was preparing to wage war. The Russians did 
not know, however, the incessant pressure that a combined 
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Franco-Austrian approach was bringing to bear upon the 
Porte. An alliance between these powers and the Sultan 
against Russia looked very tempting to the harrassed Mahmud. 
Whi le Canning continued to warn the Porte against accept­
ing the destructive help of Napoleon, he turned his attention 
directly to the Russians. He communicated to Italinski, at 
Bucharest, and to St. Petersburg through the Duke of Sierra 
Capriola, advising them of the headway that Paris and Vienna 
were making in Constantinople. T h e danger of postponing 
peace was as serious for Russia as it was for the Porte, he 
pointed out, for in the event that Russian terms were too 
harsh the Turk would surely turn to the French. The British 
Minister sketched the terrifying picture of an unbroken front 
against Russia running from the Baltic to the Black Sea. By 
way of contrast he held out to the Russians the proposition 
that a peace with Turkey would speedily result in a peace 
and alliance with England. T h e letter to the Duke of Capriola 
fell under the eyes of Czar Alexander,3 and Italinski soon 
received instructions to cultivate and continue his correspond­
ence with the English representative at the Porte.4 
This happy development coincided with an outbreak of 
rebellion within the ranks of the Turkish army along the 
Danube (February-March, 1812). Ill-fed and unpaid, lacking 
spirit and patriotic fervor, the troops refused to go on the 
planned spring offensive. T h e Divan was in a state of near 
panic, and on the seventeenth of March the Grand Vezir 
was instructed to work for the conclusion of peace on the 
best terms possible. 
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The French and Austrian embassies made frantic, last-
minute attempts to divert the course of events. Napoleon 
hurried an ambassador extraordinary to the scene, and the 
Austrian internuncio proposed that an Austrian military mis­
sion be assigned to assist the Sultan's generals. Canning 
struggled to maintain his advantage in the face of each new 
thrust, desperately aware of the lack of help he had a right 
to expect. "I am very much in want of instructions," he 
pleaded in a message to Wellesley on the twenty-first of 
April. "Even the smallest communication direct from H.M. 
Government, if greater means cannot be employed would be 
of great service. The French are making every possible 
exertion. Courier upon courier arrives from Paris."5 
If his isolation had not been bad enough in itself, there 
was a new cloud on the horizon. He had heard months 
before that a new ambassador had been appointed to the 
Porte, but he had received no notification to that effect from 
the Foreign Office. Much as he desired to return home, he 
was now so deeply involved that he wished to carry the nego­
tiations through to the end. Yet he did not know from day 
to day whether he was still empowered to act, nor in whose 
name he was empowered. 
Unofficially he had been commissioned by the Turks to 
act for them in the approaches to the Russians. But he did 
not have their full confidence and trust because of the pre­
cipitate naval action he had ordered at Napoli di Romania the 
preceding November. They demanded that he submit every 
communication to them for prior approval. This he could not 
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do if he were to accomplish anything, for, as he put it in his 
memoirs, "I had to persuade the adverse parties."6 Matters of 
substance had to be phrased in different language to meet 
conflicting viewpoints, not to mislead but simply to clothe 
the same item in garments that would make it more pre­
sentable. In order to meet this difficult demand of the Turks, 
his work was doubled, for he now began to compose two sets 
of dispatches, one for submission to the Turkish ministers 
and one to send to the Russians at Bucharest. He had, too, 
to contrive to get this second set to the Russians by secret 
couriers, with all the attendant danger of that course of action. 
To complicate the whole business, before his last desperate 
appeal to Lord Wellesley had cleared Aegean waters, he 
received a notice from Viscount Castlereagh on May 1 which 
announced the latter's succession to Lord Wellesley as Foreign 
Secretary. To Castlereagh's great honor it must be stated the 
hostility he felt for George Canning was never transferred 
to Stratford, but certainly the initial shock of the announce­
ment must have been unnerving at the very least. 
In spite of everything Canning pushed doggedly ahead. 
Ignoring the rebuffs and taunts of the Reis Effendi, he worked 
more and more through Ghalib Effendi, the plenipotentiary. 
The Grand Army of Napoleon mobilized beyond the Vistula 
and drew near the Niemen. The fruits of Tilsit were in 
poisonous bloom. The Russians had been holding out to the 
last for annexation of the Danubian Principalities, hut they 
finally withdrew their claims in exchange for some minor 
concessions along the Asian boundaries of the two empires. 
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In Europe they accepted the river Pruth as the boundary, 
along with the right to guarantee autonomous administration 
of the Principalities, but the semi-independent provinces still 
remained under the suzerainty of the Sultan. 
The treaty, known as the Treaty of Bucharest, was signed 
in that city on the twenty-eighth of May, 1812. Historically, 
it was not definitive; the dispositions and arrangements it 
made have been modified many times since. Yet, when it was 
signed, and then ratified less than a month later, it freed the 
Russian armies under Chicagov from their Danubian sta­
tions. These were the forces which moved northward, hit 
the Grand Army on its flanks during the catastrophic retreat 
from Moscow, and finally broke it at the Beresina. Years 
afterward, the Duke of Wellington, mistakenly thinking he 
was paying tribute to his brother the Marquis of Wellesley, 
had this to say of the treaty he thought the latter had con­
cluded: "If the great statesman had never rendered to 
his own country or the world any other service his 
name would have gone down to posterity as the man who 
had foreseen and had afterwards seized the opportunity of 
rendering to the world the most important service that ever 
fell to the lot of any individual to perform."7 From the Czar 
of Russia the following message was sent to Lord Castlereagh: 
"The Emperor of Russia congratulates M. de Stratford Can­
ning for his share in making peace with Turkey, cet evene­
ment si important par les consequences qu'il devait avoir."8 
While it is undoubtedly true that other factors entered into 
the total scheme which led to the Peace of Bucharest, Strat­
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ford Canning role was a principal one.9 The success he had 
achieved was remarkable for a twenty-five-year-old neophyte. 
In addition to the message cited above, the Czar sent his 
personal commendations to Canning in the form of a snuff 
box with the Czar's portrait set in diamonds. The Prince 
Regent also sent his personal approbation. The Turks, 
curiously enough, were complained that he had not pro­
cured enough for them. They dubbed Stratford Canning a 
"Russophile." 
Most happily Canning surrendered the keys and archives 
of the Embassy to the new ambassador, Robert Liston, who 
arrived on the twenty-eighth of June. In the following month, 
on July 12, almost four years to the day since he had de­
parted from England, Stratford Canning shook the filth and 
dust of the Golden Horn from his heels and began the 
journey home. 
1. Lane-Poole, op. cit., I, 129. 
2. Ibid., p. 128. 
3. Ibid., p. 162. 
4. Ibid., p. 170. 
5. Ibid., p. 167. 
6. Ibid., p. 168. 
7. Cited in ibid., p. 176. 
8. Harold Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London, 
New York, and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936), p. 49­
9. Ibid., p. 51. Temperley cautions that the other factors are not known 
as yet. He feels that the decision was Mahmud's own but may have been 
influenced by his mother, a French Creole, who was anti-Napoleonist. 
V

THERE are numerous letters dating from Canning's first resi­
dence in Constantinople which testify to his never-ending 
desire to be free of the place. Its streets and alleys were dirty 
and foul-smelling; its people ignorant, disease-ridden, and 
crawling with vermin. Moslem officialdom was corrupt, and 
the justice it administered hardly deserved the name, for it 
was arbitrary and cruel. The Ottoman Empire was a land 
in which murder was dignified under the guise of legal or 
religious execution whenever it suited the convenience of 
authority, be that authority the Sultan himself or any of the 
myriad of lesser officials. On one occasion, for example, Can­
ning was present when the head of the rebellious Pasha of 
Baghdad was ceremoniously presented to Mahmud. The lives 
of the Sultan's subjects, especially the Christians, too often 
depended on the whims of pashas and beys, any one of whom 
could take a life on the slightest pretext, and without the 
least fear of being held accountable. 
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One most not suppose that the youthful diplomat spent the 
entire four years within the walls of his residence, or journey­
ing back and forth to the Porte. H e did get away for occa­
sional excursions and periods of relaxation, but never very 
far from the capital—Smyrna was as far as he got—and such 
holidays seldom lasted longer than a few days. There was, 
also, a fairly steady stream of visitors, some of them friends 
of his, but many complete strangers bearing appropriate intro­
ductions from London. Some of these expected more service 
than the Minister could give them and complained about his 
hospitality to the Foreign Office, but these instances bothered 
him little and apparently did not upset his superiors. 
Besides these diversions there were idyllic spots on both 
sides of the Bosporus and elsewhere in the environs of the 
capital where he enjoyed riding or walking in solitude. Such 
pleasures, of course, and many more, he could find in the 
English countryside, and he longed constantly for the day 
when they would once more be within reach. 
His exile he still saw as a preparation for service at home; 
and not long after his return, he was at George Canning's side, 
electioneering in Liverpool and enjoying it to the utmost. 
Wha t he enjoyed, incidentally, was his cousin's popularity 
and his proficiency in the rough-and-tumble of partisan poli­
tics. Actually, he was along merely as an observer; his own 
yearnings for a Parliamentary career had to be set aside for 
the time being. For one thing, the Tory party had a sufficiency 
of able candidates, and, of greater practical weight, his means 
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did not allow him the luxury of a seat in the House of 
Commons. Lacking the independence of personal financial 
resources, he was forced to accept a statutory pension or 
allowance granted by the Foreign Office. It amounted to 
about 1200 pounds a year, and he could not do without it. 
The emolument was granted, however, only on the condition 
that the recipient accept the next assignment offered him 
and on the further stipulation that he not take a seat in 
Parliament. 
Consequently he found it expedient to allow himself to be 
considered a member of the Foreign Service. But he was in 
a paradoxical position. By virtue of his rank and experience 
he could not be relegated to an inferior position such as a 
clerkship or secretaryship, nor, because of his age and lack 
of seniority, could he expect an assignment equal to or above 
his rank. Napoleon had not yet gone down to defeat, but the 
end was in sight. With the coming return to peace there 
would be a whole college of senior diplomats awaiting the 
various posts that had long been vacant. Furthermore, al­
though George Canning was successful in his own bid for 
election, he was still out of favor with the dominant faction 
of the Tories and was not included in the Cabinet when it 
was organized. The portfolio of the Foreign Office was given 
to Castlereagh, and Stratford Canning was forced to bide 
his time. 
There followed a two-year hiatus in his career, and we do 
not have much in the way of detailed information as to 
 66 THE GREAT AMBASSADOR
how he spent his time. In his memoirs, he unwittingly re­
vealed how little these years meant to him by passing over 
them without much attention. In the fashion of the times, 
of course, there were clubs and literary circles, and he did 
meet with one group composed of former school associates 
which was known as the Grillion Club, taking its name from 
the coffeehouse which its members frequented. He was a 
welcome guest at Madame de Stael's circle in its early days, 
but he did not seem to be overly taken with the lady herself. 
His willingness to visit there was due, no doubt, to the variety 
of charming people to be found in attendance. Otherwise he 
seems not to have adjusted to the prosaic pace of this kind 
of life after having been so intimately involved in the fate of 
men and nations. 
Canning was still publicly and privately disavowing the 
choice of a career in diplomacy when an appointment as 
Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to Switzer­
land came as a welcome relief to boredom and inactivity. The 
opportunity came in a most unusual way, too, since it was 
tendered to him by Lord Castlereagh in Paris. Canning had 
gone there in the spring of 1814 to witness the formalities 
of the Allied triumph and the restoration of the Bourbons. 
At one of the many soirees and receptions he attended, he 
had a brief meeting with the Foreign Secretary during which 
the offer was casually made. Stratford accepted it immediately. 
This change of scene cheered him as nothing else had been 
able to. W e find him writing some of the most enthusiastic 
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and lighthearted letters of his life, "Put on your spurs,' he 
wrote to one of his small circle of close friends, 'mount your 
yacht, and come the shortest possible way to this delicious 
country. When once here, you will acknowledge that you 
have spent twenty years of your life most unprofitably. 
The finest mountains—the greenest hills—the richest plains— 
the neatest houses—the best inns—the most limpid streams, 
and for aught I know the most delightful fair ones, ever yet 
beheld in this transitory sphere!"1 And he sent this message 
to his sister the next day: "Good-bye, my dear Bess. Unless 
you bring your spouse and children here, I much doubt that 
you will ever see me again. How the deuce will it be possible 
to tear oneself away from this delicious country ?"2 
The challenge of the new post probably served to revivify 
Canning even more than did the idyllic scenery. The down­
fall of Napoleon had left the Swiss in a turmoil peculiarly 
their own, for here, contrary to the mood prevailing in the 
rest of Europe, there was little desire for a return to the 
status quo ante. Up to the time of Napoleon, Switzerland 
had been a federation of thirteen independent cantons with 
five subject provinces, but all of it under the domination of 
the towns. Bonaparte had erased this urban preponderance 
by setting up, within the "Greater Empire,'' a Swiss Con­
federation of nineteen equal and sovereign cantons. This ar­
rangement was far more attractive to the rural districts, and, 
although they welcomed their deliverance from French hegem­
ony, they wanted no part of the previous urban control. 
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W h e n , following Napoleon's defeat, the towns moved to 
reclaim their leadership, the country people made plain their 
resolution to defend their new "freedom'' by force of arms. 
Besides this conflict of urban and rural interests, the coun­
try faced further barriers to political stability. Its unique 
geography, for one thing, made communication between its 
different areas a matter of great difficulty, requiring long and 
circuitous routes of travel for all but experienced mountain­
eers. Superimposed on this natural disadvantage was the 
crisscross of religious antagonism dating from the bitter years 
of the Reformation and the religious wars. Linguistically, too, 
it was a Tower of Babel: though basically trilingual, it was 
zigzagged by as many dialects and sub-dialects as there were 
valleys and meadows in the shadows of its peaks. Stemming 
from these divisions of religion, race, language, and geog­
raphy were a dozen or more parties and factions, each deter­
mined to impose its particular viewpoint on the whole. 
T h e victorious allied powers, though they cared little about 
the mechanics of a solution, wanted the problem solved, since 
they were agreed on the need for an independent Alpine state 
to serve as a buffer between France and Austria. 
T h e simple task given to Canning was to bring order out 
of the chaos. His first few months were spent patiently list­
ening to delegations, deputations, and even individuals by the 
score. These visitations, incidentally, had begun in Paris as 
soon as his appointment was announced. 
O n one item, at least, there was universal agreement among 
the Swiss. T h e great powers were assembling in Vienna to 
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redraw the map of Europe following the upheavals of the pre­
vious decade. If the Swiss hoped to gain anything from the 
Congress of Vienna, they realized that they must put on the 
face of unity even if they did not yet have the spirit of unity. 
So well, apparently, did Stratford Canning listen to one and 
all, and so impartial were his stated views, that he was a nearly 
unanimous choice to express their desires to the Congress 
of Vienna. A draft of constitutional machinery was put to­
gether, and he took it with him to Vienna. 
Although the disposition of Switzerland was but a tiny 
item on the agenda, Canning was officially accredited as a 
member of the Committee for Swiss Questions and, as such, 
a recognized member of the diplomatic corps then swarming 
about the Austrian capital. He spent the winter of 1814-15 
going to balls, banquets, soirees, and receptions and rubbing 
elbows with the great and near great. His descriptions of 
Metternich, Talleyrand, and other powerful men in attend­
ance are lengthy and perceptive. His relations with Cas­
tlereagh became even more cordially cemented, though not 
at the expense of loyalty to George Canning. When Cas­
tlereagh departed for London after the first of the year and 
was succeeded at the Congress by Wellington, the young 
diplomat had many an occasion to see the great duke at close 
quarters. Wellington spoke to him warmly of his brother, 
Lt. Col. Charles Canning, who had been one of the hero's 
aides on the Peninsula. (Later Charles was killed at Waterloo 
as he carried an order from the Duke to one of the field com­
manders.) 
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The Committee on Swiss Questions did not meet more 
than once or twice a week in formal session, but there was 
much behind-the-scenes work. Here Canning was in contin­
uous contact with his Russian colleague, Count John Capo­
distrias. Canning had previously known the Count as one of 
the Russian plenipotentiaries at Bucharest. He was a native 
of Greece, with a Venetian title (Capo d'Istria), who had 
done yeoman service in diplomacy for Czar Alexander I. Later 
on Capodistrias was to become President of the provisional 
government of Greece and a leader in the struggle of his 
people against the Turks. The mutual respect and friendship 
that arose between Stratford Canning and Capodistrias at 
this time was to serve them in good stead during the difficult 
years of the Greek Revolution. 
The Congress of Vienna proceeded at a leisurely pace all 
through the winter until it was galvanized into activity by the 
news of Napoleon's escape from Elba. Canning was present 
at a major conference when the report was brought in, and he 
described, in his memoirs, how faces turned white and voices 
became stilled. One after another, the major participants 
departed from the table to look to their own affiairs. His 
most vivid description is of a scene composed of the stately 
figure of Wellington descending a spiral staircase with his 
own officers in train. Trooping along with them were officers 
of the principal allies listening to the calm reassurances that 
were being spoken by the Duke as he gave orders and made 
suggestions for marshaling troops and armies. 
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Before it dispersed, the Congress of Vienna ratified the pro­
posed constitution for a Swiss Federation without any major 
changes. This put the burden of securing its acceptance on 
the shoulders of Stratford Canning, and no small burden it 
was. Each of the Swiss factions had been confident of being 
able to turn the provisions of the proposed constitution to its 
own good at the Congress. Each, therefore, had given its 
assent to the draft, but conditionally. Canning had the task 
of visiting the various cantonal legislatures to plead for affirma­
tion of something none of them found quite agreeable. The 
uncertainty of the Swiss regarding a resurgent Napoleonic 
empire did not serve to ease his path, and at times he doubted 
that the Swiss Federation would survive. Its viability, how­
ever, was insured by the field of Waterloo, and gradually the 
various cantons fell into line behind it. 
The Swiss Federation, under the terms of the constitution, 
was to be a loose one of some nineteen cantons. A central 
directorate was established that would rotate its sittings be­
tween Berne, Zurich, and Lucerne, with the chief officer of 
the respective city occupying the presidency in turn. The 
constitutional machinery has been modified since, and the 
power of the central government has been stabilized more 
effectively, but the political entity we know today as Switzer­
land dates from that time. Of even greater import for the 
world at large was an act of the Congress of Vienna when 
it reconvened in the fall of 1815. This was a solemn guar­
antee on the part of all the powers of the perpetual neutrality 
 72 THE GREAT AMBASSADOR
of Switzerland. Never, even in the darkest days of the two 
world wars, has that neutrality been seriously threatened. 
That agreement has allowed the name Geneva to become the 
symbol of peace. 
With the coming of peace Canning journeyed about "sell­
ing' the new Swiss Federation. And he had the time to 
enjoy the country to the utmost. The winter of 1815-16 was 
one of the calmest he ever spent, and a modern travel bureau 
could profitably search his memoirs and letters for the pas­
sages wherein he extolls the beauty of the mountains, valleys, 
lakes, and hamlets of the Alpine paradise. 
He was to have one glorious year more. The deprivation 
of the normal intimacies of youth which he complained about 
in Constantinople was finally mitigated by the joys of human 
love. While on leave in the summer of 1816, he went back to 
England; and to the surprise of all his friends in London and 
in Switzerland, he married a Miss Harriet Raikes, a daughter 
of one of the governors of the Bank of England, The marriage 
was idyllic, but tragically short. Less than a year later she 
died along with their stillborn child and was buried at 
Lausanne. 
The charm that Switzerland held for him disappeared with 
her death. The routine duties of his work rapidly began to 
bore him. The following year saw an exchange of letters 
with George Canning, Joseph Planta, and others—all dis­
cussing his desire for office at home, or for reassignment to 
some other post. He could not afford retirement, for his 
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mother was becoming more and more dependent on him. 
An older brother, Henry, had all but lost the family business, 
and with Charles's death Canning had become her main 
support. 
On the sixteenth of August, 1819, he obtained permission 
to resign his commission on the understanding that he would 
receive either a post in the government at home or be pro­
moted to a higher-ranking mission. In the ratings of the 
Foreign Service Switzerland was then a fifth-class mission, 
the lowest ministerial level. On September 24, Lord Castle­
reagh nominated Stratford Canning as the Envoy Extraord­
inary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of 
America, a new fourth-class assignment. Canning's former 
Secretary at the Swiss mission, Henry Addington, wrote to 
him: "If you can succeed in keeping those schoolboy Yankees 
quiet and saving us another hundred millions of debt, you 
will come home a G.C.B. with a handle to your 
name."3 
The American mission was commonly agreed to be among 
the most difficult in the Foreign Service. The Americans, 
in their resentment of the mother country, were extremely 
sensitive to any hint that England might be patronizing them 
or, even worse, dictating to them. That Canning was selected 
was testimony of Castlereagh's opinion of him. For once 
George Canning had the warmest applause for a Castlereagh 
decision. It did not escape Stratford Canning's notice, either, 
since he seemed destined for diplomacy for the time being, 
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that his immediate predecessor, Sir Charles Bagot, had gone 
to St. Petersburg as a reward for his American service. That 
embassy, along with Paris, Vienna, Madrid, and the Hague, 
constituted the cream of the diplomatic world. Even if he 
did not aspire to that, a tenure of office among people of his 
own race and language could, he reasoned, help ready him 
for a career at home. 
1. Lane-Poole, op. at., I, 222. 
2. Ibid., p. 223. 
3. Ibid.., p. 285. 
VI

BECAUSE he did not want to make the long and arduous 
Atlantic crossing in the winter, Canning did not depart for 
America until the early summer of 1820. The delay gave 
him time to frequent his usual haunts in London and to sit 
in on as many sessions of Parliament as he could. The eco­
nomic dislocation of the Napoleonic Wars, the clamor for 
electoral reform, and, more than anything else, the tempes­
tuous relationship between George IV and his estranged queen 
made that winter sitting of Commons one long series of bitter 
debates. Charges and countercharges which involved careers 
and reputations flew across the floor irrespective of party lines. 
Scandal and recrimination were personally distasteful to Strat­
ford Canning, and, though he still looked upon the benches 
of Commons as his ultimate goal, the lustre of domestic poli­
tics became somewhat dulled as he observed its workings from 
the galleries. 
 76 THE GREAT AMBASSADOR
T h e preparations for his trip to the United States went on 
apace, and they were more than were usually necessary for a 
departing envoy. Furniture, servants, cooks, secretaries, and 
sundry items—including a cabriolet—all had to be transported 
with him to the primitive new capital growing on die banks 
of the Potomac. Since he had pledged himself to a stay of 
three years, he had to plan carefully lest he be unduly de­
pendent on the meager comforts available in muddy, fever-
ridden Washington. 
T h e chances for normal intercourse between the mother 
country and her former colonies were as uncertain as the 
physical appointments of the new assignment. Canning came 
to Washington at a time of transition in the relations between 
England and the United States. Memories of bitter conflict 
were still too fresh, especially in the new nation, to allow for 
for compromise where it was needed, or for any real search 
toward mutually satisfying agreement. T h e best that could 
be hoped for was an easing of the tension, so that time might 
heal old wounds without new ones developing. The United 
States was just beginning to feel its way among the powers. 
She was gradually becoming aware that her own security was 
no longer threatened by European military might, and her 
statesmen were finding that they could engage in the normal 
give-and-take of foreign relations. In the forming of foreign 
policy, although it was long to be dominated by the stricture 
of George Washington against "foreign entanglements,'' 
American leadership had begun to recognize the necessity 
of treating with the rest of the world. 
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Specifically, there were problems to be discussed with Eng­
land. The Treaty of Ghent, which ended the War of 1812, 
had not really solved the issues that led to the conflict; actually, 
those conditions most obnoxious to the Americans had ceased 
to exist once a general peace had come into effect in Europe. 
England had no longer to resort to every means possible to 
enforce a blockade of the Continent, nor was she driven any 
longer to the impressment of seamen to man her far-flung 
navy. American commerce was now unmolested on the high 
seas, but there was still one sore point: the question of the 
slave trade. The Congress of Vienna had outlawed trafficking 
in human life, and the English government felt it had the 
right to stop and search any ship thought to be carrying slaves 
in contravention of international agreement. The United 
States, although it had forbidden its merchantmen to engage 
in slaving, insisted, nevertheless, that only its own naval forces 
had jurisdiction over vessels flying the American flag. This 
was the thorniest issue remaining between the two nations. 
There were other issues, of course, less provocative for the 
time being but, potentially, major irritants. For one thing, 
the demarcation of the boundary between the United States 
and Canada remained unsettled, and, for another, the future 
of vast tracts and territories belonging to the crumbling em­
pire of Spain had to be established. 
These and a half-dozen or more minor questions were items 
included in Canning's instructions. Pre-eminent in those 
instructions, however, was Castlereagh's insistent admonition 
for caution and prudence. Painfully aware of England's 
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need for uninterrupted peace, and sensible of the American 
proclivity to look askance at any English claim or overture, 
no matter how trivial it might be, he urged upon the Minister 
to the United States a special forbearance. In dealing with 
American statesmen, the Foreign Secretary warned Canning, 
he would be treating with many men who, besides harboring 
hatred of England and anything English themselves, often 
felt called upon by their easily aroused countrymen to stand 
up to the British. In such circumstances there were frequent 
occasions for insult and affront. 
Typical of the prejudice Canning had to face were the 
anti-British sentiments of John Quincy Adams, the Secretary 
of State in the administration of President Monroe. Strik­
ingly alike in the intensity of their convictions, Adams and 
Canning were almost foredoomed to come into serious conflict. 
That they did not reach an open rupture can probably be 
laid to the inherent good sense of each man, and also to the 
fact that Stratford Canning did not have the antipathy to 
Americans that John Quincy Adams did to the English. 
Mindful of his written instructions, Canning never pushed 
as far as he might have been tempted. Their relations are 
best summed up by their own evaluations of each other. 
Adams, in his diary, candidly described the British Minister as 
"a proud, high-tempered Englishman with a disposition 
to be overbearing, which I have often been compelled to check 
in its own way. He is, of all the foreign Ministers with whom 
I have had occasion to treat, the man who has most severely 
tried my temper He has, however, a great respect for 
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his word, and there is nothing false about him Mr. 
Canning is a man of forms, studious of courtesy, and tena­
cious of private morals. As a diplomatic man, his great want 
is suppleness, and his great virtue is sincerity."1 And Can­
ning found the American Secretary of State much above par 
in general ability, but having the air of a scholar rather than 
a statesman, a very uneven temper, a disposition at times 
well-meaning, a manner somewhat too often domineering, and 
an ambition causing unsteadiness in his political career. My 
private intercourse with him was not wanting in kindness on 
either side. The rougher road was that of discussion on mat­
ters of business."2 
In one of their early conferences Canning gleaned from 
Adams what was to become the first major foreign policy 
position of the United States. They were discussing the 
Spanish colonies in Central and South America when Adams 
broached the concept of spheres of influence which was later 
to culminate in the Monroe Doctrine. Fortunately, the idea 
involved here met with sincere approval in London, especially 
when George Canning was renamed Foreign Secretary 
(Castlereagh ended his life by suicide in 1822). The elder 
Canning had always cast a wary eye at the Holy Alliance, 
which had come under the domination of Metternich;3 and 
when he heard rumors of a scheme by the Continental mon­
archs to restore Spain's American colonies to her by concerted 
force, he was deeply disturbed. Therefore, he reacted favor­
ably to the American proposal and subsequently suggested a 
joint Anglo-American action to forestall such an eventuality. 
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Monroe was inclined to accept the British offer, as were his 
predecessors, Jefferson and Madison, whom he consulted, but 
Adams could neither wholly trust British motives nor suffer 
it to appear that the American cockboat was trailing in the 
wake of a British man-of-war, as he phrased it. The idea of 
a joint project came to naught, therefore, but the later pro­
mulgation of the Monroe Doctrine was due in no small meas­
ure to American awareness of its favorable reception in 
London. It had been Stratford Canning's good fortune to be 
able to relay the initial American thinking on the matter to 
the British government. 
The cordiality engendered in early exchanges such as the 
matter just described eased, somewhat, the vexing problem 
posed by the slave trade. The issue was not definitely settled, 
but the American government agreed to co-operate to the ex­
tent of ordering its naval vessels to pursue and search any 
American ship reported by British navy patrols to be suspect. 
The United States, however, refused to countenance search 
by foreign warships, nor would she engage in it herself when 
ships of foreign registry were involved. 
The other weighty issue, that of the Canadian-American 
boundary in the area of the Columbia River, both Castlereagh 
and George Canning after him chose to leave in abeyance 
for a more propitious moment. Stratford Canning made it 
clear that the British government did not abdicate its claims 
in this area but that it chose to abstain from attempting a 
definitive demarcation until such time as a capable boundary 
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commission could effectively penetrate the wilderness and 
make a reasonable determination of rights and interests. 
Thus, there were no momentous decisions made in the 
course of Canning's Washington stay, but he made definite 
gains for his country. England was cast in a much more 
agreeable and friendly light because of his presence, and when 
he left Washington in the summer of 1823, he left with the 
accolade of more than one journalist, and without any bitter­
ness on his own part. Ruffled feelings had been smoothed 
over, and tensions were markedly reduced. 
Canning's success in America can be traced in no small 
way to a change of attitude within himself. For once, he had 
committed himself to a definite tenure and was not looking 
for early relief. His correspondence does not continually 
refer, as it used to, to the proximity of his homecoming. He 
had given his word, and there was no further discussion. This 
mental composure enabled him to take the physical discom­
fort of Washington with ease, and for two years he never 
left the environs of the capital. When one considers that the 
temperature ranged from six degrees below zero to 105 above-
according to his own records—one can assume that he had 
achieved a rare equanimity of disposition. He even became a 
very agreeable host, and, indeed, during one session of the 
Congress he took it upon himself to entertain all of its mem­
bers, either individually or in groups. The American Con­
gress interested him as an institution, too, and he was fre­
quently seen in the galleries of the Senate and of the House. 
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Of course, the language and customs of the country were 
familiar, and this no doubt made it easier for him to adapt 
himself to the American scene. 
The British Minister was entertained, in turn, by several 
of the leading American figures. The aging Charles Carroll 
of Carrollton, at whose Maryland estate he was a frequent visi­
tor, was one to whom he was most attracted. Chief Justice 
Marshall was another object of his admiration, as was the 
young Henry Clay. He also dined at Mount Vernon with a 
nephew of George Washington and privately wondered when 
the Americans would erect a suitable monument to the mem­
ory of the man who had done the most to win their freedom. 
He took one extended trip through the northern states and 
Canada. The letters, notes, and diaries he kept of this and 
other, shorter, trips reveal him to have been an acute observer 
of the American scene. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that he 
never compiled them into a single account. Such a collection 
would have made for an interesting comparison with the more 
famous reports of Trollope and Dickens. One curious entry 
is a detailed comparison of the costs of living in Hagerstown, 
Maryland for the years 1816 and 1822. Similar memoranda 
appear for Niagara and other places along his route, but he 
left no explanation as to why he made the compilation. 
With these exceptions he spent his time in and about the 
city of Washington. During the days of summer heat, when 
Congress was adjourned and the life of the city came to a 
complete halt, he occupied himself with reading and writing. 
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He developed a fascination for the Waverly novels of Scott 
and devoured them as fast as they came over to him, or 
whenever he could purchase a new one in the city. 
His last year was brightened considerably by the appear­
ance of Henry Addington, who had come over to fill his old 
post as Secretary to the Minister. The two had gotten along 
famously in Switzerland and the collaboration was renewed. 
It was Addington, too, who succeeded him in Washington 
when Canning relinquished the American mission in June 
of 1823. The ex-Minister arrived back in England in the 
following September, no longer a fledgling diplomat but a 
Foreign Service officer of rank and distinction. 
I. The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845, ed. Allan Nevins 
(New York, London, and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), 
pp. 296-97. 
*. Lane-Poole, op. cit., I, 308-9. 
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Congress of Vienna, with adherence to its principles by the monarchs of 
Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Alexander of Russia, though farseeing and 
liberal for his day, was too weak to overcome the domination of Metternich, 
and under the leadership of the Austrian Chancellor the Holy Alliance 
"gradually became an alliance of kings for the suppression of the liberal 
movements in various countries. Alexander made one concession after 
another to Metternich. The opinion was expressed that Alexander had 
completely lost any independence of view. This seemed to be confirmed 
by the events of the Greek revolution against Turkish rule" (George 
Vernadsky, A History of Russia [New Haven: Yale University Press, 3rd 
rev. ed., 1951], p. 146). Cf. Winston Churchill, op. cit., IV, 7: "Its [the 
Holy Alliance] main purpose was to intervene in any part of Europe where 
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VII

BY the time his thirty-seventh birthday had occurred (No­
vember 4, 1823) Stratford Canning had seen service in Den­
mark, in Constantinople, at the Congress of Vienna, in Switz­
erland, and in the United States of America. He had been a 
party to conferences, negotiations, and conventions involving 
men, nations, and dynasties, yet still regarded all of this as a 
prelude to eventual service in Parliament. His return home 
from America, however, coincided with a turn of events in 
Europe, and George Canning felt that his cousin's services 
were sorely needed, and at the highest level of diplomacy. 
In order to put this next phase of Stratford Canning's career 
in its proper light, a brief recapitulation of the European situa­
tion is necessary. 
The reverberations of the Napoleonic explosions had nearly 
toppled several of the major thrones and dynastic lines on 
the continent. In the wake of the near catastrophe those 
who had come so near to disaster trembled in fright at the 
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apparition of rising nationalism and republicanism. The Con­
gress of Vienna had been convened not only to dispose of the 
problems arising from the aftermath of war but to solidify the 
established regimes and political institutions. One of its off­
spring was the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. 
Its purpose soon became an undisguised effort to preserve the 
status quo.1 The deity of the Alliance was absolute autocracy 
and its demon was democracy or any form of popular rule. 
Not only were its participants determined to preserve their 
own positions but they took it upon themselves to act as sort 
of a police force for legitimacy. Thus their presumption to 
act on behalf of Spain when her American colonies began 
to sever the ties which bound them to Madrid. 
In England this was seen as a retrograde movement, and 
there was little sympathy for it. The island kingdom had a 
long and hallowed tradition of parliamentary democracy 
(though the dream of universal suffrage was as yet far from a 
reality). The current thinking of English theorists and po­
litical leaders was in the direction of broadening still further 
the basis of government. The clamor for electoral reform 
was growing louder each year. In political thinking, therefore, 
England was moving in the opposite direction from the na­
tions for whom she had bled at the beginning of the century. 
The result was a growing tendency to withdraw from Conti­
nental embroilments except in those cases which involved 
the legitimate interests of England. Of course, there was a 
rub in such a position: almost any continental settlement 
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affected England's trade and commerce, and therefore she 
was involved whether she liked it or not. In order to have a 
free hand to deal with such questions as they arose, George 
Canning had adopted a policy of non-commitment with re­
gard to continental disputes. No one country was England's 
definite ally; she was free to agree or remonstrate with any 
one whom she chose. But no sooner were these theoretical 
positions taken than certain political dilemmas arose which 
threatened their soundness. 
In 1821, a loose confederacy of Greek nationalists and 
revolutionary factions had joined forces in open revolt against 
the misrule of Constantinople. The Porte reacted vengefully, 
and the ensuing reports of massacre and atrocity visited upon 
innocent victims soon became items of marketplace talk 
throughout Europe. For the champions of the Holy Alliance, 
Alexander and Metternich, the problem was a cruel one. 
Without a doubt the Greeks were in revolt against their legiti­
mate and absolute sovereign. At the same time, the picture 
of Christian blood flowing at the hands of Moslems was 
enough to cause the greatest embarrassment, to say nothing 
of the anguished pleas for help coming from the Greeks. 
The Czar, in particular, was beside himself. All previous 
Russian intervention in the Balkans and in the Danubian 
Principalities had been based on Russia's right to alleviate the 
sad lot of her coreligionists. Alexander could not, at this 
juncture, backtrack on that position without serious conse­
quences at home and without relinquishing future pretexts 
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for action against the Turks.2 He had to cast about for some 
means of action outside the Alliance. 
Metternich and the Austrian emperor, though not as seri­
ously concerned on the religious score, could not afford to 
ignore it completely. They were more disturbed by the 
probable consequences of a separate Russian move than they 
were with the fortunes of the Greek people. To Metternich 
the Greeks were rebels against authority pure and simple. 
Were he to abandon them on those grounds, however, he 
would face the danger of leaving to Russia a clear field for 
unilateral operation. This could lead to eventual Russian 
pre-eminence in the Balkans as well as along the course of the 
lower Danube. In order to thwart any such eventuality Aus­
tria had to pretend to be concerned for the Greeks. 
Despite George Canning's aim to be free of Continental ties, 
England could not hope to remain unconcerned. The Eng­
lish government had to cope with a vocal and powerful public 
opinion. The romance of the Greek revolt had already led 
to public subscriptions for financial aid, and there had been a 
substantial number of philhellenic volunteers sallying forth to 
do battle alongside the revolutionaries. The deep attachment 
for Greece in the classics-steeped upper classes threw the 
weight of British popular sympathy to the side of the revolu­
tion immediately. The death of Lord Byron at Missolonghi 
further intensified these sentiments. 
Both the Cannings secretly wished for Greek success as 
avidly as did their more romantic countrymen. Stratford had 
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written from America in 1821 expressing the hope that the 
Sultan would be driven bag and baggage into the heart of 
Asia. There were wider and more consequential issues at 
stake, however, than a sentimental attachment to a romantic 
ideal. Whatever the ultimate outcome of the struggle was 
to be, George Canning was determined that it not include 
the precipitate downfall of the Ottoman Empire. Such a 
calamity could only lead to grave results for England in that 
her lines of communication to India would be seriously 
jeopardized and her Levantine commerce put at the mercy 
of the power or coalition of powers succeeding to the hegem­
ony of the Sultan. Above all else, he was determined that 
Russia not use the Greek question as a means of establishing 
herself astride the Bosporus and casting her shadow to the 
Persian Gulf. Stratford Canning agreed with his cousin's 
reasoning, and furthermore he felt that the scramble for 
spoils which would inevitably follow the collapse of the Turk 
would plunge Europe into a bloodbath alongside which the 
Napoleonic Wars would pale into insignificance. 
The Foreign Secretary had to move very carefully. A highly 
vocal faction was all for instant action, but George Canning 
fended them off temporarily by prevailing on the Cabinet to 
recognize the belligerent status of the Greek Provisional Gov­
ernment, in March of 1823. In doing so England put her­
self in the position of being able to claim early support of the 
Greek nation should the revolution be successful. Like Met­
ternich, George Canning feared the consequences of unilateral 
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Russian action. Unlike Metternich he had no disposition to 
throttle the revolt if it could make headway without destroy­
ing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In spite of all the 
romance attached to it, the chaotic amalgam of sincere nation­
alists, professional revolutionaries, and self-seeking factions 
composing the revolutionary movement had little appeal for 
George Canning, and he could not bring himself to look upon 
them as the ideal heir to Ottoman rule. He believed that 
the Greeks were not yet ready for complete independence, but 
also he felt that there should be no return to the status quo 
ante. Some middle way had to be found. As far as public 
opinion was concerned, the difficulty of his job was eased 
somewhat by the reports of the early volunteers, who began 
to find to their sorrow that all was not well with the revolt 
and that many of the factions were as desperate and as in­
human as their oppressors. Many Englishmen were begin­
ning to think that complete independence was not the answer. 
When, therefore, in January of 1824, the Russian govern­
ment circulated a memorandum among the major powers 
which called a conference in St. Petersburg to adjudicate the 
dispute, George Canning reluctantly agreed to send a plenipo­
tentiary to represent England. His agreement was based on 
the necessity of making England's position known relative to 
the solution proposed in the Russian memorandum. By its 
terms Greece was to be divided into three autonomous prov­
inces, each of which was to remain under the sovereignty of 
the Sultan. On the surface this arrangement seemed to meet 
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George Canning's requirements for a way out of the crisis, but 
the Foreign Secretary was suspicious of Russian motives. He 
feared that their game would be to play one faction against 
another and then to step in as the dominating element. He 
himself preferred a unified state, preferably one small enough 
not to be able to make aggressive moves which would disturb 
the peace. Sir Charles Bagot, British Ambassador to the Rus­
sian Court, was instructed to sit in at the conference but not 
to commit England to any decisions of the kind envisioned 
by Russia. 
The conference began slowly and dragged, chiefly because 
no prior agreements had been made and little groundwork 
had been done to effect a unanimity of view. Then, in May, 
the secret terms of the memorandum were published in a Paris 
journal, and there were explosive repercussions in Greece. 
The Provisional Government, seeing anything less than com­
plete independence as a negation of all they were fighting 
for, defiantly rejected the proposed mediation. They appealed 
to England to protect them from the dubious benevolence of 
those who would save them in this manner from the hated 
Turk. 
Now George Canning had long believed that any attempt 
at mediation must have the support of at least one of the con­
flicting parties. In such a case the concerted pressure of 
the mediating nations could be brought to bear on the recal­
citrant party with some reasonable hope of success. But 
where both parties were resolutely opposed to a suggested 
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solution, as they were in this instance, the mediation was 
doomed to failure. The only alternative was for the professed 
peacemakers to impose their remedy by force of arms, a policy 
which he felt contradicted itself and carried with it the seeds 
of general war. Bagot was accordingly called home and the 
conference ground to a halt.3 
By this time a wholly new ingredient had been added to 
the stew and changed its flavor radically. The Greeks had 
been buoyed considerably by British recognition of their 
belligerent status in the previous year. With the aid of volun­
teer officers and other outside assistance they had managed 
to win some impressive victories over the Sultan's forces and 
were holding several key positions. Mahmud, disgusted with 
his Janissary generals and bitter over the performance of his 
army, turned to his Egyptian vassal Mehemet Ali Pasha for 
help. In return for crushing the Greek revolt Mahmud 
promised to cede at least the Morea and Crete to Egyptian 
rule. Mehemet assigned the task to his son Ibrahim, who set 
sail from Alexandria with a large fleet and thousands of well-
trained troops. It looked like the beginning of the end for 
the Greek Revolution.4 
George Canning was afraid that Alexander would inter­
vene. The uncertainty as to what the aggressive and ambitious 
Egyptian viceroy would do after that disturbed all the Euro­
pean powers, and the Russian conference was reconvened. 
Canning still refused to participate but wanted an observer 
on hand. 
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Accordingly, he prevailed on Stratford to accept the assign­
ment as the Ambassador to the Porte until the Greek question 
should be resolved. Prior to going to Constantinople, how­
ever, he was to go to St. Petersburg, ostensibly to settle a 
Russo-British boundary matter in the northwest Pacific, but 
really to keep an eye on the proceedings of the conference and 
to present Britain's views should they be sought. 
Stratford Canning, in the meantime, had been meeting 
with the American Minister Richard Rush in an attempt to 
iron out the difficulties still remaining with the United States. 
He had also found time to engage in another courtship, and 
the prospect of an ambassador's pay and subsequent pension 
were too attractive to decline. 
Before Canning departed, the Foreign Secretary supplied 
him with a clear statement of English policy to guide him: 
To preserve the peace of the world is the leading object of 
the policy of England. For this purpose it is necessary in 
the first place to prevent to the utmost of our power the 
breaking out of new quarrels; in the second place, to com­
pose, where it can be done by friendly mediation, existing 
differences; and thirdly, where that is hopeless, to narrow 
as much as possible their range; and fourthly, to maintain 
for ourselves an imperturbable neutrality in all cases where 
nothing occurs to affect injuriously our interests or our 
honour.6 
Armed with these general principles, Stratford Canning 
set out in the fall of 1824 for St. Petersburg by way of Vienna, 
where he was to discuss the situation with Mettemich. On 
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one important point the instructions from the Foreign Office 
were deficient, and that was on the matter of just how Eng­
land would settle the dispute, or even narrow its range. 
George Canning had not found a practicable middle way 
between the repugnant extremes, between putting down the 
revolt in the name of legitimacy and using force to compel the 
Sultan to acknowledge Greek independence. The Russian 
compromise had already been repudiated by the Greeks and 
was known to be equally unacceptable to the Turks. 
If Stratford Canning, therefore, were to be challenged to 
come forward with a means of mollifying both parties, he 
would be forced either to improvise on the spot or to confess 
his inability to offer a better plan than the one to which his 
country objected. It is quite probable that his ability to im­
provise is what the Foreign Secretary counted on, and for 
this reason he wanted his cousin in the role. Stratford 
Canning's personal task would be to arrive at a solution con­
sonant, as far as possible, with intrinsic merits of justice and 
based on the worthy aspirations of all parties concerned. In 
a sense, then, his mission was exploratory: to ascertain just 
what would be suitable to the European powers as well as to 
the belligerents. 
At Vienna he found Prince Metternich, as expected, ada­
mant in his absolutism. The Greeks, according to that archi­
tect of restoration, were nothing more than a backwash of 
the worst elements of Jacobinism. While he proclaimed 
sympathy with the plight of the Sultan's loyal Christian sub­
jects in Greece and declared his intention of doing what he 
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could for them, Metternich made it clear that he in no way 
considered the rebels to be representative of the Greek people 
as a whole. Tha t they were able to continue their resistance 
to lawful authority at all was a sin he laid at the feet of George 
Canning, whom he suspected of secret republicanism. There 
was no doubt in the Austrian's mind but that English money 
and English sentimentalism alone sustained the Greeks. Met­
ternich agreed with the English Foreign Office in one respect 
only, namely, that Russia would seek to use the situation to 
her own advantage. Tha t was the sole reason for Austria's 
participation in the conference: to discourage and destroy the 
hopes of the impertinent Greek rebels and to tie Russia's 
hands by removing the pretext for intervention. He implied 
that in order to do this Austria might have to support a move 
for some kind of semi-independence. (The Austrian Chan­
cellor had high hopes that by the time the conference con­
vened Ibrahim would already have settled the matter and the 
Greek revolt would be a thing of the past, although he did not 
indicate this to Canning.6) 
There is an interesting sidelight to this meeting between 
Canning and Metternich. Although the Englishman had been 
a minor member of the Congress of Vienna, he had never 
had any real exchanges with the doyen of European state­
craft. Undoubtedly Metternich knew of Stratford Canning 
and his work, and there is every reason to suspect that he 
looked upon the latter as a formidable diplomat in the making. 
Hoping to unnerve him at the outset, the Prince received him 
correctly but coldly, and his first words were uttered with 
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great disdain: "You have a tug on your sleeve." And as 
Canning noted, "the remark was not pleasing."7 
With little gained in Vienna other than the conviction that 
the cause of Greek independence would find little more than 
grudging support from the Hapsburg camp, Stratford Can­
ning departed for St. Petersburg in January, 1825. The 
journey occupied some twenty days (including some all-night 
stages), and in the course of it he drew up precise notes and 
memoranda to serve as agenda and check lists for himself in 
his bouts with Alexander and his Foreign Minister, Count 
Nesselrode. In one instance, for example, he drew up a 
parallel tabulation of policy positions for England on the one 
side and the members of the Holy Alliance on the other, so 
that every point of agreement and divergence would be crystal 
clear in his mind.8 He also drew up a lengthy explanation of 
the change of position England had assumed on the confer­
ence, emphasizing that opposition to the conference arose not 
from intransigence or equivocation but from the inherent 
impossibility of successful mediation at the moment. Should 
further exploration of the subject with the Porte and with the 
Greeks lead to a substantial alteration of these chances, then, 
he felt, and then only, should the proposed conference be 
attempted. For the powers to take substantive positions before­
hand would leave them with little recourse but to abandon 
the Greeks to their fate or to take up arms against the Sultan. 
To point up England's position that further groundwork 
was needed, he had something definite to suggest to the Rus­
sians, and that was the return of their ambassador to the Porte 
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as an evidence of good will to the Sultan. The ambassador 
had been withdrawn some time before when Russian repre­
sentations in behalf of the Greeks had met with severe rebuff 
( the Sultan hanged the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople in 
public),9 and the two powers had almost come to blows. To 
return the ambassador as a prelude to the conference would 
be proof of pacific intent, and might lead to the spirit of com­
promise required. Refusal to do so would make every Russian 
move suspect in Turkish eyes and, he might well have added, 
in English eyes as well. 
T h e reception he met with in St. Petersburg was almost as 
cold as the Russian winter, at least as far as the subject of 
Greece was concerned. He was given to understand that 
since England had seen fit to withhold her influence from the 
conference there was no point in discussing the matter. For 
several weeks he was kept completely in the dark; as he put 
it, ''one might imagine there was no such land as Greece 
in the world." He spent his first few weeks exclusively on 
the question of the North American matters he had come to 
negotiate. Although he was sure the Russians were burning 
with curiosity to know more of England's attitude and intent, 
he maintained a studied and consistent silence with respect to 
Greece. When the North American business was disposed of, 
he suggested to Count Nesselrode that if there was nothing 
additional to be discussed he should like to arrange his audi­
ence of leave-taking. 
T h e conference was now in full session and Stratford 
knew that it was not going well. Rather than being a peace 
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conference, it had developed into a meeting in which the 
several participants found it hard to avoid a serious falling out 
as they maneuvered for positions considered most advantageous 
to themselves. All of them knew that without England's 
co-operation a resort to force against the Sultan was really 
impossible, and for Stratford Canning to depart without di­
vulging a hint of English intentions was more than Nessel­
rode could stand. A series of meetings ensued between the 
two with serious attempts on each side to come to an under­
standing, but they always ran into the stone wall of whether 
or not Russia intended to resort to force. Canning, seeking 
to narrow the range of the dispute, demanded a declared 
disavowal before England would partake in the deliberations, 
while Nesselrode, though pleading nothing but good intent, 
would not go that far. 
What did come out of it, however, was a clearer picture 
for Stratford, who had yet to go to the Porte and attempt 
to persuade the Sultan to accept a friendly mediation. For 
one thing, he was satisfied that as long as England main­
tained her firm stance against an imposed settlement, there 
was little danger that Russia would precipitate a conflict. 
Secondly, he was in a stronger position to warn the Greeks 
that they must give in on some of their more unrealistic 
aims or face the probability that they might end up with 
nothing but an exchange of foreign rule. There was even 
the more ominous danger that, if Russia and Austria should 
fall out completely and nullify each other, the Greeks might 
be abandoned entirely to the mercies of a vengeful Sultan. 
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Over and against these warnings, Canning felt he could 
suggest to the Greeks that if they accepted England's sincere 
desire to mediate unselfishly in their behalf, they might 
achieve a measure of independence. Finally, he had been 
able to persuade the Russians that the English Cabinet, far 
from sponsoring revolution as such, was actually in agreement 
with the Alliance that complete independence for Greece 
was impracticable at the present time. The conviction that 
he thus left with them was to be important in George 
Canning's eventual decision to act in concert with Russia 
rather than to allow her to go it alone. 
Canning came back to England in May to begin his prepa­
rations for another residence in Constantinople, the despised 
"dust hole'' he had quit thirteen years previously. He had 
also to attend to a personal matter of some moment. At the 
end of his American mission he had met one Eliza Charlotte 
Alexander, a pretty young girl close to half his age. Miss 
Alexander was not the dutiful Victorian type of young lady, 
and in spite of her parents' approval of Stratford Canning had 
turned him down when he originally proposed marriage. She 
had actually gone to Holland in the summer of 1824 to avoid 
his attentions, but Stratford, just as insistent in love as he 
was in diplomacy, pursued her there before he went to Russia. 
Apparently he improved his chances by his persistence, for 
when he renewed the courtship and the chase after the 
Russian interlude, she finally accepted him. 
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Stratford Canning and Eliza Alexander were married on 
the twenty-fifth of September, 1825. It was to be a long, 
happy union, one that was marked by mutual respect and 
confidence. Despite his strong personality Canning was not 
the domineering male usually associated with the Victorian 
age. 
1. See above, chap. VI, 11. 3. 
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basis the Alliance expressed itself against support of the revolution. 
"Alexander did not want to quarrel with the Alliance, which had come 
into existence at his own initiative, but his diplomacy during this period 
sought for independent means of expression outside the Alliance. He 
sought separate agreements with its members." 
3. Cf. Crawley, op. cit., p. 36. 
4. Cf. Temperley, op. cit., p. 53. 
5. Lane-Poole, op. cit., I, 343. 
6. Cf. Crawley, op. cit., pp. 39-42. Crawley says, in this connection, 
that Mettemich's seeming reversal on the matter of Greek independence 
was not seriously advanced but was merely a means of forestalling Russian 
action. 
7. Lane-Poole, op. cit., I, 349. 
8. Ibid., pp. 359-62. 
9. This had occurred in 1821 at the beginning of the revolt. Mahmud 
held the Patriarch personally responsible, under the millet system, for the 
behavior of the entire Greek Christian community. After the execution 
by public hanging in front of the patriarchal palace, the body was ill-used 
by the mob. The Russian ambassador protested vigorously and shortly 
thereafter quit Constantinople. See Crawley, op. cit., pp. 17-18. 
VIII

SCARCELY had Eliza Alexander become the new Mrs. 
Canning than her husband whisked her off to the Aegean on 
a most unlikely honeymoon. Canning had arranged pre­
liminary conferences with several members of the Greek 
Provisional Government and with some of the factional 
leaders involved in the struggle. To Count Capodistrias, his 
old colleague of Swiss days who had fallen from the Czar's 
favor by reason of his part in the insurrection,1 he emphasized 
the dire possibilities inherent in too resolute a stand for com­
plete independence. The Count was sufficiently aware of 
general Russian policy to see the force of the argument and 
began to throw his weight behind some form of peaceful 
approach to the Porte. Prince Alexander Mavrocordatos was 
another one of the leaders to whom Canning's candor and 
sincerity became immediately apparent. His calm words of 
warning coupled with promises of real support on a middle 
ground were beginning to have their effect.2 
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There were other developments which tended to turn the 
Greeks toward a position more in keeping with English policy. 
The Petersburg Conference had come to an agreement on 
the part of Russia, Austria, France, and Prussia whereby they 
warned the Sultan to come to terms on the pain of severe 
penalties should he fail to do so. It was no secret, however, 
that Prince Metternich had let it be known at the Porte 
that Austria had no intention of following through with any 
sanctions whatsoever, and thus the strength of the demands 
was immediately vitiated. The Porte remained as intransigent 
as ever. 
This meaningless arm-waving was further weakened by the 
death of Czar Alexander I at the close of the year, which 
removed from the scene one of the founders and props of the 
Holy Alliance. After some uncertainty about the succession, 
his younger brother Nicholas ascended to the throne. Nicho­
las' ambitions were unknown. His first utterances seemed to 
negate the sometimes warlike threats of his predecessor and 
to imply that Russia no longer thought of armed intervention. 
All in all the Greeks felt they were being abandoned to 
their fate; the possibility of English mediation was the sole 
remaining hope. At a meeting on shipboard off the island of 
Hydra their representatives intimated to Canning that they 
would accept a settlement granting independence to the 
Morea, that is, the lower portion of Greece excluding Epirus, 
Macedonia, and Thessaly. They were willing to tolerate the 
presence of Turkish garrisons on the border and promised 
indemnities to satisfy legitimate Turkish claims. 
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A year earlier it would have been a major and perhaps 
efficacious concession, but now it came at a time when Greek 
fortunes were at a very low ebb. Not only was their foreign 
support dwindling and their cherished dreams of Russian 
aid vanishing in the mist, but a series of Egyptian military 
triumphs over their crumbling armies had reduced them to 
despair. The already stubborn Turkish attitude had stiffened 
correspondingly. Consequently, when the English Ambassa­
dor reached the Dardanelles in the spring of 1826 after a 
long and tiresome trip, delayed by meetings, by sickness in 
his party (Mrs. Canning had been laid low with fever), and 
by weather, he faced a rather defiant Porte. They were not 
thirsting for the opportunity to make any concessions. 
It was quite a change from his earlier experience: the 
basic structure had not changed so much, but the authority 
of the government had been appreciably strengthened. The 
Sultan Mahmud had solidified his power. He had effectively 
curbed the feudal autonomy of the derebeys, the great land­
holders, and had replaced them with appointed officials. He 
had brought all his vassals under control save one, Mehemet 
Ali, and the Egyptian was being bought off by the prospects 
of rich rewards in Greece. Bushels of human ears were reach­
ing the Seraglio daily and no attempt was made to hide them 
or the glee with which they were received. The depredations 
of the Egyptian troops had already been a matter of personal 
experience for Stratford Canning and his party. At one tiny 
port where they had put in for food and water they had 
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found a ghost town, devoid of all life but birds of prey, 
and these were busily picking the bones of the slaughtered 
inhabitants. 
Stratford Canning had come back to Turkey as an Elchi, 
the term reserved for the full ambassadors of the major 
powers. Neither he nor the Turks knew yet that in the years 
to come the title would be his almost exclusively. He was to 
be the great ambassador, the Elchi par excellence. A hint of 
things to come can be seen in his behavior at his audience 
with the Sultan, when he presumed to wear a ceremonial 
sword in the presence of the great Caliph himself. Mahmud 
spoke not a word throughout the audience but neither was 
any attempt made to induce the English Elchi to forgo the 
side arm. It was the beginning of the revolution he was to 
effect in the relationship between the Seraglio and foreign 
envoys. 
Before he was able to press any of his views upon the Porte, 
Canning had first to defend the right of England to meddle 
at all in the internal affairs of the Empire. With perfectly 
good logic the Turks asked him what the reaction of the 
English Cabinet would be should they enter a protest in 
London on behalf of the Peterloo rioters and other political 
malcontents then disturbing the peace in his homeland. 
Canning countered, with little effect, that there was a great 
difference between legal prosecution of rioters and the bar­
barities being inflicted in the Sultan's name on the women 
and children of Greece. 
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At the beginning he could make no progress in Constanti­
nople, but other developments were working to help him. 
The reports of the conference at Hydra and the accession of 
Nicholas I in Russia had prompted George Canning to send 
the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburg to take up the 
negotiations that the Elchi had begun the previous year. 
Nicholas, in an evident pose of desiring to appear as peace­
fully inclined as possible, entered enthusiastically into the 
proceedings, and the Wellington Protocol which resulted 
from the meeting (April 4, 1826) adopted almost in detail 
the lines of settlement advanced at Hydra. By its terms 
England and Russia agreed that Greece was to have full 
autonomy, with a payment of annual tribute to the Sultan 
who was also to have a voice in the nomination of its officials. 
The news of the agreement was joyfully received in England, 
but Stratford Canning, who doubted the sincerity of the 
Russians, had some misgivings, especially about their guarded 
disavowal of the use of force as a method of mediation. Nor 
was his doubt unjustified, for hard on the heels of the 
Wellington Protocol came a severe ultimatum to the Porte 
from Russia (April 5, 1826). While it is true that it made 
no mention of Greece and concerned Turkish laxity with 
respect to several items of the Treaty of Bucharest, the intent 
was clear. It was the same relentless pressure brought to bear 
to keep the Turks off balance in hopes that the walls would 
finally crumble without the need for high explosives.3 
Canning viewed the ultimatum as a double blessing,4 since 
it not only disspelled any rash hopes that might have been 
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arising in England for a quick and easy way out of the 
problem but also removed for him a dilemma that would 
face him if the Turks were to be convinced that no force 
would be used against them. By now he was sufficiently 
grounded in his understanding of Ottoman mentality to 
realize that no matter how much they appeared to resent 
the sword-rattling of the European powers, it was the only 
language they understood. Once it ceased they would return 
to their old ways. If the Wellington Protocol were to be 
taken in Constantinople for what its terms implied,5 the Turks 
would turn a deaf ear to the thought of Grecian independence 
and he, as Ambassador, would be at a loss as to what pressure 
he could bring to bear upon them. As things turned out, 
the necessary pressure remained along their Danubian border 
because of the Russian move. Before too long, consequently, 
there was a surprising reversal of Turkish recalcitrance. The 
Porte suddenly agreed to send representatives to meet the 
Russians at Akkerman. It was not only the Russian pressure 
that motivated the Sultan, however, for the embattled Mah­
mud had a surprise in store for everyone. 
If the Greek War had taught Mahmud anything it was the 
lesson that his army was hopelessly inefficient and incapable 
of meeting the trained modern armies of Europe. In his 
relations with foreign powers, therefore, he would perpetually 
be treating from a position of weakness. The root of this 
inefficiency, moreover, lay in the control wielded by the 
Corps of Janissaries, and in their unwillingness to pursue 
anything but their own ends. 
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It has been noted that Mahmud had made several strides 
toward improving the administration of the empire since the 
time of Canning's earlier term at the British Embassy. These 
improvements, let it be emphasized, were not made in the 
name of progress as commonly understood in the West: not 
in the interests of enlightened justice and humanitarianism, 
but solely to reconcentrate power in the hands of the Sultan 
and the Divan. If anything, they were to make it easier for 
the Sultan to be the autocratic Oriental monarch of old. The 
Janissaries, with their bureaucratic network in the capital and 
in the provinces, were the single greatest barrier remaining. 
Apparently Mahmud had decided to move against them 
some time before. He had freed himself from dependence 
on the Corps by employing the ruthless machine of Mehemet 
Ali in Greece. When the Russian pressure was renewed, 
Mahmud evidently concluded that he would lose less by 
treating with the Czar than by remaining a moment longer 
under the shadow of the praetorian guard the Janissaries had 
become. 
He himself had come to power and his two immediate 
predecessors had met their death as a direct result of an 
attempt to crash the Janissaries.8 There had been many 
Turkish leaders then, civil, religious, and military, who had 
applauded the attempted reforms of Selim III, but the hold 
of the Janissaries had been too strong and opposition to them 
too unorganized. In the intervening years, however, Mahmud 
had seen Mehemet Ali rise to a level of real power through 
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his destruction of the Mamelukes in Egypt and the adoption 
of army reforms.7 The Ottoman Sultan was not to be outdone, 
and he planned carefully. Over the years he had gradually 
removed the members of the Corps from one key position 
after another. Then, in June of 1826, he resurrected the 
Nizam Jedid. The Janissaries were given the opportunity of 
enrolling in the new army if they wished, but the Corps 
itself was disbanded. The Janissary units in the capital began 
a revolt by murdering the Sultan's emissaries, but Mahmud 
was ready. On the night of June 15, a ruthless campaign was 
begun against them. They were seized and slaughtered by 
the thousands in the capital and provincial cities.8 Their 
barracks were put to the torch, and artillery was turned on 
those who tried to make their escape. For months afterward, 
the city was a scene of horror. The bowstring and scimitar 
were steadily plied, and the very name Janissary meant an 
automatic death sentence. As is common in such explosions 
of revenge, the damning indictment of being listed on the 
rolls of the Corps was used against personal and political 
enemies. There was no investigation and no defense. 
Predictably, the violence brought with it xenophobic out­
bursts, and often the only safety for the Embassy staff was 
to be found within the confines of the Embassy itself. Poor 
Mrs. Canning watched in fear and dread late one night as 
her husband hurried down to the Embassy courtyard in his 
dressing gown to save the lives of the Embassy guards, who 
happened to be listed among the Janissaries. 
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While all this was going on, Canning was on guard against 
an inside danger as well. Treachery had been uncovered in 
the Embassy staff, involving one of the lesser dragomans who 
was known to be revealing secrets to Baron Ottenfels, the 
Austrian Internuncio. The delicacy of the affair was com­
plicated by the fact that the individual in question was a 
favorite at the Seraglio, and the Ambassador did not want 
to dismiss him summarily. It was better, he thought, to keep 
him in sight and to remove the danger by not entrusting him 
with information of any importance. In this quiet and un­
obstrusive way, Canning removed what might have been 
magnified into a major incident at a time when there was 
enough to worry about. After all, the machinations of the 
Internuncio and Prince Metternich did not depend on the 
services of a single corrupt dragoman. Metternich's devotion 
to the principles of absolutism had made him insensible to 
all considerations of humanity and justice. To try to thwart 
him directly in each and every instance would have been, in 
Canning's opinion, a waste of time and perhaps the very 
diversion the Austrian Chancellor was contriving to effect. 
Obviously, in this period of upheaval, there was little to 
be accomplished in the way of solving the Greek crisis. 
Mahmud's violence showed no signs of abating all through 
the summer, and the Ottoman Court seemed to be in a state 
of hypnotic trance. One eye was feasting on the continuing 
bloodbath and the other was fastened hopefully on the 
masses of recruits drilling European-style in every empty space 
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and campground for miles about. Gradually the comic-opera 
aspect of this new army dwindled for European observers, as 
Mahmud gave evidence of imposing his will, and what had 
initially been assumed to be the last gasp of a tottering dynasty 
imperceptibly transformed itself into the prospect of a new 
birth of power. 
It is difficult to judge just how unnerving this unexpected 
possibility was to the European courts and chancelleries, but 
it would be foolish to assume that it had no effect. The Porte 
also was showing some new astuteness in her foreign relations. 
For concomitant with an increasing stubbornness about 
Greece, where the Egyptians were all but smothering the 
rebels, the Turks displayed a marked willingness to appease 
the new czar of Russia. Turkish plenipotentiaries acceded 
to Russian demands relative to the border disputes along the 
Danube and signed a treaty with the Russians at Akkerman. 
It was a strategic retreat that cost Turkey little in the way 
of actual surrender while it removed any immediate pretext 
for Russian incursions southward. This affair was concluded 
in October of 1826, and the customary winter lag in 
negotiations and communications left all participants in a 
state of confused indecision. 
Even George Canning was at a loss as to how to proceed. 
He admitted that the barbarities in the Morea had put a 
distinctly different coloration on the grounds for mediation 
than had heretofore existed. There was also a recurrence of 
piracy in the Aegean which was proving detrimental to 
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British commerce. The rising clamor on this score plus a 
new wave of sympathy on behalf of Greek independence 
seem to have influenced him to countenance the use of force 
after all. 
When Stratford Canning protested the piracy to the Reis 
Effendi, he was met with indifference. The piracy, according 
to the Turks, was simply a result of the rebellion, and the 
rebellion would long ago have foundered but for support from 
England and the other powers. Let the Sultan deal with the 
Greeks as they deserved and there would be no further dif­
ficulty. The conviction grew in the Elchi's mind that, once 
again, only a display of force would sway the Turks. They 
ignored all evidence of cruelty presented to them, or denied 
the facts as they chose, and he saw no hope of persuading 
them to a different mode of action by words alone. His reports 
to London bear this conclusion out and undoubtedly they had 
their effect on his cousin's outlook. 
By the spring of 1827, George Canning had finally become 
the Prime Minister of England. He was faced with the choice 
of allowing Greece to be subjugated anew, of standing by 
while Russia took unilateral action, or of moving in concert 
with the other powers to bring effective pressure on the Porte. 
He welcomed a move by France to associate herself with the 
aims of the Wellington Protocol, and in July, the Treaty of 
London was signed by France, England, and Russia. It re­
stated the provisions of the Protocol, whereby the powers 
bound themselves to mediate in behalf of Greek independ­
ence, save for Turkish rights to indemnification and interest 
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in the foreign affairs of the new state. It also contained a 
secret article binding the three powers to interpose themselves 
between the belligerents should an armistice be refused.9 A 
time limit was annexed to the treaty when it was presented to 
the Porte, but as Stratford Canning reported, the Reis Effendi 
refused to look at the treaty and did not even bother to have it 
translated. 
Exactly how the interposition was to be made and how the 
armistice was to be enforced is not known. Three allied 
squadrons set sail for the Aegean under the loose over-all com­
mand of Sir Edward Codrington with orders to prevent the 
Sultan's armies in Greece from receiving either reinforcements 
or supplies. On his arrival in the waters of the Archipelago, 
the Admiral sought the advice of the British Ambassador as 
to the lengths he was to go to thus 'prevent," and in reply 
Stratford Canning wrote that he presumed the Cabinet in­
tended Codrington to use 'cannon shot" if necessary. 
The measure of prevention intended by the Prime Minister 
is a secret that died with him on August 6, after he had been 
Prime Minister for little more than one hundred days. His 
death came at the very time that Codrington was seeking 
clarification of his orders, and it was tragic for the cause of 
peace. There is little doubt that the Prime Minister would 
have restricted the Admiral to the use of warning shots unless 
he were attacked. As matters stood the orders were indefinite, 
but warning shots were all that Stratford Canning intended. 
He never failed to accept a share of the responsibility for what 
transpired a few weeks later, however, and freely admitted 
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that he should have been more judicious in his choice of words 
to a man of Codrington's fighting instincts. 
Early in October the allied fleet sought shelter from a severe 
storm in the harbor of Navarino. Unfortunately, the bulk of 
the Turco-Egyptian fleet was also at anchor in the same port. 
An incident ensued and a fierce battle followed, in the course 
of which the entire Moslem fleet was destroyed with the loss 
of countless seamen. The disaster could not have been more 
complete. 
Only the slightest chance warned Canning and his diplo­
matic confreres in Constantinople of the danger they were in 
before the news reached the Porte. Well aware of the 
frayed condition of Turkish nerves, they had all feared just 
such an eventuality and had made some moves to send away 
the women and children of the embassies but had not yet done 
so. Only fifty years earlier the lot of a foreign ambassador in 
a like situation would have been certain death, and the various 
envoys were not yet sure that the idea of diplomatic immunity 
had taken root in the minds of the Turks, especially after the 
violence of the preceding year in the Ottoman capital. 
Some time previous to this the ambassadors of France, Eng­
land, and Russia had begun the practice of meeting daily to 
discuss the developing crisis, and on a Sunday afternoon fol­
lowing the coup at Navarino, the English Ambassador was 
on his way to the French Embassy when a passerby thrust a 
crumpled note into his hands. It was a message from an 
English merchant captain informing the Ambassador of large-
scale naval action he had heard while sailing in the vicinity of 
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Navarino. Correctly interpreting the sounds of cannonade and 
intermittent explosions as harbingers of danger, the seaman 
had skirted the area and made a dash for Smyrna, from where 
he dispatched an overland messenger to Pera. Being thus 
warned, the diplomats had the opportunity of seeing to it, at 
least, that all their people were safely gathered in the respec­
tive embassies to await the outcome. Escape was impossible; 
to move staffs and families would have required fair-sized 
vessels, and none were available. Even had they been, a dash 
through the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles was incon­
ceivable. 
Fortunately, no attempt was made upon their persons, but 
the embassies were surrounded by troops and the envoys ac­
cused of violating the law of nations. The fact that further 
intelligence indicated the first shot had been fired by the 
Turks themselves did not assuage the anger of the Porte in 
the least, and for a time the foreigners felt they were living 
in constant peril of their lives. However, as the weeks passed 
without further retaliation, Canning thought that the Turks 
might have been brought to their senses by the shock of their 
losses. He ventured to send a dragoman to ask for a confer­
ence with the Reis Effendi. He reasoned that it was possible 
the Divan might be awaiting an approach on the subject of 
peace rather than wishing to appear fearful of the allies by 
making the first move. 
He was able to get his conference—several of them, in fact— 
but his hopes for Ottoman surrender to the inevitability of 
Greek independence were soon crushed. Actually a struggle 
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of vast proportions had been raging in the Divan ever since 
Navarino, with the Sultan himself urging a war to the death, 
and being restrained only by a majority who were in favor 
of coming to terms. The Sultan, accordingly, had withheld a 
declaration of war but he was resolute on Greece. Let the 
Greeks submit to his authority and he would listen to and 
repair their grievances. He would give them kind and friendly 
government but never independence. 
When it was apparent that negotiations would be fruitless, 
the allied envoys asked for their passports. They were re­
fused permission to leave, however, on the grounds that they 
were asking of their own accord and not under instruction 
from their respective home governments. Notwithstanding 
this refusal the ambassadors resolved to leave with their mis­
sions and repair to Corfu to await the decisions of their su­
periors. Canning described the departure in his memoirs: 
The position, it must be allowed, was sufficiently deli­
cate and hazardous. It was also attended with much in­
convenience and embarrassment. We were acting under a 
heavy responsibility towards our respective Governments. 
We had to provide for the protection of the merchants, for 
the conveyance of the official correspondence, and for the 
safety of the crown property which must be left behind. 
We could not foresee into what fanatical agitation the 
Musulman populace might be thrown by our departure. . 
On 8 December I embarked on board a small merchant 
vessel. My wife went with me. Our companions were 
numerous. . We had to walk a considerable way through 
the town. It was already dark when we started. It blew 
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hard from the north, and rained plentifully. We had the 
streets in consequence to ourselves; there was no hindrance 
to our exodus. The French ambassador had weighed 
anchor an hour or two before us, but we passed him in the 
night and were the first to reach the Dardanelles. . We 
had to encounter the officers of the Custom House, and here, 
if mischief was intended, we should have to undergo an 
awkward detention. I got into a boat and waited on 
the Pasha, who treated me as a mere English traveller with 
becoming hospitality. The windows of his Excellency's 
apartment looked out upon the water, and when I saw 
that our vessel had cleared the line of his guns, I told him 
who I was, and explained the circumstances under which I 
had left Constantinople. He took my communication with 
Turkish gravity and personal good humour. It looked as if 
he had received orders to let us pass. We had scarcely 
cleared the Dardanelles when we were told to be on our 
guard as pirates were supposed to be in the neighborhood. 
The warning was thrown away upon us, for our vessel 
was not armed, and I doubt whether there was a single gun, 
pistol, or cutlass on board. Our business evidently was to 
push on, and we were fortunate enough to reach the Gulf 
of Smyrna without accident or alarm. A royal frigate was 
waiting for us there.10 
Canning and his wife returned to England in 1828, just 
after the turn of the year. He looked upon his mission as a 
dismal failure, and he had suffered a grievous loss in the death 
of his cousin. He was somewhat heartened by a warm wel­
come from the Duke of Wellington, now the Prime Minister, 
and the personal approbation of the King at Windsor, but 
otherwise the outlook was very dismal. 
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1. Cf. Crawley, op. cit., p. 16: "When the revolt broke out sooner than 
the cautious friends of Greece had hoped or expected Capo d'Istria soon 
lost his position at the Emperor's side." 
2. Ibid., pp. 45 ff. A sizable number of important leaders had already 
submitted an "Act of Submission" to England whereby they sought an 
English Protectorate over Greece. This measure followed the Greek re­
jection of the terms outlined in the Russian memorandum. Although the 
idea of a Protectorate was immediately dismissed by the Foreign Office, 
nevertheless George Canning did take it, together with other overtures 
being made to various European royal houses looking for a candidate for 
a Greek "throne," as a sign that the Greeks were ready to accept a semi-
independent autonomy along the lines he had been urging. He thus felt 
free to attempt mediation along with Russia. Accordingly, Stratford Can­
ning was instructed to press the Turks to accept similar mediation. 
3. Ibid., p. 2: "The Russian Cabinet liked always to have some un­
settled claims which could be pushed forward at favourable moments as 
an excuse for further encroachment." 
4. Ibid., p. 54: "The awkward paradox was this: Stratford's lever of 
negotiation with the Turks was admitted to be the prospect of a war with 
Russia: yet Wellington, so far from admitting the right of the Tsar to 
make war, was to obtain if possible an undertaking from him not to do so." 
5. Ibid., p. 61: "The protocol made it quite clear that meditation was 
to be offered to, not forced upon, the Turks " (my italics). 
6. See above, chap. II, pp. 22, 33 n.2. 
7. See Toynbee, op. cit., VIII, 232-49, for a full treatment of Moslem 
reaction to and adoption of Western military organization in the nine­
teenth century. 
8. Some historians think that Mahmud intended the slaughter as an 
act of revenge. Others feel that the violence of the Janissary reaction drove 
him to it. It seems safe to say that he expected the reaction and was 
prepared to meet it in any way necessary. Cf. Fisher, op. cit., pp. 273-741 
who notes that 14,000 artillerymen were gathered in the capital. 
9. Cf. Crawley, op. cit., p. 76. 
10. Lane-Poole, op cit., I, 455-57. 
IX

THE death of George Canning signalled the end of an era 
of great Tory leadership in England. Incompetence and in­
decision became the order of the day in Westminster and 
Whitehall. The months immediately following the Prime 
Minister's death had seen a caretaker Cabinet under Lord 
Goderich function until a new government was organized 
under what should have been the able leadership of the Duke 
of Wellington, but it was an administration which proved to 
be highly ineffective. Before 1830 was out, it was to go down 
to defeat opposing the Reform Bill being supported by the 
Whigs and young Tories. 
For Stratford Canning the untimely death of George Can­
ning was a great personal blow. Not only did it sever the deep 
ties which bound him to his cousin and mentor, but it shat­
tered his hopes for home office as well. Stratford had now 
to face the realization that there was to be no place for him 
in the Cabinet in the foreseeable future. He had, however, 
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resolved to finish the task entrusted to him by his cousin: 
the liberation of Greece as an independent country, free from 
both Turkish and Russian domination. 
The leadership which George Canning had maintained in 
European affairs, particularly with reference to Greece, was 
on the point of being abandoned to Russian ascendancy. In­
deed the new Czar's intentions had been quickly manifested 
by a declaration of the war which the late Prime Minister had 
feared. Stratford Canning had barely reached England when 
Nicholas I declared war on the Porte.1 
In view of this turn of events Canning did not go through 
the usual formalities of submitting his resignation to the new 
Cabinet but decided instead to press them to pursue the goals 
delineated by the Treaty of London before time had erased 
the meaning of the agreement. He had assumed that as a 
matter of honor if not of policy the Wellington Cabinet would 
feel constrained by the terms of that treaty to implement the 
intentions of the previous government. If it were to do so, 
it was imperative that steps be taken to return the Ambassador 
to the scene and to re-establish contact with both the Greeks 
and the Turks. Canning urged that there was every reason, 
now that England had used force, to follow it up to its logical 
conclusion by pressing upon the Porte the determination of 
England to see the independence of Greece realized before 
the Sultan should undo himself by miscalculation. The 
danger was, of course, that should Britain suddenly abstain 
from the imbroglio the Sultan might well try his new army 
against the might of Russia. He would inevitably be crushed, 
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to the detriment not only of Turkey but of England as well. 
To dispatch the English fleet to the Dardanelles, on the other 
hand, was a measure Mahmud would understand, and it 
would likely bring him to senses before a catastrophe oc­
curred. 
However, the logic of this reasoning found little support 
at the Foreign Office, where a new face had appeared.2 The 
Earl of Aberdeen who soon succeeded Lord Dudley as Well­
ington's Foreign Secretary was a conviced pacifist. Despite 
his early philhellenism he could not countenance force even 
to help the Greeks. Aberdeen refused to believe that the 
very horror he detested was actually going on, that savagery 
was continuing in Greece because no one had taken effective 
means to put an end to it. The apparition of possible violence 
to come blinded him to the bloodshed at hand. Nor did he 
know the Turks as Stratford Canning did, or he would have 
recognized that firmness might bring not the conflict he feared 
but the peace he desired. Under the domination of Welling­
ton, furthermore, Aberdeen had become something of a legiti­
mist, and the Greeks were not doing much to convince him 
that they were worth fighting a war for. Factional strife and 
assassination had become rampant; there were two; and some­
times three groups, each of which claimed to be the legitimate 
provisional government. Their greatest leader, Count (Presi­
dent) Capodistrias, was soon to fall under an assassin's knife. 
Understandably under the circumstances, it was exceed­
ingly difficult for the Elchi to press his views home with the 
Cabinet. It is worth noting, however, that the very policy 
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he was advocating was the same the Czar had lately offered 
to London. The invitation was embodied in a memorandum 
that was rejected by the Wellington Cabinet in January, be­
fore Nicholas had decided to act alone. In desperation Can­
ning resorted to every stratagem he could think of to spur the 
Duke to action. Once he appealed to Wellington to imagine 
what would happen if by some chance the Turks did succeed 
in beating off the Russians. Was Christendom to bow before 
a new wave of Moslem terror in Greece? On another tack, 
he proposed a joint Anglo-French occupation of the Morea. 
When this drew no response, he suggested that France alone 
proceed on such an expedition, with England giving its bless­
ings. 
This last suggestion apparently did not conflict too harshly 
with Aberdeen's principles or with Wellington's parsimonious-
ness.3 The Cabinet sanctioned the move and by July a force 
of 18,000 French troops landed in the Morea. The non-in­
tervention principle of George Canning was thus effectively 
buried along with the legitimist pretensions of the Holy Al­
liance. 
The Wellington Cabinet sanctioned the French move on 
the grounds that it was in line with that article of the Treaty 
of London which required that the signatories interpose them­
selves between the belligerents should an armistice be refused. 
Here was an interesting paradox: the government of France 
was considered to be acting in behalf of the three signatories 
of that document, and Russia, now at war with the Sultan, 
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was one of the three! But that technicality was easily disposed 
of. Russia was neatly fitted into the scheme of things by being 
judged to be at war in the Balkans and the Black Sea but 
neutral in Greece. 
Mediation, at any rate, was resurrected, and a meeting of 
plenipotentiaries representing the signatories of the Treaty 
was called to convene at Poros, an island near the northeastern 
coast of the Peloponnesus. There they were to draw up an 
instrument of peace in accord with the terms of the same 
Treaty. Stratford Canning was the English plenipotentiary, 
and was, as Crawley notes, the wrong man for the Wellington 
Cabinet to send in view of the limitations they wished to put 
upon the new state.4 Of course, these limitations were not 
yet known or Stratford would never have gone out. 
The joint instructions given the ministers were correctly 
broad on all three points they were to consider: the territorial 
limits of the new state; its form of government; and financial 
indemnification to the Porte and to Turkish subjects likely to 
be effected by the change of sovereignty. The settlement 
of these points was to be determined by local conditions. On 
the matter of territorial extent, for example, they were to judge 
on the basis of two criteria: first, to include within the bound­
aries of the new state any area whose populace had been in­
volved in open insurrection, so that that area was not to be 
abandoned to certain revenge; and second, to select a naturally 
defensive boundary with a mind to "'mountain ridges and deep 
ravines.'' Anyone who is familiar with the terrain of Greece 
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will know how indefinite the last admonition was. On the 
matter of the form of government the plenipotentiaries were 
to keep in mind the factional strife among the Greeks, and 
they were to consult the Greeks themselves. It was a fore­
gone conclusion that the respective European governments 
favored a monarchy, but until a suitable prince could be un­
covered it was possible that the conferees would have to go 
along with the provisional president, Capodistrias. Such was 
the extent of their orders. 
Mrs. Canning's health was not good in the summer of 1828 
so she remained home in England. Canning joined his 
French and Russian counterparts at Poros, and they plunged 
into the morass of detail awaiting them. They were joined 
for long periods of time by Capodistrias whose objections and 
truculence at this juncture became a constant thorn. As Can­
ning put it, England and the civilized world wanted to see an 
independent Greece, but not a Greece powerful enough to 
keep the eastern Mediterranean in a state of perpetual fer­
ment. Turkish agreement was going to be hard enough to 
obtain without dismembering her still more to suit the dreams 
of a "greater Greece."5 With Capodistrias, Stratford could be 
patient and understanding, and in spite of extreme provoca­
tion he kept the Greek president from leaving, and diereby 
upsetting, the meeting. 
Day-in and day-out shipboard existence was not easy for 
Canning, who never prided himself on being a mariner. 
Seasickness and summer heat bothered him constantly, but 
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his powers of endurance were such that he kept himself and 
his colleagues at their tasks until, item by item, they forged a 
vehicle that seemed able to traverse the rest of the distance to 
the promised land.'' Subject to ratification by all concerned, 
the Poros Conference set the continental boundaries of Greece 
along a mountain range bordering Thessaly, somewhat to 
the north of the one Stratford Canning preferred (he had 
urged a line running from Arta to Volos just above the thirty-
ninth parallel). Here he acceded to the judgment of the 
French ambassador who was an expert in geography. The 
insular boundaries included most of the islands in the far-
flung Aegean Archipelago, including Crete. Where popula­
tions were so mixed as to ensure continued violence, there 
was to be a transfer of population depending on individual 
choice. A further recommendation was that a kingdom be 
set up, with a Crown to be offered to a foreign prince as the 
means best calculated to stifle factional disputes. Finally, the 
outlines of a constitution were drawn, centering much author­
ity in the Crown to allow for stabilization at first, but contain­
ing machinery for a later broadening of the base of govern­
ment. The solution was agreed to by the plenipotentiaries 
and the Greeks. There remained the tasks of obtaining Turk­
ish acquiescence and finding a king—a king who would not 
need an expensive court and one strong enough to be what 
he was supposed to be. 
For the winter the diplomats decided to withdraw to Naples, 
then the favorite retreat of European society. There Mrs. 
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Canning joined her husband. But it was not entirely a period 
of relaxation. In the midst of the social whirl Canning had 
several discussions with Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who 
seemed to be a nearly unanimous choice for the throne of 
Greece. Whether or not Canning influenced Leopold ad­
versely is an open question. The Ambassador clearly hoped, 
along with the others, that the Crown would go to Leopold, 
but told him quite frankly that it was a throne which might 
drive its occupant to despair.6 At any rate, Leopold declined 
the homage of Greece to become, a short while later, the King 
of the Belgians. Had he accepted the throne of Greece it is 
interesting to speculate on what the subsequent history of that 
land might have been. 
Stratford Canning's plans suffered a rude jolt when he 
heard of Lord Aberdeen's reactions to the decisions of Poros. 
He unequivocally rejected the northern boundary and accused 
Canning of openly flaunting his instructions with regard to 
Crete.7 That island, it is true, had not been included in the 
agenda but, in the opinion of the ambassadors, would have 
been if the home governments had been aware of local con­
ditions. Hard fighting had been going on there for years, 
and it would have been unfair to abandon the rebels to the 
vengeance of the Turks. The plenipotentiaries had included 
it in accord with their general instructions to pay heed to the 
needs of the local populace. 
Unfortunately, strong and severe expressions were used on 
both sides, and the rupture resulted in the inevitable. Strat­
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ford Canning offered to resign as Ambassador rather than to 
try to undo what he had done. The resignation was accepted 
in April of 1829, and Aberdeen's brother, Sir Robert Gordon, 
replaced Canning for the coming negotiations in Constanti­
nople. For the time being the Elchi was removed from the 
scene of action.8 
By an ironic twist of fate his retirement from diplomacy 
ushered him, at last, into the benches of Commons, but at the 
very time he would have wished otherwise. While he had 
been engaged in the discussions at Poros, he had been elected 
to represent the constituency of Old Sarum. It was one of the 
most rotten of the "rotten boroughs,' to be sure. However, 
he was a Member of Parliament and had some consolation 
from the fact that his seat was once held by no lesser a light 
than Chatham, the elder Pitt. 
In December of that same year, Wellington, by way of 
compensation and appreciation for Canning's services, recom­
mended to the King that the new M. P. be awarded the Grand 
Cross of the Bath. He was henceforward known as Sir 
Stratford Canning. 
1. See Temperley, op. cit., pp. 54 ff. Nicholas was not entirely un­
provoked. Smoldering with rage over the blow delt him at Navarino, 
Mahmud issued a blistering proclamation at the close of 1827 repudiating 
the Convention of Akkerman and virtually calling for a holy war in 
defense of Islam. It was more than the war party in Russia could tolerate, 
and war began in April of 1828. 
2. Ibid., pp. 53-54: "The policy of acting with Russia, in order to 
restrain her from attacking Turkey, was one which none but a great 
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statesman could conceive or execute. Wellington and Aberdeen, who 
succeeded [George] Canning, made no attempt to do so. They could not 
conceive that support of Russia might really be a benefit to Turkey." (See 
also Stratford Canning's memoirs in Lane-Poole, op. cit., I, 458-61.) 
3. Wellington did not want to spend a single shilling on a Greek 
war: " . Thank God, it has never cost us a shilling, and never shall." 
See Crawley, op. cit., p. 121. 
4. Ibid., pp. 109-12. 
5. See Stratford Canning, The Eastern Question, pp. 188-99, f°r a full 
account of the Poros meeting. 
6. Leopold did talk to others about the matter, of course, including 
Capodistrias. 
7. Cf. Crawley, op. cit., p. 147. Aberdeen feared that the new Greek 
state would be nothing but a tool of Russia and that a Russian foothold 
in Crete would give the Czars a strnglehold on the Levant. 
8. Ibid., p. 154: "Stratford was deeply disappointed at the result, but 
he was perfectly right to resign; he wrote to Dawkins [the English 
Resident in Greece]: 'As matters now stand the fate of Greece will turn 
almost exclusively on the fortunes of the Russian campaign.'" 
X

THE tentative arrangements of the Poros Conference were 
approved without change through a separate group of French 
and Russian representatives sitting in a superior conference 
with the English in London. This ratification took the form 
of a protocol which became known as the Protocol of March 
(1829). To the protocol the English Cabinet added an 
Annex of its own whereby Lord Aberdeen specified that the 
new state was to end at the Isthmus of Corinth. This was 
the new departure from the Poros agreement that the Foreign 
Secretary wanted Canning to follow, and it was more than 
the Elchi could stomach. He considered it a glaring injustice 
to the Greeks. It was also Canning's opinion that if Aberdeen 
wanted, as he had professed he did, a trouble-free Greece and 
a Greece that would not cause trouble, he should be willing 
to grant her a defensible boundary with the Turks. To choke 
her off at Corinth was to leave her hopelessly weak and sub­
ject to later attack. It was because of this difference of opinion 
that Canning was superseded by Sir Robert Gordon. 
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Upon his arrival home from Naples, Canning found that 
there was an evident lack of liaison between the Duke and the 
Foreign Secretary, for, according to Wellington, the Annex 
was to be brought forward only if the Sultan refused the more 
northerly boundary. Furthermore, it had been Wellington's 
intention that the Annex be used as a device to force the Porte 
to accept either a semi-independent larger state (that is, up to 
the northerly line) or a completely independent smaller state.1 
Whatever Wellington intended, the opportunity to remedy 
the situation had passed, as Gordon was already engaged in 
pursuing Aberdeen's private policy in Constantinople. 
It is not clear just what Aberdeen hoped to accomplish by 
this open and major break with his allies, but the whole en­
terprise came to nought when thus presented. Mahmud 
would countenance neither the Protocol nor the Annex, and 
Gordon was reduced to useless thumb-twiddling while the 
Czar worked with the tool the Turks understood best: an 
advancing army. 
The whole substance of the Poros Convention and the 
March Protocol became practically academic in September 
when the Russians captured Adrianople. Constantinople 
was but a short march further, and the Sultan had no better 
defences there than he previously had at Adrianople. The 
populace became panicky and mourned the absence of the 
Janissaries. Mahmud and the Divan were frightened as much 
by the thought of revolt as by the threatening Russians. 
When, therefore, the Russian commander, General Diebitsch, 
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halted and offered an armistice, the Porte hastily agreed.2 The 
famous Treaty of Adrianople was signed on September 14, 
1829. It included some territorial arrangements in Circassia 
and recognition of Russian right to hold the mouth of the 
Danube, plus further rights respecting the Christian populace 
in the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, but its most 
important feature was the enforced acceptance by the Turks 
of the terms of the Treaty of London and the March Protocol. 
The independence of Greece was finally recognized by the 
Porte. 
Many questions remained to be settled: the definitive de­
marcation of a boundary, the amount and method of indemni­
fication, the selection of a monarch for the new state. The 
still primitive communications of the time allowed for an in­
credible lapse of time between the initialling of a diplomatic 
document and its practical implementation. This factor, com­
bined with Turkish skill in vacillation, was still delaying a 
final settlement in Greece when the Wellington Cabinet fell 
in 1830. 
When the Ministry of Lord Grey assumed office in 1831, 
Turco-Egyptian troops were still on Greek soil, although there 
was no more fighting. On the contrary, the former masters 
stood on the sidelines while the erstwhile Provisional Govern­
ment fell apart and the cruelties of civil war superseded the 
horrors of subjugation. There was every chance that the 
Greeks would yet be their own worst enemy. President Capo­
distrias had been murdered and had been succeeded by a 
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much less capable brother, Count Agostino Capodistrias, who 
seemed unable to bring even a semblance of unity to the 
country. 
However, the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, 
was a person not unlike Stratford Canning in his ability to 
perceive the right course of diplomatic action. Though they 
were often to differ substantially in the coming years, Palmers­
ton and Canning understood each other and were to work well 
together. Without any hesitation Palmerston asked Canning 
if he would go to the East and help bring order out of the 
chaos. Canning could not respond with the same assurance, 
however, for he was doubtful that anything could be salvaged 
out of the miserable mess. He was in Parliament, moreover, 
and his misgivings were strengthened by the continued poor 
health of his wife. There was some embarrassment, too, in 
that Sir Robert Gordon still held the ambassadorship to the 
Porte and the Grey Cabinet seemed to be ignoring Gordon 
very pointedly. On that score Palmerston persuaded Canning 
that his special mission would in no way detract from Gordon's 
position or prestige inasmuch as the peace effort might better 
be handled by a plenipotentiary accredited to none of the 
conflicting parties. Because of his deep devotion to the goal 
of final peace and independence for Greece, Canning was 
finally persuaded to leave his wife. He accepted the assign­
ment. 
Prior to his leaving England his previous recommendations 
had been justified and his hand appreciably strengthened by 
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a new agreement among the three powers, the Protocol of 
September, 1831. It overturned Aberdeen's restrictions and 
re-established the more northerly Arta-Volo line as the bound­
ary. Further, a loan was arranged to enable Greece to indem­
nify the Sultan and the dispossessed Turkish landowners. 
Once again Canning set out for the Levant. He was ap­
proaching his forty-fifth birthday, and nearly a quarter-century 
had gone by since he first set sail from Portsmouth with the 
Adair mission. He had suffered much in the way of privation 
and personal loss in the intervening years, and the knighthood 
which had been bestowed upon him was small consolation. 
His first wife was long buried, and with her was entombed 
the body of their stillborn son. The second Mrs. Canning 
continued in poor health as the result of another stillbirth 
amid the scenes of carnage that surrounded their first years 
in Constantinople. One brother had died at Waterloo and 
another, Henry, had passed away with the last year. George 
Canning was gone and his name was fast becoming a memory. 
The dreams of youth had evaporated. 
His mood of depression did not lighten as his ship ap­
proached the shores of Greece. "It grieves me to the heart to 
say that I hear nothing good of the Greeks,1' he wrote to his 
wife from on board. "No fresh crimes But disunion, 
and party hatred, and political intrigue carried to the worst 
extremes. The Scripture expression—'to the Greeks foolish­
ness'—is forever running through my head . ," and again, 
as if trying to determine his own role in all of this, "my only 
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hope is that Providence may possibly choose to glorify itself 
by employing the weakest of its instruments in effecting the 
general good."3 
Perhaps the bitter reflection that almost three years had 
been wasted by Aberdeen's misconception of reality caused 
the picture to appear darker than it actually was; for notwith­
standing his sense of despair, Canning plunged into the 
shambles as though there were nothing so beyond repair 
that it could not be made to yield to the craftman's skill. Un­
doubtedly he was able to communicate his feelings of ex­
treme danger to those with whom he came in contact, for he 
proved to be able to inspire a new surge of national unity in 
the quarreling National Assembly of the provisional govern­
ment of Greece.4 Although his success was not immediately 
apparent to him, the progress he made is attested by a letter 
from Palmerston which reached Constantinople some weeks 
afterward: "The Conference are delighted with what you did 
in the Morea,1 the Foreign Secretary wrote on the seventh of 
March, 1832, 'and all agree how lucky it was that you should 
have dropped down there at the moment you did. You seem 
at all events to have re-established union "B 
At the end of January he approached the Golden Horn of 
Constantinople for the third time in his life. This time he 
arrived in a steamship. Modernity was coming to Turkey at 
a snail's pace, but inevitably and inexorably. It is possible 
that it was at this moment that Canning began to feel a 
sympathy for the Turks. Perhaps he began to wonder then 
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what conditions would have to be established before this un­
happy empire could take its place in the community of nations. 
At any rate, we find him beginning to allude to such feelings 
at this time.6 They were to be intensified by what he saw 
in Turkey, for the country was developing in a way he had 
not thought possible. Almost singlehandedly, the Sultan 
Mahmud seemed to be making a heroic effort to lift his coun­
try from the morass of outworn tradition and to shake off the 
torpor of centuries. 
The first thing that struck Canning was the remarkable 
change in court etiquette. At the audience of reception the 
Elchi was received with dignity. Not only did the guards 
present arms to him but the Sultan himself spoke warmly and 
entered into real conversation with the whole staff of the 
mission. It was evident that Mahmud wished the representa­
tive of the British court to consider the Sultan of Turkey as 
being approachable. Sir Stratford was struck, too, by the rela­
tive freedom with which a foreigner could walk about the 
streets of the ancient capital and wander through a slave mar­
ket without being stopped and questioned.7 (The existence of 
the slave market indicates that only a subtle observer would 
have perceived that Turkey was undergoing a complete re­
versal of its way of life, for though there were signs of change, 
there was no revolution taking place.) 
Canning's task was to obtain the Sultan's final acquiescence 
to the surrender of sovereignty over the land and people of 
Greece. He was aware that there was more at stake than mere 
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sentiment. That territory had been conquered in the name 
of the Prophet and at the cost of Moslem blood. Its sur­
render to the infidel meant sacrilege and cowardice of a 
degree to which no follower of Mohammed could be indif­
ferent. He knew, too, that even by agreeing to negotiate the 
final transaction Mahmud might be exposing himself to a 
dire fate at the hands of fanatics. The Elchi could not expect 
the Sultan, therefore, to take the public lead in the amputa­
tion. A stratagem had to be found that would allow the 
Sultan to submit to the inevitable. 
The opportunity to open discussions readily presented itself 
in the form of a new cloud on Mahmud's horizon. Mehemet 
Ali Pasha, enraged at the reversal of his fortunes in Greece, 
and blaming the weakness and cowardice of the Porte for all 
of it, had invaded Syria, and he now demanded that it be 
turned over to him. He had besieged and captured Acre and 
had sent word that Ibrahim would come to Constantinople 
with a powerful army to demand the heads of the Sultan's 
ministers. Mahmud was virtually helpless, but even so he 
could not proceed carelessly on the Greek matter, or appear 
indifferent to the sensibilities of the Moslem populace. There 
was no telling which of his ministers might seek the favor of 
Mehemet Ali by arousing the people of the capital against the 
Sultan. 
Canning's stratagem was simple: " to awaken the Sul­
tan's hopes of eventual assistance from England [against 
Mehemet], without committing my Government or compro­
mising my own character."8 But he could not go through the 
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regular ministerial channels. He had to have an instrument 
of direct and secret approach to Mahmud himself. That in­
strument was found in the person of a professional under­
cover agent, a Phanariot Greek8 by the name of Stefanaki 
Vogorides, whom Canning knew to have uncanny access to 
the Seraglio. Secrecy was of the utmost importance for all 
concerned, and the dignified Elchi now began to engage in 
cloak-and-dagger operations of the best fictional type. A 
nocturnal meeting between himself and Vogorides was ar­
ranged: 
His house, at some considerable distance up the Golden 
Horn, was to be the scene of our interview. I promised to 
go at night, and he undertook to send his own boat for 
my conveyance. The night appointed for my visit chanced 
to be most boisterous. A strong north gale with driving 
rain blew down the harbour. I had to walk no small distance 
to the water, and then to embark alone on its troubled 
waves. On board I crouched in utter darkness under my 
umbrella, and shivered to the blasts that rushed over it. The 
return was so far better that the wind no longer beat against 
our teeth. 
My conversation with the agent in question led to a 
satisfactory understanding between us. He engaged to work 
in my favour with the Sultan; I displayed a readiness to 
consult his Majesty's wishes to the full length of my tether. 
A confidential intercourse under his auspices would be 
maintained simultaneously with the official negotiation.10 
In the nest of intrigue that was Constantinople it would have 
been impossible to conceal a succession of such meetings, and 
after that Canning employed the embassy physician, Dr. Mac­
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Guffog, as the go-between with Vogorides, thus bypassing 
even the embassy dragoman. T h e secrecy was not melo­
dramatic, however, and was utilized to relieve Vogorides' fear 
as much as for anything else. 
Once the contact was effected the Elchi lost no opportunity 
in impressing upon the Sultan the ultimate good that would 
come to his realm by co-operation with the European powers, 
not only in Greece, but over the whole range of international 
intercourse. In many of his messages there are indications of 
the reformer-to-be: 
I want to see her [the Porte] in a situation to receive the 
full tide of European civilization, to enlist the whole force 
of the country in support of its independence, to take her 
proper place in the general councils of Europe, and to base 
her military and financial systems on the only true founda­
tions of security for persons and property. Beg of him 
[Vogorides] to reverse this picture and to imagine the Sultan 
wasting the remains of his strength in civil war with Egypt, 
alienating himself from his natural and most tried friends 
by rejecting their proposals, making himself unpopular at 
home by half-measures of innovation, without carrying them 
far enough to acquire confidence and sympathy abroad, 
and left to struggle as he best may I say that it would 
be better for him to revive the Janissaries, to resume the 
turbans and pelisses of ancient times, and to demand the 
restoration of Greece. The choice lies between fanaticism 
and discipline; there is no middle line.11 
T h e Sultan could procrastinate as well as his ministers, 
and the contest was long and tiresome. But Canning was 
persistent and Mehemet Ali was as threatening as ever. The 
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pressure of Mehemet and the thought of British help eventu­
ally broke the back of Mahmud's resistance, and the agree­
ment on Greece was ready for signature. 
While these secret negotiations between the Sultan and 
himself were in progress, Canning, in company with the 
French and Russian envoys, was forced to carry on wearisome 
discussions with the Divan. The agreement of the Sultan's 
ministers to all territorial particulars as well as to the details 
of financial indemnification had to be won before Mahmud 
could publicly assent to a settlement. Verbally the Turks 
would agree to this detail and that, but again and again they 
refused to sign written agreements. At one stage of the deal­
ings the Grand Vezir absented himself on official business 
in the provinces for weeks on end. Not to be outdone Can­
ning sent a subaltern to his camp in Albania to get the needed 
assent. 
Perseverance finally wore down procrastination. At one 
of the final meetings Canning arranged through Vogorides 
for a messenger to arrive from the Sultan (he referred to the 
incident as a ''coup de theatre"^) expressing his Majesty's 
desire that the conferees agree to the Arta-Volo line as the 
most satisfactory to all. At long last the agreement was 
handed to the clerks to be put into final form, and the 
twenty-first of July was appointed as the day for formal 
signing. 
The plenipotentiaries met in an imperial kiosk some miles 
up the Bosporus. They started what should have been per­
functory proceedings at ten o'clock in the morning, only to 
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have their Turkish member begin all over again with the 
usual delaying tactics. Canning held them all to their tasks 
and at length accused the Ottoman dignitary, Suleiman Nejib 
Effendi, of attempting to thwart the will of the Sultan. The 
Turk remonstrated and declared he would sooner cut off his 
right hand than sign the document. Whereupon Canning 
retorted that he would then have to sign with his other hand 
as they had met for that purpose alone and not for new 
debate. When the Elchi insisted that they would remain 
around the clock until they were finished, Suleiman realized 
the end had come. At three o'clock the following morning 
Suleiman signed the hated document in the name of the 
Sultan.12 The ten-year Greek War was over! It was a war 
that could have destroyed Mahmud and his realm and em­
broiled all of Europe. Sir Stratford Canning had played a 
significant role in it and could be proud of his service. He 
had seen leaders die—George Canning and Czar Alexander 
and Capodistrias, among others. He had seen nations change 
and reverse policies of long standing. The echoes were not 
soon to die, but the struggle was over. 
That his patience had worn thin in the end is best shown 
by the tone of the message he sent Palmerston later that same 
day: "You can hardly refuse to join with me in swearing at 
the Turks. No man in Christendom can have an idea of what 
we have gone through. I defy even a Dutch negotiation to 
be worse. if you are satisfied I shall soon forget my 
vexation to make up matters with the Turks, we have 
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just been dining with one of the plenipotentiaries, who, in 
spite of his beard and his Koran, drinks champagne like a 
Christian."13 
By way of postscript to the story of Greece, Prince Otho 
of the royal house of Bavaria landed in Greece in January 
of 1833 as the first king of independent Greece. He was 
the choice of the powers when other desirable candidates 
were eliminated or eliminated themselves for one reason or 
another.14 
Sir Stratford Canning received plaudits from the King, 
from the Sultan, from Palmerston, and even from the aged 
Talleyrand. But the best of all his rewards was the infant 
son he found in Lady Canning's arms when he arrived home 
in September. 
1. Cf. Crawley, op. cit., p. 153. 
2. Ibid., p. 162. Actually, Diebitsch's army was in a precarious position. 
It was greatly reduced by illness and there was a Turkish army advancing 
on it from the rear. But this weakness was not realized in Constantinople, 
and Mahmud feared to order his remaining troops to advance to what 
must have seemed certain defeat. 
A further explanation of Diebitsch's sudden halt lies in a policy change 
adopted by Nicholas I. Realizing that his vaunted military power was not 
what it was represented to be, the Czar had lately changed Russian policy 
vis-a-vis the Porte. His advisers pointed out that Russia would not be 
able to hold the Straits against the rest of Europe. Better, then, to have 
a weak Turkey as a neighbor to be saved for future action than to expose 
Russia in an awkward, indefensible position. (Cf. Temperley, op. cit., 
P- 570 
3. Lane-Poole, op. cit., I, 496. 
4. Cf. Crawley, op. cit., p. 199. 
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5. Lane-Poole, op. cit., I, 498. 
6. Cf. The "Memorandum on the Turco-Egyptian Question'' of Strat­
ford Canning to Palmerston, Paris, December 19, 1832, and discussed in 
chap. XII below. The memorandum is reprinted in full, as Appendix V, 
in Crawley op. cit., pp. 237-45. 
7. See the letter to Lady Canning, February 24, 1832, Lane-Poole, op. 
cit., I, 503. 
8. Lane-Poole, op. cit., I, 507. 
9. That is, a Greek of the Phanar section of Constantinople where the 
headquarters of the Greek Patriarch was located. Generally these were 
members of old families in the city and were in high esteem at the Porte. 
They were not nationalist in the sense of the revolutionaries, and, indeed, 
there was often great animosity between the Phanariots as a group and the 
leaders of the sevolt. 
10. Lane-Poole, op. cit., I, 506-7. 
11. Ibid., 508. 
12. See Ibid., pp. 501-11, for the account. 
13. Ibid., p. 511. 
14. Cf. Crawley, op. cit., pp. 205-8. 
XI

PASSING reference has already been made to the fact that 
Stratford Canning had been elected to Parliament in 1828 
while he was still at Poros and the official Ambassador to 
the Sublime Porte. The term "election'' is used loosely, for 
his first constituency, Old Sarum, had a grand total of eleven 
voters, all of them tenants of the Alexander family. Upon 
request, they had dutifully sent their landlord's son-in-law 
to sit in the House of Commons. Reflecting on this event in 
later life, Canning revealed his feelings about the effects of 
his career in Parliament: "They voted in obedience to their 
landlord. Not one of them did I ever see. Their votes, how­
ever, served to gratify a long-cherished wish of my heart. 
But did they enable me to attain the object of that wish? 
No: I cannot say that they did."1 
When he made that assessment in the winter of his life, 
he was testifying to the fact that from his very first days in 
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Commons he was out of his element. One can only wonder 
why he did not recognize it at the time. Several opportunities 
for him to take his leave gracefully soon arose, but he 
persevered for the better part of a decade. His failure to with­
draw from Parliament most probably arose from a natural 
reluctance to admit, even to himself, that his most cherished 
ambition had been illusory. How else can one explain the 
paradox of a man returning again and again to an arena in 
which he feared even to walk to his seat and trembled when 
he felt called upon to speak? From afar, of course, we can 
readily measure the disparity between the image of his dreams 
and the reality he encountered in Commons, however we 
might puzzle over his inability or refusal to see it. For long 
years Canning had been involved in matters of world-wide 
significance; the destiny of men and nations was something 
he had lived with day in and day out. Suddenly he was 
face to face with the petty haggling of everyday politics. 
He was unable to feign a passionate interest in ephemeral 
issues, and, when weightier questions were before the House, 
he shrank from the snap judgments required in the give-and­
take of floor debate. He had become habituated to a careful 
analysis of any problem to come before him and refused to 
adopt positions merely at the behest of party leadership. 
These were qualities that quickly marked him as unsuited 
for advancement to ministerial rank where, above all, party 
loyalty was considered an indispensable prerequisite. He was 
immediately identified as an independent and remained so 
throughout his Parliamentary career. 
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This does not mean that he was indifferent to the domestic 
issues of the day. Quite the contrary, for when he ceased to 
represent Old Sarum on the accession of William IV in 1830 
(a member of the Alexander family decided to take the seat), 
so intense was his interest in the Reform Bill that he paid one 
thousand pounds, in April of 1831, for the right to sit for 
Stockbridge. He had canvassed earnestly about for a con­
stituency in which he might stand in a real election but had 
found none. Stockbridge was his for the taking simply 
because it was high on the list of boroughs to be dissolved 
under the Reform Bill introduced in Commons in March, 
1831, and in consideration of this impending doom, the price, 
as he ruefully noted, was "somewhat high." The per diem 
expense of this seat was greatly increased, moreover, when 
Palmerston sent him to Constantinople a few months later. 
While he was absent on that mission, the Reform Bill was 
passed, and Stockbridge was abolished as a constituency of 
Parliament. 
This might we have meant the last of domestic politics 
for him but for a strange combination of circumstances. Upon 
his return from Constantinople in the fall of 1832, he was 
without a post of any kind. The Embassy at St. Petersburg 
was vacant at the time, and he was named by Palmerston as 
the British Ambassador to the Court of Czar Nicholas I. 
But Canning's appointment to the Embassy was rejected by 
the Russian court, an action almost unheard of in diplomacy 
save for instances in which relations between governments 
were already strained. 
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There are several theories which have been advanced in 
explanation of the Czar's rejection.2 Most historians agree 
that the Czar and Count Nesselrode did not consider Canning 
pliable enough for them to work with, but whether that was 
because of their prior experience or because of plans they 
had concerning the future of the Turkish Empire is an open 
question. It became the conviction of Canning and his friends 
that the latter was the case.3 However, it is a mystery why 
Palmerston made the appointment a matter of public record 
in the official Gazette without first having ascertained its 
suitability to the Russian court. This has led some observers 
to conclude that the Foreign Secretary was acting in a 
predetermined manner to effect the recall of the Russian 
Ambassador, Prince Lieven, whose wife had made herself 
particularly obnoxious to Palmerston. The supporters of this 
theory hold that Palmerston was well aware of Canning's 
non grata status in St. Petersburg and gazetted him precisely 
because he knew of the coming rejection. He could, therefore, 
refuse to send an ambassador at all and leave it to protocol 
to force the Czar to withdraw his. 
At any rate, the immediate result was, of course, that 
Canning did not go to Russia, although he remained for 
some time the officially designated "Ambassador to the Em­
peror of all the Russias" and was sent, so titled, on a special 
mission to Madrid that lasted from December of 1832 through 
April of 1833. The purpose of the mission was to offer the 
friendly mediation of England in the dispute over the succes­
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sion to the throne of Portugal. Dom Pedro, the Emperor of 
Brazil and eldest son of the late King John VI of Portugal, 
had relinquished his claim to the throne of Portugal in favor 
of his seven-year-old daughter. The Regent, Pedro's brother 
Dom Miguel, had seized the crown for himself in 1827, but 
at this time Dom Pedro, having been turned out of Brazil, 
was leading his partisans in a civil war against his brother. 
A similar situation was building up in Spain where the long 
recognized heir to the throne, Don Carlos, had suddenly and 
unexpectedly been supplanted by a daughter who issued from 
the king's (Ferdinand VII) fourth marriage. The peace of 
the whole Peninsula was threatened, and Palmerston was 
anxious to remedy the situation. The Grey Cabinet wished 
to enlist the aid of the Spanish court in favor of Dom Pedro 
and his daughter, but the Spanish king and his ministry 
politely and firmly refused. Inasmuch as the bulk of European 
absolutists favored Dom Miguel, the English overture came 
to nought and the mission was withdrawn at the end of April. 
Shortly before the conclusion of the Spanish mission, 
Palmerston offered Canning the permanent post at Madrid. 
It was an admission that he would not be able to force the 
Russian appointment through. But Canning declined it, first 
of all because he would have to displace his former secretary, 
Addington, the current envoy, and secondly because he found 
nothing attractive about Spain other than the marvelous 
collection of art in the royal museums. In July he graciously 
allowed Palmerston to withdraw his nomination to St. Peters­
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burg, and this chapter was closed. Palmerston, in great 
embarrassment apparently, tried to secure a peerage for him, 
but even here circumstances militated against the unfortunate 
diplomat. Lord Grey had to reject Palmerston's request simply 
because the claims and pressures for peerages were so heavy 
at the time. A widespread unemployment of deserving poli­
ticians had resulted from the Reform Bills!4 
The Grey Cabinet toppled in 1834 and was followed 
by the first Peel Government. Peel offered the Governor-
Generalship of Canada to Canning, but as the latter had 
again entered Parliament, he declined the honor (which 
was subsequently given to Lord Amherst). 
Canning had re-entered the lists in the course of the party 
realignments which saw the appearance of the Stanleyites 
and Peelites prior to the emergence of the new Conservative 
party. He was elected as one of the two members for King's 
Lynn in Norfolk with the understanding that he would 
support Stanley (the future Earl of Derby) in divisions of 
the House, with the further understanding that Stanley, in 
turn, would give Peel a chance to prove himself and his 
newly emerging party group. As things turned out Canning 
found that he was usually closer to Peel on most issues than 
was Stanley. Once more his inability to be a party man 
caused him to lose favor with all. He was personally satisfied, 
however, when his constituents returned him to office in two 
successive elections, those of 1837 and 1841. He felt that 
the endorsements were a tribute to his fidelity in attending 
sessions regularly if to nothing else. 
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It would be tempting to engage in a lengthy discussion 
of the intracacies of party politics in this transition period, 
but it is outside the scope of this study since Canning did 
not make a material contribution to any of the developments. 
In 1839, when the days of the Melbourne administration 
seemed to be numbered, Canning had a discussion with Sir 
Robert Peel, the obvious successor, relative to his future 
employment. Peel told him quite frankly that there would be 
no place in a Cabinet of the future government for him and 
urged him to return to the field of diplomacy. He promised 
a suitable appointment, and Stratford Canning prepared him­
self for re-entry into the Foreign Service. 
1. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 2. 
2. See E. F. Malcolm-Smith, The Life of Stratford Canning (London: 
Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1933), pp. 147-53. 
3. See letter from Planta, July 23,1833, Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 21-22. 




THE dependence of the young queen, Victoria, on Lord 
Melbourne enabled his administration to hang on into 1841. 
Melbourne, however, was loath to face the mounting domestic 
quarrels centering about the Corn Laws, which imposed a 
high tariff on wheat imports in order to protect the price of 
the domestic product. He finally induced the Queen to 
accept his resignation and a general election followed. The 
resulting Parliament clearly showed Sir Robert Peel as the 
obvious leader and the second Peel Cabinet was formed in 
September. Within a fortnight Sir Stratford Canning had 
once more been designated Ambassador to the Sublime Porte 
and had accepted the post. 
Canning's decision to go back to Constantinople was care­
fully considered. He had the option of other assignments, 
for, prior to his choice of Constantinople, Peel had again 
offered him the chance to go to Canada as Governor-General. 
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When he declined that honor, he could have become Treas­
urer of the Queen's Household, but neither was the thought 
of being a courtier particularly appealing, so he refused that 
honor as well. When the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Aber­
deen, proposed that he return to Constantinople, Canning 
assented with unexpected enthusiasm. On the eve of his 
fifty-fifth birthday, Sir Stratford Canning had finally found 
himself, and he set out with a determination to effect a 
foreseeable good: the revivification of the Ottoman Empire 
as an integral unit in the community of nations. That end 
he saw now as being not only desirable for the internal 
welfare of the Empire, but as a necessary condition of world 
peace. Further, he saw now the possibility of its realization, 
for his ten-year withdrawal to the periphery of diplomacy had 
given him time to think calmly about the necessary means to 
that end. Broadly stated, he had concluded that there were 
two overriding objectives: first, a general reform of the 
internal structure of the Ottoman Empire to assure it a 
contented and loyal citizenry; second, a freedom from foreign 
pressures that would allow concentration on the first objec­
tive. These were germinal concepts dating from his previous 
tenure. Much had happened in the intervening decade to 
corroborate them. A review of those events will reveal why 
Canning believed the stage was now set for the final drama. 
When Canning had returned home in 1832 from the 
relative triumph of the Greek negotiations, he had come, it 
will be remembered, under the obligation of serious personal 
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commitments to the Sultan Mahmud to do all in his power 
to secure British help in resisting the ominous advances of 
Mehemet Ali in Syria. His immediate recommendations, in 
line with these commitments, were ignored by the Grey 
government, however, as Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary, 
had chosen to adopt a wait-and-see" attitude. Even a per­
sonal plea from Mahmud was in vain because Palmerston 
could see little difference in whether the House of Osman 
or the House of Mehemet Ali held sway over the Bosporus.1 
Shortly after this initial rebuff Canning had been sent to 
Madrid. Lord Grey, in the meantime, had asked Sir Stratford 
to give the government the benefit of his considered views on 
Eastern affairs. In compliance with this request Canning put 
his thoughts on paper and sent them to Palmerston from 
Paris in December of 1832.2 This memorandum was a pene­
trating analysis of the alternatives facing Britain and the 
Porte. 
Canning's thesis was that to leave Mahmud to his fate 
at the hands of Mehemet Ali was to endanger Britain's whole 
position in the East. The result would be a weakened Turkish 
Empire, and Russia would be the beneficiary. By way of an 
alternative Canning recommended a moderate intervention 
by which Mehemet Ali and his heirs would become hereditary 
rulers of Egypt under Ottoman sovereignty. Mehemet's son, 
and general-in-chief, Ibrahim Pasha, would also remain the 
lifetime ruler of Syria. Such friendly intervention by England 
would not only save Mahmud but would give England the 
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opportunity to assist him in his reforms. Inevitably, England 
would benefit from such co-operation. 
To this plea, also, Palmerston turned a deaf ear. He ques­
tioned Sir Stratford's arguments3 and remained convinced 
that the outcome of the struggle was a matter of indifference 
to England's place in the East. Palmerston's position was 
very quickly shown to be an error which resulted in near 
disaster. 
At Konya the Egyptians smashed a Turkish army and 
captured the Sultan's Grand Vezir; Ibrahim Pasha marched 
unopposed into Anatolia. Rebuffed by England, and hostile 
to France because of her actions in North Africa,4 with 
Ibrahim advancing rapidly, Mahmud was soon forced to 
take his one remaining avenue of escape: the intervention 
of Russian arms. Mahmud, understandably, sought the aid 
of Nicholas I, and the Czar was perfectly amenable to the 
idea of giving it inasmuch as Mehemet Ali seemed far too 
aggressive a potential successor to Ottoman rule, totally out 
of line with Nicholas' Turkish policy.5 "The end of February 
[1833] witnessed a remarkable event in history, for Russian 
troops arrived on the Bosphorus and camped on the shores 
of Asia in order to defend the Sultan against his Egyptian 
rebel."6 Palmerston and the French reacted as quickly as 
possible, but the Foreign Secretary's "delay had been fatal."7 
Russia had the situation well in hand. Mahmud was saved 
from Mehemet Ali and the Egyptian viceroy was forced to 
recall Ibrahim to Syria, where he was allowed to stay on 
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payment of an annual tribute to the Sultan. In return, 
Turkey agreed, in June, to the terms of the Treaty of 
Hunkiar Skelessi.8 
The Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi was a treaty of defensive 
alliance binding Russia and Turkey to come to each other's 
aid if the need should arise, and confirming all previous 
agreements between the two empires. More importantly, it 
contained a separate article by which the Czar could dispense 
the Sultan of the obligation of assistance and, as a substitute, 
demand that the Porte ''confine its action in favour of the 
Imperial Court of Russia to closing the strait of the Darda­
nelles, that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessels of war 
to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever." 
Palmerston protested the treaty as a key with which Russia 
might continually open the door to interfere in Turkish affairs, 
and he showed his contempt for the article on the Straits by 
sending a naval squadron to demonstrate at the mouth of the 
Dardanelles. The result of his error, however, was patent, 
and the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi "bred in Palmerston a 
fatal hostility to Russia, and converted even Whigs to the 
Tory policy of bolstering up Turkey."9 
Palmerston's introduction to Eastern diplomacy had been 
educational, even if somewhat jolting.10 From then on he 
took a keen interest in Turkish affairs, if only in order to 
find a way to thwart Russia.11 When, therefore, Mehemet Ali 
renewed the conflict in 1839 Palmerston did not stand idly 
by as he had in 1832 and early 1833.12 His readiness to act 
was fortunate, for Mehemet's early victories were as devastat­
153 T H E GREAT AMBASSADOR 
ing in their effect as they were startling in their rapidity. 
Mahmud, thinking to strike first, had ordered his army to 
invade northern Syria, but it was met and destroyed by 
Ibrahim at Nezib. Within the same week, the Turkish fleet, 
ordered to attack the Egyptians at Alexandria, was surrendered 
intact to Mehemet. Worst of all, Mahmud II died on June 30, 
ill and broken in spirit. He left behind him, as Sultan, his 
sixteen-year-old son, Abdul Medjid. 
As news of the successive disasters flowed into London, 
Palmerston leaped into action. Even before that he had noti­
fied the Austrian government of Britain's intent to maintain 
the Porte by forceful suppression of Mehemet Ali if need 
be.13 Now the pace quickened as he feared unilateral action 
by Russia under the terms of the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi, 
and by the French in behalf of Mehemet Ali. He immediately 
proposed concerted European action to preserve the integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire. Diplomatic channels hummed with 
activity, and the rapidity with which the British Foreign 
Office moved forestalled any attempt by either France or Rus­
sia to play its own game. In December Palmerston even pre­
vailed upon Russia to renounce its preferential position in the 
Straits (a position Russia had repeatedly denied) in favor of 
an agreement for concerted European action, thus voiding one 
of the major articles of Hunkiar Skelessi. By the following 
July, England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia had hammered 
out an agreement known as the Treaty of London.14 Relative 
to the Turco-Egyptian conflict, it assured Mehemet Ali life­
time rule in Egypt if he agreed to cease hostilities in twenty 
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days, and, as an added inducement, he was guaranteed life­
time rule in southern Syria if he should accept these terms in 
ten days. His alternative was to face a combined attack by 
the European powers. 
Mehemet refused to budge, and an Anglo-Austrian fleet 
bombarded Acre, landed troops in Syria, and eventually smoth­
ered the Egyptians. Mehemet Ali was forced to yield to 
British terms and was retired to Egypt for the remainder of 
his life. He became senile in 1847 and died two years later. 
Ibrahim ruled Egypt for one year after the incompetency of 
his father but preceded him in death. Their descendants 
ruled Egypt for more than a century after them, outlasting 
the House of Osman by some thirty years. 
It was a tragedy for the Moslem world that Mahmud, the 
Sultan, and Mehemet, the modernizer, had not been able to 
work together. Despite their political differences they had 
much in common, and their talents were such as should have 
produced complementary effects. They might well have 
achieved the reform of Moslem society neither could effect 
by himself. 
It was ironic that the final settlement achieved by force of 
European arms bore such striking resemblance to the solution 
proposed by Sir Stratford Canning in 1832. 
Following the settlement of the crisis, France added her 
signature to the Treaty of London of 1840, and on the thir­
teenth of July, 1841, the five European powers and the Porte 
initialled a new Straits Convention which restated the ancient 
rule of the Straits, "in virtue of which it has at all times been 
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prohibited for the Ships of War of Foreign Powers to enter 
the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus; and that, 
so long as the Porte is at peace, His Highness will admit no 
foreign Ship of War into the said Straits."15 Article Two of 
the Convention excepted light vessels employed in the service 
of the several diplomatic missions in Constantinople. 
By the autumn of 1841, then, when Sir Stratford Canning 
reappeared on the scene, a relative quiet had settled over the 
Levant, and the Ottoman Empire was at peace with all of its 
neighbors. This was the freedom from external pressure that 
he saw as the indispensible prerequisite for the prosecution 
of an internal reform. 
As early as his first residence in Constantinople, Stratford 
Canning had sensed the real weakness of the Turkish Em­
pire.16 It was not foreign pressure nearly so much as it was 
internal malaise. By 1832 he had come to more definitive 
conclusions respecting the nature and cause of the illness: 
"I think the time is near," he had written to Palmerston, 
when it is necessary that a decided line of policy 
should be adopted and steadily pursued with respect to this 
country. The Turkish Empire is evidently hastening to its 
dissolution, and an approach to the civilization of Christendom 
affords the only chance of keeping it together "17 
In this letter he had discussed the financial and military 
maladministration of the Empire, but only as they reflected a 
more basic disease: the injustice inherent in the whole fabric 
of its life. The root of this injustice was a religious intoler­
ance based on strict interpretations of Koranic law.18 Accord­
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ing to these strict interpretations, the infidel, the non-Moslem 
(rayah), had no legal standing in relation to his Moslem fel­
low subjects. Hence, millions of the Sultan's subjects could 
not look to the monarch for protection and security, nor could 
they, as a further consequence, generate any sense of loyalty 
to the Sultan or patriotism for their country. Indeed, it was 
the helplessness of these people which often generated pres­
sure from the outside, for it was their pleas that brought 
Russia, England, Austria, or France, as the case might be, to 
the Porte demanding correction of one thing or another, but 
always in seeking justice for non-protected subjects of the 
Sultan. 
The cure, it should be carefully noted, lay in "an approach 
to the civilization of Christendom." Stratford Canning was 
not dreaming of a holy war, of an imposition of Christianity 
on the Moslem. What was needed was an adaptation to the 
Western concept that rights were inherent in the person and 
did not depend on a man's beliefs. Canning was under no 
illusion that the task was an easy one. On the contrary, in 
the same letter, he refers to the chance of securing such an 
accommodation as "a very precarious one at best," but none­
theless necessary. 
The Ambassador's hopes were considerably brighter on this 
score when he resumed his old post, for there had been a wel­
come series of internal developments, too, which bolstered the 
prospects afforded by the general peace. Mahmud II, from 
the time he obliterated the Janissaries, had tried valiantly to 
maintain a course directed toward modernity. While cir­
157 THE GREAT AMBASSADOR 
cumstances had forced him to concentrate on the military 
aspect of this reform to the detriment of social improvement, 
he had not been unmindful of the need for the latter. Shortly 
before his death Mahmud had again turned his attention to 
the concept of general reform—Tanzimat. With the aid 
of his principal adviser, the reform-minded Reshid Pasha, 
he had prepared a decree of reform that was sweeping in its 
innovations. Reshid Pasha remained at the side of the young 
Abdul Medjid and prevailed upon him to issue the decree, 
the famous Hatti-Sherif of Gulhane (November 3, 1839). 
This hatti-sherif ("noble rescript"), or hatti-humayun ("im­
perial rescript"), as some historians prefer,19 decreed security 
of life and property for all subjects regardless of creed, abol­
ished the odious practice of execution without public trial and 
judicial sentence, and assured to the condemned the right to 
bequeath his property, thus barring its seizure by the con­
demning magistrate and thereby removing one of the major 
motives for "legal" murder. The decree also fixed a system 
of tax quotas and regulated the terms of military service. 
These were all revolutionary concepts. 
There had been one serious setback of late, and, once again, 
it was casued by external events. The near disaster of Me­
hemet Ali's final threat had set off violent recriminations 
within the Divan and the Seraglio. Reactionary elements 
blamed the reform movement for the collapse of Ottoman 
defenses, and their invectives had proven too fierce for the 
terrified boy who now occupied the throne. They had forced 
Abdul Medjid to dismiss the liberal ministers of his father, 
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and by 1841 reaction seemed to be firmly in the saddle. So, 
although the Gulhane (Rose Chamber) Decree had been 
duly promulgated, the outlook for reform was not completely 
roseate. 
But Canning viewed this development as merely a tem­
porary deviation from the path the Turks themselves knew 
they had to travel. He was full of confidence when he pre­
sented his credentials to Abdul Medjid early in 1842, and 
he was able to testify that his heart went out to the young 
Sultan; "the graciousness of his manner," he wrote to Lord 
Aberdeen, 'and the intelligent, though gentle and even melan­
choly, expression of his countenance, warrant a hope, per­
haps a sanguine one, that with riper years and a more ex­
perienced judgment he may prove a real blessing and source 
of strength to his country."20 
For the time being the Elchi decided to leave Abdul Medjid 
to the normal processes of maturing that would come with time 
and circumstances. In the meantime he had to gauge the 
temper of the men who were actually running the Empire 
and those who might conceivably replace them in the course 
of the year ahead. Reshid Pasha, the only possible rallying 
point for the discredited innovators, had been packed off to 
the Turkish Embassy in Paris, safely removed from the Sul­
tan's ear. Sir Stratford and Reshid had first met in the 
early 1830's when Reshid had been a member of the Turkish 
Boundary Commission in the Greek negotiations. One of the 
few Turks willing to face the stark realities of that era, Reshid 
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knew that the Englishman, Canning, had actually obtained 
the best possible terms for Turkey. Most Turkish statemen 
considered Canning, still under the cloud of Navarino, to be 
under the Russian thumb, but Reshid told Mahmud quite 
frankly that had it not been for Canning the Turks might 
have come out far worse. His honesty, in a day when few 
dared to be honest, had appealed to the embattled Mahmud, 
and Reshid became a trusted lieutenant. Additional experi­
ence in London and Paris afforded Reshid Pasha added op­
portunities to assess the value of Western political systems, and 
the facility with which he imparted his evaluations to Mah­
mud had helped him to emerge as the latter's chief adviser. 
Together they charted the reforms which Canning had now 
made his own, and it was Reshid who had authored the salient 
points of the Gulhane Decree. Reshid had now been shunted 
aside, but Canning knew that he would have to come back. 
The ministry surrounding the Sultan in 1842 was com­
posed, for the most part, of old men who dreamed of a return 
to the days before Mahmud's meddling had so rudely inter­
fered with their traditions. Their reaction had reached such 
an extreme that they had even excluded from public service 
any Turk who could speak the Christian languages. Fanati­
cism was in full swing. Christians were again being abused 
in the courts and in the course of their daily pursuits; 
local pashas were again indulging in instances of legal murder; 
the Divan was again turning a deaf ear to all reports of in­
justice and illegality. 
 160 THE GREAT AMBASSADOR
In face of this situation the British Ambassador had to exer­
cise the utmost self-restraint. He was well aware that he was 
not regarded as a welcome friend by this element of Ottoman 
leadership. "It would be a great mistake," Canning wrote to 
Aberdeen on March 27, 1842, "to suppose that the Porte is the 
best judge of her own interests. Her ministers 
have neither the capacity nor the knowledge to grapple with 
the difficulty of the times. They have not even the sagacity 
to recognize their real friends."21 His first task would be to 
cultivate the friendship of the Sultan. His second would be 
to effect a change in the tenor of the ministry. 
The man at the top of the Divan was the Grand Vezir, 
Mohammed Izzet Pasha, a gallant old soldier but a Moslem 
fanatic. Sarim Effendi, just as reactionary but a shrewder 
man, was Minister for Foreign Affairs. Most dangerous, in 
Canning's estimate, was the High Chamberlain, Riza Pasha-
dangerous because he was unprincipled. He had been a con­
fidant of Mahmud but had quickly thrown in his lot with the 
reactionaries. Gossip reported by the dragomans indicated 
that, in collusion with the Finance Minister, Safti Pasha, 
Riza was steadily enriching himself at public expense. If 
Canning were to accomplish anything it was clear that these 
four ministers would have to go. 
Canning waited until June before he brought up the sub­
ject of reform. He mentioned it to the Sultan at a private 
audience where Riza was present in his capacity as High 
Chamberlain. Abdul Medjid responded freely, and declared 
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that he had ordered the implementation of those humane 
laws promulgated at Gulhane; that reform was dear to him. 
The difficulty, unfortunately, was finding even ten pashas to 
co-operate with him; he would be sure of success with even 
that little help. Something about his bearing convinced Can­
ning that the Sultan spoke sincerely. The Ambassador be­
came convinced that Abdul Medjid would sanction and 
promote reforms with the proper urging and assistance. This 
audience was the beginning of a close relationship between 
them. 
Beyond that one incident Canning studiously avoided giv­
ing offense to reaction. There were many items that had 
piled up in the Embassy archives to concern him—the back­
wash of years of war and turmoil. There were many cases 
of indemnity due British subjects whose property had been 
damaged during the conflict in Syria. Matters involving trad­
ing rights and commercial agreements throughout the far-
flung Empire had magnified a thousand times, far beyond the 
capabilities of the limited Embassy staff. He had to plead 
with the Foreign Office to empower the consular establish­
ments to assume the responsibility in such cases. He had to 
delineate duties and responsibilities within the Embassy, 
where he had found laxity and shoddiness of method. The 
British Embassy in Constantinople was to be a working em­
bassy, and the Ambassador saw to it that it was. 
Within a year he saw the rewards of his patience. Mo­
hammed Izzet Pasha retired as Grand Vezir to be succeeded 
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by Rauf Pasha, who was much milder in outlook and corre­
spondingly more tractable. Sarim Effendi was replaced by a 
new Foreign Minister, Rifat Pasha, a typical Turkish func­
tionary but a man whom Sir Stratford felt to be sincerely 
interested in what was best for Turkey—one who could be 
prevailed upon in the long run. Best of all, Reshid Pasha 
was recalled from Paris and installed as governor of Adrian­
ople—not an honor, to be sure, but desirably near at hand from 
Canning's point of view. Riza Pasha, on the other hand, 
became the Seraskier (commander-in-chief of the army), so 
the current was flowing in both directions. 
Slowly the stage was being set in accordance with Can­
ning's plans when an unlooked-for occurrence pushed him 
precipitately into the director's box. One summer day in 
1843, a group of Armenians threw themselves in front of his 
carriage as it was proceeding from the palace at Pera to the 
vicinity of Buyukdere. Their plea was simple—that the Buyuk 
Elchi intervene at the Porte in behalf of one of their loved 
ones who had been condemned to death. His crime was that 
of apostasy from Islam; the young man had originally forsaken 
the Christian heritage of his forefathers to become a Moslem, 
then repented his act and returned to Christianity. Under 
Koranic law, the punishment was death by beheading. 
The family of the doomed man knew of the Elchi's many 
exertions in behalf of abused Christians, and they turned to 
him in desperation. It brought Canning face to face with the 
inflexibility of tradition. Intervention in behalf of a Christian 
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was one thing; a reversal of the criminal law of Islam quite 
another. Yet it was the issue that he knew must eventually 
be faced, for it was not an isolated case. It had happened 
before and could be repeated indefinitely. He decided the 
time had come for a test of strength, and he thereupon made 
appropriate overtures at the Seraglio asking that the Arme­
nian's life be spared. Needless to say, the advances were 
brusquely thrust aside, and, as if to emphasize the absolute 
character of the law, a public execution followed. The de­
capitated body was left exposed for three days in a busy spot 
of the city and then thrown into the waters of the Bosporus. 
Canning's entire staff must have shaken their heads in 
despair as he girded for battle—Alison, the Oriental secretary, 
who knew well the traditions and laws of the country; Pisani, 
the dragoman, on whom would fall the dubious privilege of 
carrying the protest to the Porte—all of them anticipated the 
tension of the coming days and weeks and months. Sir Strat­
ford Canning had fixed his eye on a goal, and those who knew 
him realized there would be no turning back. This time, 
however, what he wanted appeared to be an absolute reversal 
of Islamic law, a virtual recantation of doctrine. Even the 
most hopeful of his associates could not see how he would 
accomplish it. 
The Ambassador's first move was to send a report of the 
incident to London. He also saw to it that his European 
colleagues sent similar reports. From the Earl of Aberdeen 
came instructions to require of the Porte that no further 
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executions of such nature take place. Baron Bourqueney, the 
French Ambassador at the Porte, was ordered by Paris to act 
in concert with Canning. Characteristically, there were no 
clear orders on what to do upon rejection of any protest, but 
they were at least authorized to begin proceedings. Canning 
was prepared to counter the certain refusal of what he con­
sidered to be the necessary guarantee of correction. The 
Turks, he knew, would be quite ready to promise an accom­
modation to the expressed wishes of the powers, but he was 
not interested in a mere modus vivendi between opposing 
principles of justice. He had seen too many arrangements 
wither and die through apathy. He wanted a final and ir­
revocable rejection in principle of the religious law, a legal 
foundation for personal religious freedom which, inevitably, 
would have a bearing upon wider areas of civil freedom. 
If, at the time, this seemed impossible of fulfilment, he could 
point back to the history of the Western powers themselves. 
They were but a few centuries removed from the days of the 
religious wars when devout and sincere men on both sides felt 
they were carrying out the will of God if they took the life of a 
heretic or non-believer. The growth of religious toleration 
had brought in its wake the adoption of legal principles en­
suring civil freedoms. Such freedom had seemed just as 
impossible in the West of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries as it did in the Moslem world of the nineteenth. 
The reaction Canning foresaw came as predicted. When 
the joint notes of protest were duly presented at the Porte, 
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the members of the Divan, one and all, were full of expres­
sions of sorrow and remorse over the execution. Rauf Pasha, 
the Grand Vezir, affirmed that, personally, he did not have it 
in his heart to kill even a fowl, but the law of the Koran was 
inflexible and immutable; it was not within the power of 
the Caliph himself to gainsay it. Rifat Pasha pointed out that 
for the Divan to take even an official note of the protest would 
be to stir the most violent reaction among members of the 
ulema and among the traditionalists. The Reis Effendi, how­
ever, had a plan which, he said, had the Grand Mufti's ap­
proval: the Porte would issue instructions that the magistrates 
turn a deaf ear to reports of apostasies in the future. This was 
the only way, he asserted, that the Porte could contrive to 
effect a cessation of the admittedly barbarous practice. 
Even as Rifat was urging this arrangement on the foreign 
envoys, a report of another religious execution, at Brusa, 
reached the capital. This time five powers protested: Austria, 
Russia, Prussia, France, and England. Rifat stuck to his posi­
tion and reaffirmed his previous offer: if the powers would in­
dicate satisfaction with a "gentlemen's agreement'' of the kind 
suggested, the Porte would guarantee the incidents would not 
be repeated. The offer was tempting and attractive to the 
others, but Canning held out for a declaration of principle as 
the only sure guarantee. The Reis Effendi came back with 
the flat statement that "a law prescribed by God himself was 
not to be set aside by any human power." Then came the 
veiled threat that, in pushing too far, the Christian powers 
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might undo everything, that were the Sultan to agree to so 
revolutionary a demand he might lose his throne. It was a 
back-to-the-wall threat of a kind Canning had faced as a young 
man when the Porte threatened to turn to Napoleon in pref­
erence to England. Here again he met the threat head-on by 
reminding Rifat that the sword of revolt had already been 
raised against the Porte; that Mehemet and Ibrahim were 
buried in the sands of Egypt only by the force of the Christian 
powers. If another revolution were to come, the Egptians 
would most likely be the inheritors of Ottoman prerogatives. 
What could all the Turkish pashas and functionaries expect 
at their tender hands? 
The impasse was absolute: reform had finally come face to 
face with the only real barrier, the Koran. The other powers 
began to waver and draw back, but the Elchi had come too 
far to flinch at this juncture. He turned to an exploration of 
the Koran itself. Although he was a convinced Christian, Sir 
Stratford Canning had a deep and sincere respect for the 
Moslem moral code. He had begun to wonder how a religion 
that was capable of its moral heights could, at the same time, 
endorse the cruelties wrought in its name. The lamps burned 
for long hours at the Embassy during these weeks, and Alison 
and the others were kept to the same grindstone he turned 
for himself. Canning went deeply into Moslem theology and 
law and found himself agreeably enlightened. 
Koranic law, like its Christian counterpart, stemmed from 
two great sources. There was the basic Scripture, the Koran, 
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and there was the body of traditional commentary, comprising 
a host of obiter dicta attributed to the Prophet himself and 
to his immediate followers, joined together with exegetic in­
terpretations of the great teachers. These commentaries were 
grouped together under the name of Sunna, or what might be 
loosely translated as the Body of Tradition. Indisputably, 
the Sunna had to have a Koranic basis for validity; it was to 
the Koran itself, therefore, that final appeal had to be made 
in disputed cases. 
A search of tradition revealed that, beyond the shadow of a 
doubt, the Sunna decreed death to an apostate. Undaunted, 
Canning began to scan the words of the Koran with the com­
pulsion of an Augustine reaching for the light. The Koran 
is divided into 114 chapters (sura), and he plunged into 
them with the ardor of a True Believer. The further he 
delved the stronger grew the conviction that the invocation 
of the death penalty was an unwarranted extension of scrip­
tural admonitions. 
All the pertinent verses of the Koran were noted, discussed, 
and interpreted. Of them all, only one was considered to be 
open to the traditional interpretation cited as authority for 
executing the apostates. It was found in the forty-seventh 
Sura and read as follows: 
Verily, they who turn their backs after the Guidance hath 
been manifested to them, Satan hath deceived them and 
emboldened them. How will it be when the angels shall 
cause them to die, smiting their faces and their backs! 
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There was general agreement, however, that the context 
from which this passage was taken was referring to the early 
warrior disciples of the Prophet who had begun to lose heart 
and were showing reluctance to rush into battle with the dis­
regard considered necessary by Mohammed. The penalty 
threatened for such shirkers, far from being a command for 
human execution, was actually a warning of the revenge to 
be exacted by the angels of an evil conscience when the souls 
of miscreants came to pass over the bridge to Paradise. Such 
was the scriptural basis on which the objectionable practice 
was founded.22 
Early in 1844, then, the ministers of the Divan were 
shocked by the unheard of attempt of a Christian embassy 
to lecture to them on the fine points of Islamic law. A kind 
of panic swept through the Seraglio. Hurried consultations 
were held with individual imams and with the ulema as a 
whole, but neither the individual theologians nor the ulema 
could gainsay the points being pressed by the Buyuk Elchi. 
Alternately he was roundly cursed and privately blessed as he 
gave no quarter in the following weeks, using every stratagem 
and tactic which long experience had stocked in his private 
armory. 
By adopting this aggressive stance, Canning removed him­
self from association with his diplomatic conferers and again 
stood alone, as one after another the other powers shrank 
from an internal theological dispute. Privately the several 
ambassadors cheered him on, but they could do nothing in an 
169 THE GREAT AMBASSADOR 
official way to help. He had even gone too far for Aberdeen 
and, had they been closer, the Foreign Secretary might have 
stayed the hand of his ambassador.23 
The closing days of February saw him demanding a forth­
right declaration of principle while Rifat held out just as 
stubbornly for acceptance of his original compromise. Aber­
deen wished to accept this promise, but Canning insisted that 
"there is no lasting security against the recurrence of the 
barbarous practice except in a real surrender of the principle. 
Together with that principle, the main barrier between Tur­
key and Christendom would be removed."24 He reminded 
the Foreign Secretary that there was every possibility that a 
case of apostasy might occur which would involve a British 
subject. Now was the time to have a clarification of princi­
ples, not later on when relations might be gravely jeopardized. 
Meanwhile, he had held several secret meetings with Reshid 
Pasha in the course of which Canning learned that he had 
gradually acquired support in the Divan sufficient to sustain 
his position if he should succeed in winning the Sultan 
to his side. Armed with this information he peremptorily 
demanded an audience with the Sultan himself. Now it is 
true that, in the altered protocol of the Seraglio, an audience 
was more easily secured than had previously been the case, 
but it was still bound by rigid formal procedures. The re­
calcitrant members of the Divan feared that the Elchi's mag­
netism would easily sway the young monarch. Obviously, 
they could not indefinitely refuse to set a date for such a meet­
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ing as that would have left the Englishman no course but to 
break off diplomatic relations with the Porte. 
There were possibilities open to them, though, of blocking 
the Elchi in his mad scheme. The Grand Vezir and his ad­
visers had the right to inquire into the nature of the desired 
audience and then to confine the discussion of the subject to 
certain points. Once agreed upon, it would be a serious 
breach of etiquette for an ambassador to go beyond the pre­
determined points. In this way the Divan could control the 
nature and extent of agreements entered into by the Sultan, 
and the monarch did nothing substantially beyond reading 
a prepared document given him by those whose position de­
manded contact with the despised giaours. 
Seeing their salvation in the involved intricacy of courtly 
procedure, the Grand Vezir and the Reis Effendi thereupon 
requested the Ambassador to submit a record of the items he 
wished to be treated. Canning willingly sent them a memo­
randum which he requested be embodied in a formal note to 
be read to him by the Sultan. This was the procedure of 
the Court. Once his own words were read back to him by the 
Sultan, they became a formal promise of the Sultan to 
the Queen of England and, when properly worded, stood as 
the law of the Empire. Canning's memorandum, naturally, 
contained a precise abrogation of the law and practice of 
executing apostates. 
One further detail of protocol must be noted for proper 
understanding of what followed. Once the Reis Effendi 
accepted such a memorandum on behalf of the Sultan, the 
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Porte's agreement was understood. Canning, accordingly, 
was not surprised when Frederick Pisani brought tack word 
that the audience had been granted for the twenty-second of 
March but that the Porte rejected the memorandum sub­
mitted. (This rejection was on the fourteenth of March.) 
The dragoman later recorded that he trembled in fear as he 
handed the Elchi the text of a note given him by the Reis 
Effendi which the Porte considered more suitable. The ex­
pected outburst failed to materialize for some reason as the 
Elchi's eyes rested on the salient clause: " the Sublime 
Porte will take efficacious measures, the measures which are 
possible, in order that the executions of Christians who, having 
become Musulmans, return to Christianity, shall not take 
place.' It was nothing more than Rifat's compromise posi­
tion, but Pisani reported that the Sultan was to give the 
English Ambassador verbal assurances that the desires of the 
Queen of England would be fully and sincerely meet. 
Within a few days Pisani was summoned back to the Am­
bassador's office. He was handed another note and told that 
it was the only note the Ambassador of the Queen of England 
would receive. The text of the note was precise and clear: 
The official declaration communicated by his Excellency 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be transmitted to the 
British Government, who will understand with satisfaction 
prevent henceforward the execution and putting to death 
that the Sublime Porte, in taking effectual measures to 
of any Christian, an apostate from Islamism, relinquishes 
for ever a principle inconsistent with its friendly professions; 
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and the further assurances to be given at the ambassador's 
audience of the Sultan will fully satisfy the British 
Government that Christianity is not to be insulted in his 
Highness' empire, nor anyone professing it to be treated as a 
criminal, or persecuted on that account.25 
This was likewise refused by the Reis Effendi and Canning 
sent no further communication before the day of the audience. 
Eyewitness accounts of that day testify to Canning's deter­
mination. He came to the antechamber of the audience room 
bearing a document. The Grand Vezir and Rifat both knew 
what it was. Canning advanced to the Reis Effendi, who 
moved backward, out of reach, only to have the terrible Eng­
lishman follow him. In desperation Rifat clasped his hands 
behind him as if to signify that the crime to come was not of 
his doing. Canning thrust the document in his arms, and 
they proceeded into the throne room. The deed was done and 
the revolution accomplished without bloodshed. Abdul Med­
jid gladly read the document and shook the Ambassador's 
hand, whereupon Canning asked if he might be the first 
Christian ambassador to kiss the Sultan's hand. This was 
denied as being just a little too much to ask. It was a quaint 
attempt to hold on to the past, and of little moment. Millions 
of the Sultan's subjects now had religious freedom in principle 
though the fact might take many more years to realize. 
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XIII

THE successful outcome of the apostasy controversy presented 
Sir Stratford Canning with an opportunity that was at once 
golden and full of danger. A revolutionary principle had 
been established which cleared the way for major reforms, but 
no one realized better than he that the gap betwen principle 
and practice was enormous.1 If the victory were to mean 
anything, it had to be followed up by practical implementation 
or it would remain an empty monument to good intentions. 
On the other hand, if he alone were to push too hard in this 
direction, he could easily undo in a moment all that had been 
accomplished. He was under no illusion that fanaticism and 
reaction were buried. He was never in doubt that there 
would be retrogression from the established principle of re­
ligious freedom. That there would be sidestepping, back­
sliding, open defiance and contravention, he freely predicted.2 
Reform could not be permanent until the Turks themselves 
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wanted it; the great design of Mahmud and Reshid had to 
be put into practice by Turks for the whole Turkish people 
and all subject peoples of the Empire. The best a friend 
could do, be he the British Ambassador or anyone else, was 
to help those few Turks who saw the light to overcome the 
obstacles by whatever means wisdom and prudence offered.3 
This was the attitude he adopted. 
Since permanent and effective change depended, ultimately, 
on the character of the ministry in the Porte and the general 
tenor of Ottoman leadership, Canning had first to face the 
fact that in 1844 he was still dealing with the same group 
that had seized the reins a few years earlier. The membership 
of the Divan constituted a reactionary bloc, and the sprinkling 
of moderates among them were too disjointed a minority to 
represent anything resembling a party.4 The dearth of po­
tential leaders outside that circle, however, made it mandatory 
to whittle away at the predominance of the most reactionary 
ministers by replacing them with those less rigorously in­
clined until a more balanced Divan should result. This was 
but a continuation of the tactics he had been employing before 
the apostasy crisis had erupted. 
Canning's major aim was to restore Reshid Pasha to power 
either as Grand Vezir or as the Foreign Minister (Reis Ef­
fendi). He turned his attentions to Rifat Pasha, the current 
Foreign Minister. Knotty problems between the Greeks and 
their former masters, a thorny dispute in the mountains of 
Lebanon involving a triangular conflict between the Christian 
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Maronites, Moslem Druses, and the Turkish administrators 
of the province, a boundary disturbance on the Persian fron­
tier—all kept the Elchi and Rifat in constant communication. 
Fortunately, in each instance, the British Ambassador found 
himself able to support the Turkish viewpoint. He was, 
therefore, able to demonstrate his devotion to justice on behalf 
of the Sultan just as much as he had previously been com­
pelled to act against what the reactionaries claimed was their 
monarch's best interests. With his counsel and advice each 
of the issues was peacefully resolved in the course of the year 
to the satisfaction of all and to the increasing esteem of Rifat 
at home and abroad. 
Interpersed among the official exchanges were frequent 
discussions of general problems facing Turkey, and Canning 
gradually sounded out the Reis Effendi's personal opinions. 
As he suspected, Rifat was more than sympathetic to reform 
but fearful that too rapid an extension would bring the whole 
structure down in collapse. In this the Pasha echoed the usual 
rejoinder of the Turkish dignitary but with an important dif­
ference : he was willing to discuss alternatives and to mull over 
hypothetical situations with an eye to the future. Inevitably 
the conferences broached the subject of the utilization of the 
talents of a man like Reshid, and Rifat readily agreed that they 
were being wasted in the civil administration of Adrianople. 
It would be impossible, however, he pointed out, to bring 
Reshid back into the government without provoking storms of 
the most serious kind. Canning happily concurred in this 
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assessment because he did not want Reshid enmeshed in one 
of the lesser ministries and he could not ask Rifat to step 
down, much less propose the resignation of the Grand Vezir 
merely to open the way for the reformer. 
Quite happily, the Presidency of the Council became vacant 
late in the year. Although the President of the Council was 
not a member of the ministry, the position was one of great 
influence in the hierarchy of the Porte. Its occupant could 
propose programs and policies for debate without having to 
initiate or support them as an executive or administrator. 
Thus, a competent man with a sense of timing could lead 
without the onus of partisan responsibility. The Elchi sug­
gested to Rifat that he might justly seek the post. He had 
demonstrated his ability in the Foreign Ministry, and such a 
move could in no wise be construed as a demotion or mark of 
failure. Moreover, Rifat could be of immeasurably greater 
service to his country and his Sultan, Canning reassured 
him, by providing the leadership needed by the moderates. 
The Ambassador also contrived to acquaint the Sultan with 
the desirability of such a move, and in due time Rifat Pasha 
became the President of the Council. Lest there be any 
suspicion engendered by the change, he was succeeded at the 
Foreign Ministry by an outspoken foe of Canning's, Shehib 
Effendi. And, to further cloak the pattern of succession, the 
dangerous Reshid Pasha was sent back to Paris as ambassador. 
The year 1844 drew to a close with the star of Stratford Can­
ning ostensibly on the decline. Whispers were even circulated 
 180 THE GREAT AMBASSADOR
about the Porte that a cabinet change was impending in Eng­
land and that the obnoxious Elchi would soon be leaving him­
self. Canning did nothing to dispel the rumors. He was rea­
sonably sure they had their source in Riza Pasha, who had 
already made inquiries of the Ottoman Ambassador in London 
on the best method of securing Canning's recall. 
While Canning was making these careful inroads at the 
Porte, he continued to encourage the Sultan on particulars of 
reform lest the momentum be entirely lost. Within two 
months of the close of the apostasy crisis, Abdul Medjid de­
creed the abolition of torture throughout the Empire and this 
was a boon to Moslem and rayah alike. Petty but oppressive 
irritants, such as distinguishing marks on Turkish merchant 
ships of Christian ownership, quietly disappeared. Canning 
also recommended an early end to the discriminatory harach 
(head tax) levied on Christians, and he painted for the Sultan 
a picture of the day when the rayah population must become 
the mainstay of the government and the army. If they were 
not engaged and trained in government service on a basis of 
equality, the future of the Empire would be endangered. 
In order to protect what had been won, British consulates 
were put on the alert throughout the Empire and were under 
instruction to report to Canning any infringement of the 
newly recognized rights. The mere presence of a British 
representative in a courtroom helped to insure justice on more 
than one occasion. So commonplace did this habit of con­
sular offices become that Turkish complaints of meddling and 
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interference soon filtered back to the nervous ears of Lord 
Aberdeen in London. The Foreign Secretary reacted by 
sending a circular letter addressed to all consuls warning 
against undue interference in internal affairs of Turkish ad­
ministration. The Ambassador dutifully forwarded the letter 
to all officers under his jurisdiction but appended to the direc­
tive a note assuring his agents that he never considered any 
action of theirs to have been contrary to the tenor of the For­
eign Office instructions.5 
As time went on his efforts in behalf of religious freedom 
brought him some embarrassment—in the form of scandalous 
conflicts among Christians. The Christian population of the 
Empire adhered overwhelmingly to one or another of the 
Orthodox sects, chiefly the Greek, Armenian, and Syrian 
Orthodox Churches, with a sprinkling of Roman Catholics 
and Maronites and smaller autocephalous groups scattered 
about. With the advent of 'religious freedom" some of the 
smaller religious societies, along with Protestant missionary 
groups from England and America, attempted to begin activ­
ities. Sadly enough, their efforts ran into severe, and some­
times vicious, antagonism from their brethren in Christ. Like 
the major Christian communities, these minority sects ap­
pealed, in their turn, to Sir Stratford Canning. The situation 
posed a cruel dilemma for him. Personally, he was a con­
vinced Anglican, and he dreamed of a united Christian 
church which would, one day, become irresistible in its at­
traction, even for the world of Islam. He had little sympathy, 
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therefore, for the type of Protestant fundamentalists seeking 
entry into the fabric of Eastern Christianity. For the same 
reason he abhorred any further splintering of the major 
Orthodox churches. But at the same time he was doggedly 
devoted to the idea of personal freedom, and though he de­
tested the spectacle of Christian squabbling in full view of 
Moslem hauteur, he found no real difficulty in giving priority 
to that principle over his own sympathies. He solved the 
personal dilemma by limiting himself to action in individual 
cases according to their particular merits. On no account 
would he present the Porte with a demand for a general 
recognition of Protestantism as such, for to do so at this junc­
ture in the over-all struggle would, in his opinion, result in a 
general setback for Christianity. Accordingly, he sought 
and obtained legal status for an Armenian Protestant group 
and secured permission for the erection of a Protestant church 
in Pera to serve the foreign Protestant community. He like­
wise requested the Sultan's blessing on the erection of an 
Anglican hospice in Jerusalem and the establishment of an 
Anglican bishopric there. Limited action of this type he 
deemed sufficient for the times. 
Secular aspects of the Sultan's regime interested the Am­
bassador no less than did the religious. Financial reform and 
an efficient military organization were every bit as essential 
to the welfare of the Empire as was legal reform. The Nizam-
Jedid of Selim III, resurrected by Mahmud after the abolition 
of the Janissaries, aimed at a regular army, staffed by career 
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officers and maintained by the financial resources of the cen­
tral government. Obviously, it was directly connected with 
the revenue system of the Porte; and here was the stumbling 
block, for, in spite of the tax system proclaimed in the Gulhane 
Decree, tax collection was still largely a matter of farming out 
the taxes. The net loss to the Sultan's government was enor­
mous, and the opportunities for personal profit were in direct 
proportion. Invariably, the district tax collectors were the 
local beys and pashas on whose feudal-like local troops the 
Sultan's military power had formerly depended. That they 
should surrender the chief source of their income in favor of 
a system of direct taxation whose main purpose would be to 
reduce, if not destroy, the basis of their military responsibility 
and power was a "consummation devoutly to be wished" but 
obviously not one to be sought without trouble. The network 
of vested interests was widespread and the chain of corruption 
extended right back to the Divan, where the Seraskier, Riza 
Pasha, and the Finance Minister, Safti Pasha, were working 
hand in hand. 
The foreign debt of the Porte had grown tremendously 
under the pressure of the Egyptian wars, and its credit had 
diminished to the danger point. Early in 1845, Rifat Pasha, 
freed from the restraint of ministerial responsibility, had begun 
to raise some searching questions as to the state of the Imperial 
Treasury. From a whisper the questions soon grew to a 
thunderous roar, and when the ensuing investigation revealed 
the extent of corruption that had damaged both the treasury 
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and the army, the wrath of blame fell upon the respective 
ministers. Riza Pasha and his bedfellow, Safti Pasha, were 
summarily dismissed from office. Meanwhile the cry was 
being raised on all sides, from within the Council, from the 
associations of merchants and bankers, from reformers and 
patriots generally, for the return of Reshid Pasha as the one 
man best fitted to salvage the Porte's prestige. 
So little did any of this appear to be the work of Sir Strat­
ford Canning that the Sultan deemed it advisable to ascertain 
from the Elchi whether the British government would take 
offense at the appointment of the Ambassador to France as 
Foreign Minister of the Porte. When the necessary assur­
ances that this would not be so came from the British Em­
bassy without hesitation, Reshid Pasha was recalled from Paris 
and assumed the office of Foreign Minister on October 23, 
1845. Stratford Canning had waited four years to see this day. 
1. The more so because the Sheik-ul-Islam had not ratified the distinc­
tion pressed by Canning (Temperley, op. dt., pp. 26-28). But Canning 
was trying to push the Porte into a statement of principle from which 
escape would be difficult. It should be noted, therefore, to supplement 
Temperley's observation, that neither the Sheik nor the ulema denounced 
the distinction, so Canning was justified in applying the rule of silence. 
2. Canning was neither shocked nor surprised, as some historians (e.g., 
Temperley, op. cit., p. 243) imply, when he had to face the fact that 
reform would be indefinitely postponed—a conclusion that is not supposed 
to have dawned upon him until the early fifties. As early as December 13, 
1843, we find him writing to Aberdeen: "The plans of Reshid Pasha, the 
regulations of Gulhane, the improvements introduced from Europe went 
out of favor with the settlement of Egypt and the recovery of Syria and 
Candia. The Porte gradually relapsed into most of her old ideas ." (cf. 
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Bailey, op. cit., p. 222 n. 73). And in October of 1845, he wrote to the 
Foreign Secretary: "If the principles now in requisition are found unequal 
to the process of restoration, what but despair can ensue . ?" (Lane-
Poole, op. cit., II, n o )  . And again, to Lady Canning, on July 20, 1846, he 
wrote: "I am sick of assurances, and believe nothing" Qhid., p. 159). 
Disappointment, yes, but not shock. 
3. Stratford Canning never claimed to be the "Reformer of Turkey,'' 
although the sobriquet was bestowed upon him by well-meaning friends 
and admirers, including his principal biographer, Lane-Poole. The sub­
stance of the reforms which Canning hoped to see adopted were not 
finally implemented until the Revolution of Mustapha Kemal succeeded 
in the early 1920's. 
4. In or out of office, Reshid was the leader of the loosely knit liberal 
bloc, but as Bailey, op. cit., p. 222, notes, "Reshid and his colleagues 
continued to work alone as individuals, rather than as leaders of an 
efficient organization or party." 
5. Cf. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 101. 
XIV

SIR Stratford Canning had left England without his wife and 
family. So long a time had elapsed since his last previous 
residence in Constantinople that he wished to be sure die 
proper accommodations were available before sending for 
them. He had to be especially careful about arrangements 
because his young son, named George, for obvious reasons, 
had contracted an illness in Spain which had invalided him 
for life. The boy was never to follow in the footsteps of his 
famous namesake as his father had so fondly hoped. Lady 
Canning did bring the children out later on, but the weakness 
of the boy and the lack of proper medical facilities in Constan­
tinople forced her to return to England early in 1845. 
These periods of separation from his family were somewhat 
compensated for by the stimulating presence of a remarkable 
circle of men who were associated with him for varying 
lengths of time during this tenure of office. The days when 
the complexion of an embassy staff used to be largely of the 
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ambassador's making had disappeared, and many an envoy 
was beginning to suffer under the curse of having to tolerate 
incompetent assistants foisted on him by the Foreign Office. 
Fortunately, Canning had little cause to complain in this 
regard, for among those who spent part of their apprentice­
ship under his tutelage were a number of men who went on to 
win their spurs in the field of diplomacy and statecraft. The 
more prominent among them were John Drummond Hay, 
Henry Wellesley, later Lord Cowley, and the Lords Stanley, 
Ampthill, Napier, and Zouche. In company with them were 
Charles Alison, the distinguished Orientalist, and archaeo­
logists and historians Layard, Rawlinson, and Newton. With 
subordinates such as these at hand the Ambassador's burden 
was not nearly so heavy as it might have been, for, as noted 
previously, the concerns of the Embassy had grown tremend­
ously, and Canning had been disturbed by a noticeable lack 
of efficiency when he had resumed office in 1842. These as­
sistants were of a calibre to follow intelligent direction and to 
assume responsibility when it was given to them, and Canning 
gave them ample opportunity for both. At times each of 
these had felt the bite of his temper, but all testified, in later 
years, to the debt they owed him for his counsel. 
With Layard and Rawlinson among the list of persons who 
were familiar figures at the Embassy, it was not unusual that 
Canning should choose as an avocation the growing science of 
archaeology, to which, on his own initiative and at his own 
expense, he was to make a contribution. At Budrun, in the 
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far southwestern corner of Asia Minor, for example, there was 
a crumbling ruin that had excited the interest of antiquarians 
for some time. It was nothing but a nondescript crusaders' 
fortress, yet knowledgeable observers puzzled over the marble 
bas-reliefs of its massive walls. They had obviously been part 
of some ancient monument sacrificed to the needs of another 
era. Alison, sent by Canning to investigate the feasibility of 
extricating them, returned a favorable report, and the Am­
bassador made immediate overtures to the Porte regarding 
their acquisition. Abdul Medjid, in giving his assent to their 
removal, bestowed the sculptures as a personal gift from him­
self to the Elchi. When, after two years of patient excava­
tion, the marble blocks were finally removed, the work in­
volved in getting them out led to a discovery of their original 
use and the monument from which they had come. It proved 
to be none other than the tomb of King Mausolus erected at 
Halicarnassus by Queen Artemisia in 353 B.C., an edifice 
numbered among the Seven Wonders of the World. Can­
ning, who had accepted the original gift in the name of the 
British people, presented all the finds to the Trustees of the 
British Museum, where they were eventually installed in a 
separate Mausoleum Room. 
An even greater reservoir of knowledge, as far as history 
and archaeology are concerned, was tapped by the diggings 
of Austen Henry Layard at Nineveh. Layard, convinced that 
a series of mounds near Mosul covered long-buried secrets of 
ancient Assyria, had arrived at Constantinople in 1842, penni­
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less after exhausting his own funds in fruitless effort. Can­
ning accepted the logic of Layard's theories, and, being unable 
to procure government funds for the undertaking, he person­
ally guaranteed the archaeologist a salary and advanced funds 
necessary to begin the work of excavation. Finances were 
only one part of the preparations, however, for in most cases 
the object of an archaeologist's search lay on the private prop­
erty of powerful, and often greedy, landlords who bowed to 
nothing less than an imperial rescript. For Layard, and again 
for Rawlinson, who searched in the same regions, Sir Strat­
ford Canning was always ready to ask for the requisite orders. 
Canning was not a wealthy man; and, while it is true that 
these ventures were diverting to him, they cannot be regarded 
as the hobby of a dilettante. Here again, as in all things, it 
was to a great degree his sense of national pride that motivated 
his actions. He felt that England should be in the forefront 
of scientific achievement in the scholarly unearthing of the 
past, just as much as he considered it rightful for her to lead 
humanity to the glories of the future in a world of peace and 
enlightenment. But it was not until Layard had unearthed 
the royal palace at Nineveh, with its priceless records in clay 
and stone, that the British government and the British Mu­
seum moved to relieve the Ambassador of the financial burden 
involved. 
The first bright results of these endeavors were coming to 
the fore in 1846, and they coincided, happily, with the promo­
tion of Reshid Pasha to the office of Grand Vezir. To Can­
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ning it was a welcome sign of liberal strength in the Porte, 
and he felt that it would be a good time to take leave of ab­
sence. Reshid might do better if it were made absolutely 
clear that he was no tool of the English Elchi and could func­
tion on his own resources. Satisfied that much good had been 
effected, and feeling a need for a breath of English air, Sir 
Stratford Canning asked for an audience of leave-taking at 
the end of July, 1846. From the Sultan and from Reshid came 
sincere expressions of hope that the absence would not be too 
long and that he would return to them in health and safety. 
One misgiving marred the complacency of his departure, and 
that was caused by the knowledge that Riza Pasha had re­
turned to the Divan as Minister of Commerce. This develop­
ment could be an omen of ill, or it could be a smybol of 




THE England to which Stratford Canning returned after an 
absence of almost five years was undergoing some marked 
changes of her own. As a matter of fact, the whole continent 
of Europe was in a period of social and political transition. In 
England, the broad extension of the franchise effected by the 
Reform Bill had made Parliament more directly answerable 
to the country as a whole. The major parties, however, had 
been slow to adjust to the change, and their leadership, seem­
ingly incapable of gauging the temper of the wider electorate, 
found it impossible to present more than a shadow of party 
unity on the great issues moving the mass of new voters. 
Both Tories and Whigs had been badly split in the thirties 
on the questions of Catholic emancipation and parliamentary 
reform. Now, in the forties, the same kind of cleavage con­
tinued over the issue of free trade and the corn tariff. The 
old party names were still in use, but the rampant criss-cross­
ing of party lines was pointing to an inevitable realignment. 
Sir Robert Peel's ministry, for example, was Tory in name, 
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but when Peel finally succeeded in repealing the Corn Laws 
in June of 1846, his Parliamentary majority depended heav­
ily on the votes of Whig and Irish members. These same 
votes were denied him, however, in an ensuing motion of no 
confidence entered by rebels in his own Tory party led by 
Stanley and Disraeli, and the Peel government collapsed. The 
succeeding Cabinet was headed by Lord John Russell as Prime 
Minister, supported by his own Whig party and a mixture of 
Peel Tories and Radicals, the basis of the Liberal party of a 
later day. 
Canning was really rather indifferent to the general con­
fusion of party politics. What mattered most to him was the 
return of Palmerston to the Foreign Office, where he felt a 
strong hand was needed. The same currents that were break­
ing down traditional patterns in England were flowing even 
faster across the continent of Europe. But whereas public 
clamor had a constitutional outlet in England, it was stifled 
on the Continent. What passed as constitutional reform and 
social transition in England was looked upon as political 
revolt and the upheaval of established order in Europe. The 
Continental autocracies, almost without exception, were bent 
on maintaining the system of hereditary privilege and rank 
at all costs. Here was a hidden danger. What would happen 
if Europe were suddenly to explode in revolution? The 
French Revolution had been followed by almost a quarter-
century of war and turmoil. It was not beyond the realm of 
possibility that a like eruption could occur again. 
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Men like Canning and Palmerston could not profess to 
foretell the future, but they knew that England had no policy 
to prepare her for these possibilities. Their number was 
dwindling, however, for in their preoccupation with their 
own affairs the English people had all but forgotten the rest 
of the world. Englishmen sensed that they were on the thres­
hold of a new day, and the growth of political democracy was 
only one of its harbingers. The Industrial Revolution had 
progressed further in England than any other place on earth. 
The products of her new factories were being carried to every 
corner of the globe, and the vessels that carried them were re­
turning swollen with fresh food for the machines and furnaces 
of the Midlands. The maritime supremacy of Britain, which 
had safeguarded her through the blackest moments of war, 
was now being used to corner world markets for her manu­
factures and to guarantee an unending backflow of raw ma­
terials. All this had come about in an era of uninterrupted 
peace that had settled over Europe after the Congress of 
Vienna. And as the prosperity and profits grew with each 
year of peace, who could be bothered contemplating the 
possibility of war? The new merchant aristocracy had no time 
for it. Let Palmerston and others of his quaint circle go on 
prating about coalitions and paramount interests, and play 
their games of treaties and notes and memorandums and the 
like. They were a carry-over from the past, and no one really 
paid attention to their antics. Macaulay was soon to bear 
scholarly witness to the popular fancy that nothing but un­
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clouded glory lay in the future. "Optimism reigned through­
out the land."1 
Thus did the English seem oblivious to the ferment brew­
ing beneath the surface calm of that continent which was 
less than a day's sail distant. Except in France, the struggle 
for personal political rights in Europe was still embryonic; 
and the rising clamor of homogeneous racial and cultural 
groups seeking national identity separate from the age-old 
hegemonies which held them subject went unheard by the 
bulk of Englishmen. Unmindful of the recent past, the 
average Englishman no longer realized that the option of peace 
or war might rest in the will of one man. Long accustomed 
to popular control of government, they failed to realize that 
it was not so everywhere. And if their new leaders acknowl­
edged the fact, they failed to remind their countrymen. The 
aging Duke of Wellington fretted publicly about the woeful 
state of England's defences, but few rallied to his side. What 
need was there for armies? The world was on the march 
toward unending progress. 
Such was the atmosphere in which Stratford Canning spent 
a quiet, relaxing year as a 'simple householder," attending to 
personal affairs, visiting the few old friends who remained, 
and calmly planning his future. It was a year that wore 
away all too rapidly; and as the summer of 1847 neared, he 
began to prepare for a return to his station in Constantinople. 
Because he was approaching his sixty-first birthday in an era 
when longevity was the exception rather than the rule, he was 
forced to examine the realities of the present and assess the 
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probabilities of the future. In deference to the desires of his 
family, he wished to set some terminal date to his public 
career, provided he could do so with the assurance that some 
gains had been cemented at the scene of his labors. 
Since Reshid Pasha seemed to be securely in power, it was 
reasonable to conclude that the reform movement was in a 
strong position and that the time was ripe to push for practical 
implementation of, at least, the most important reforms. Sir 
Stratford was convinced that certain specifics could no longer 
be postponed lest they suffer cumulative deterioration and 
eventually atrophy from want of serious resolution. Accord­
ingly, he wrote a long and detailed letter for Reshid's consid­
eration in which he enumerated definite actions that must 
be initiated, and toward the completion of which he, Strat­
ford Canning, was ready to spend a final eighteen months in 
the palace at Pera.2 
The reforms he was now urging, the Ambassador reminded 
the Pasha, had long since been agreed to in principle. They 
included a revamping of the revenue system and a broadening 
of educational opportunities that would be of direct benefit 
to all subjects of the Sultan. Concerning the position of 
Christians, he demanded immediate abolition of the harach 
and the admission of Christian evidence in the courts of law. 
He mentioned the horror with which England regarded the 
forcible conversion to Islam of Christian children and pointed 
out that the Ottoman Empire could never hope for a real en­
tente with England while such obnoxious practices continued. 
And the Sultan, Canning warned in this connection, might 
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well need an English alliance in the near future. Events were 
to prove the foresight of this admonition, though no one then 
realized how soon the need was to arise. Finally, he alluded 
again to the impossibility of ever fostering a sense of patriot­
ism and loyalty among the rayah population until its members 
were allowed to participate in government and military service 
on a basis of complete equality. 
It is doubtful that the Elchi expected an answer in kind to 
this memorandum. He had submitted a statement of his con­
ditions, and it was sufficient for his purpose. If Reshid could 
lead the Divan along in reasonable co-operation, it would soon 
be apparent for all to see, and then Canning would be happy 
to collaborate to the best of his ability. If, on the other hand, 
practical assurances were not forthcoming, he had resolved to 
give up his mission as a failure. 
At any rate, the Ambassador had no further time for un­
trammeled thought. Lord Palmerston had decided to entrust 
him with two preliminary missions, one in Switzerland and 
another in Greece. 
Switzerland was beset by religious strife, and outright civil 
war was in the offing. A few years earlier, all monastic 
establishments had been suppressed in the Protestant canton 
of Aargau. The bickering between Catholic areas and the 
rest of the country had grown until, lately, a resolution 
calling for the expulsion of the Jesuits had been passed by 
the Federal Diet in Berne. The reaction of the Catholic 
cantons had been severe, and seven of them had formed a 
protective league, the Sonderbund, which armed itself and 
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was now defiantly challenging the power of the Diet. Purely 
political questions had become entangled with the original 
religious issue, with the Catholic league taking a position 
against a general constitutional revision being supported by 
the Liberal majority in the Diet. One canton, Neuchatel, 
had officially declared its neutrality but succeeded only in 
incurring the enmity of the Diet because of that attempt. 
This was an added complication because the hereditary 
sovereign of Neuchatel was none other than the Protestant 
King of Prussia, whose Hohenzollern family had never 
relinquished its original ties to that tiny princedom. The 
Swiss crisis, therefore, was dangerously near to inviting 
foreign intervention on a major scale both on religious and 
political grounds. The major powers, fortunately, were agreed 
on the necessity of antecedent mediation of a diplomatic 
nature, and Sir Stratford Canning, one of the chief architects 
of the federal system inaugurated in Switzerland thirty years 
earlier, was a logical choice as mediator. 
Before Canning was able to reach Berne (December, 
1847), however, an armed clash did occur, and it resulted 
in an overwhelming victory for the troops of the Diet. But 
the Diet, swelling with pride because of its easy victory, had 
assumed a vindictive posture toward the rebels. Not only did 
it carry through with the measures originally contemplated, 
but it imposed a punitive fine of one million francs on the 
former members of the Sonderbund and the monasteries 
collectively. The Diet also threatened to occupy Neuchatel 
with Federal troops, whereupon King Frederick William of 
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Prussia, on behalf of Neuchatel, and Austria and France, on 
behalf of the Catholics, entered forceful and ominous protests. 
The Diet curtly rejected the protests, and Sir Stratford pres­
ently found himself mediating between the Swiss government 
and the Continental powers. He did secure a commitment 
on the part of the Diet, in January, to refrain from occupying 
Neuchatel, and a general amelioration of the punitive fines. 
Prussia was thereby satisfied and withdrew her active interest 
in the imbroglio, and France and Austria were soon to turn 
their attention elsewhere. The year 1848 had dawned and 
restless winds were blowing across the face of Europe. 
Canning came back to London in February preparatory 
to returning to Constantinople by way of Greece where the 
situation was chaotic. Prince Otho of Bavaria, to whom the 
European powers had given the crown of Greece fifteen 
years before, had turned out to be a royal misadventurer. 
Ever since his arrival in Athens, early in 1833, he had carried 
on as though the Kingdom of the Hellenes had been erected 
for his personal pleasure and profit. Alien to the people over 
whom he ruled, Otho made not the slightest move to accom­
modate himself to their culture or to solve their problems. 
Consequently, the strife between parties and factions had 
never ceased. The sycophants who surrounded the King 
formed circles which succeeded one another from time to 
time in the guise of constitutional ministries, but they were 
governments in name only. And if its internal affairs were 
tragic, the relations of the Greek government with other 
states were almost ludicrous, since Greek envoys at foreign 
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courts were chiefly concerned with transmitting information 
highly partisan to the interests of the King or were busy 
conspiring against him. Most embarrassingly for the Christian 
powers of Europe, Greece had completely failed to honor 
the obligation, imposed upon her by treaty, of indemnifying 
former Turkish owners for property expropriated at the time 
her independence was recognized. The British government's 
Foreign Office was determined to rectify the situation. 
Palmerston proposed to Canning that prior to his return 
to Constantinople, he circulate through the courts of Europe 
and sound out the several governments on a solution to the 
Greek problem. It was his desire that Canning stop off in 
Athens and present Otho and his cohorts with a concerted 
ultimatum that they put their house in order or submit to 
forcible intervention of some kind. Canning was to work 
out the details according to the reaction he found en route. 
What was to be a grand progress from capital to capital 
across the continent turned out to be a dismal first-hand 
observation of riot, misrule, and revolution. On his way back 
from Switzerland in February, Canning had stopped at Paris, 
where he had found the king confident of his close ties with 
the people, but within two weeks Louis Philippe and his 
court had been received as pitiful exiles in London. The 
Second French Republic had been born. Revolt spread 
rapidly, and within a month the turmoil was general through­
out Europe. Though conservative fear described it variously 
as anarchism, socialism, hatred of the aristocracy, the move­
ment was basically a not-to-be stilled public demand for 
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constitutional democracy. Unfortunate excesses did occur 
but they were perhaps due mostly to muddled attempts to 
meet the popular upsurge with force of arms rather than 
reasonable compromise. The nature of the turbulence on the 
Continent is shown by contrast with the course that the 
Chartist movement took in England. Chartist leaders organ­
ized a popular meeting and issued threats and ultimatums. 
In a momentary fit of panic the Duke of Wellington was 
summoned to protect Government and Crown, but he wisely 
kept the regular troops out of sight and left the maintenance 
of law and order to a hastily erected organization of civil 
constables. On the day of the promised demonstration little 
happened beyond a quiet and dignified procession of three 
carriages leaving the meeting at Kensington with petitions 
addressed to the Commons. Not so on the Continent, where 
the Bourbons were ejected from France and the Second 
Republic arose from the barricades. In Vienna the Emperor 
Ferdinand was deposed and succeeded by the youthful Francis 
Joseph, while Metternich, who refused to bow to any sem­
blance of democracy, was forced to fly in disguise. In Berlin 
and in a half-dozen lesser capitals of German states, kingdoms 
were shaken, but all weathered the storms by compromising 
to a certain extent with their subjects. 
Nationalism, too, entered the picture. In Hungary, Poland, 
and northern Italy there were attempts, some concerted and 
successful, others sporadic and easily quelled, against the 
Hapsburg and Romanov overlordships. It was, as Canning 
himself described it, "the famous year of revolutions." 
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Needless to say, his tour met with little success under the 
circumstances. The question of Greece had receded far into 
the background for the embattled monarchs and their minis­
ters, and Canning was left to his own resources to deal with 
the matter. Impatient of any further delay in picking up the 
reins in Constantinople, he had refused to alter his schedule 
and, as a mark of singular audacity, even allowed Mrs. Can­
ning and his daughters to accompany him to the Continent. 
Fruitless as the journey was, he completed it as directed, and 
if nothing else was accomplished, he did acquire a fresh 
insight into the views and policies of the several powers. 
He was quite understandably empty-handed, then, when 
he arrived in Athens, and though he listened patiently to all 
who approached him, there was little he could do with the 
intractable monarch save to deliver a frank and serious 
warning that the situation could not continue in a process of 
indefinite deterioration. Personally antipathetic to Otho, he 
nevertheless steeled himself to treating with the king as the 
legal ruler until events should determine otherwise. Curiously 
enough, this characteristic adherence to principle earned 
Canning the enmity of many Greeks and their English 
sympathizers who thought he should have been more forth­
right in his condemnation. But Canning felt that he was 
present in Greece as a judge for the European powers rather 
than a partisan of one faction or another. This adamant 
devotion to what he considered his sworn duty cost him the 
friendship of several Englishmen who had cast their lot with 
the Greeks since the days of Byron and who had become 
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violently antagonistic to Otho. It was not the first time that 
Canning's strong will drove him in an opposite direction from 
his own sympathies, nor was it to be the last. Had he been 
less rigid with himself, less ready to sacrifice even friendship 
where duty dictated, he would not have been the man he was. 
He would have preferred to face Otho armed with definite 
directives and able to predict severe alternatives, but he was 
in no way so empowered nor could he make the slightest 
pretense of being thus commissioned. 
The disappointment he suffered in Athens, where he had 
no direct and continuing responsibility, was trifling compared 
to the near disaster that threatened his inner hopes and 
his prestige in Constantinople. Revolution had not directly 
affected the Ottoman Empire, but it had galvanized the forces 
of reaction into seizing upon the opportunity afforded by the 
Elchi's absence to work on the monarch's fear and timidity. 
Shortly before the Ambassador returned in June, the con­
spirators had successfully effected the removal of Reshid, and 
a rigidly conservative cabinet was in the saddle. 
Canning was overcome by feelings of rage and frustration. 
His wrath was directed no less at the combination of circum­
stances that had delayed him too long and at the intriguers 
who capitalized on it than it was at the obvious weakness of 
both the Sultan and Reshid. Had the times been normal, the 
patent inability of the Pasha to stand alone and the behavior 
of the Sultan, who wavered with every change of wind, might 
have caused Canning to throw up his hands in despair. But 
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the luxury of petty recrimination and aggrieved pouting were 
not in the Elchi's repertoire, and this certainly was not the 
hour to include them, for the clouds on the horizon were 
too ominous to allow for such indulgence. The anger of the 
Ambassador caused shudders that vibrated in every corner 
of the Seraglio. Without waiting for the official audience of 
welcome, he made his views and his demands known at once. 
Abdul Medjid, already showing disappointing signs of dissi­
pation, abjectly admitted that he had acquiesced to the 
exactions of an unworthy plot against his minister and restored 
Reshid to the Council immediately. Ali Pasha, who had been 
Reshid's foreign minister, was likewise reinstated and Rifat 
Pasha, who had gone back to the Foreign Office, pleaded that 
he had done so only to save what he could. Within two 
months of Canning's return Reshid Pasha was back as Grand 
Vezir (August, 1848), Ali Pasha as Reis Effendi, and Rifat 
returned to the Presidency of the Council. The celerity of 
the realignment was ample testimony of Canning's power. 
His influence was not being applied for motives of personal 
vengeance, however, but to prepare the Turks for coping 
with fresh disturbances in the Danubian provinces. 
In the month of Elchi's reappearance at the Porte the air of 
revolution had blown as far as Bucharest, the capital of the 
principality of Wallachia where a popular uprising demanded, 
as elsewhere, universial extension of suffrage and, in particu­
lar, legal eligibility of all electors for the office of hospodar, or 
prince. The situation in this instance was uniquely complex. 
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This province, along with its sister state of Moldavia, enjoyed 
a semi-autonomous status under the sovereignty of the Sultan 
as a result of the Treaty of Adrianople forced upon Turkey 
to end the Turco-Russian hostilities in 1829. The clauses of 
the Treaty pertinent to these provinces guaranteed them 
complete internal freedom, but, in a vaguely stated article, 
Turkey and Russia jointly reserved the right to maintain law 
and order if they agreed such intervention was necessary at 
any time. To make the conditions even more complicated, 
the Czar was granted the protectorate over the Orthodox 
Church on the grounds that the population was preponder­
antly Christian and stood in need of such paternal guardian­
ship. Thus Czar Nicholas I had sufficient legal grounds for 
concern in whatever transpired in these territories that 
stretched along the northern banks of the Danube and the 
western side of the Pruth, but he did not have the primary 
right to interfere, as it was expressly recognized by the terms 
of the Treaty that ultimate sovereignty over the territories was 
vested in the Ottoman Sultan. As practical recognition of 
that sovereignty, the hospodars were required to pay a yearly 
tribute to the Porte. 
Autocrat of all the Russians by Divine Right and Supreme 
Head of the Orthodox Church, Nicholas I sincerely and 
firmly believed that the least questioning of authority was 
tantamount to political revolution and religious heresy. He 
regarded it as his sacred duty to crush revolution wherever 
it appeared, and he was in the forefront of those who pro­
claimed that sovereigns had the duty to support one another 
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in defense of that principle. It was not surprising, conse­
quently, that when the ugly demon appeared so close to his 
own sacred soil and within the shadow of the imperial eagles, 
he decided upon immediate annihilation. It made no differ­
ence to him that the hospodars were not hereditary sovereigns 
but elected princes, chosen for life by the aristocracy. An 
assault against them was an affront to the principle of 
absolutism which he could not tolerate, and he instructed 
his ambassador at the Porte to inquire, not about the advis­
ability or relevancy of military occupation, which he took for 
granted, but about the method to be employed. 
Upon receipt of this inquiry the Turks turned to Canning 
for advice. It was the first time he would be brought into 
direct conflict with the Czar, for despite years of cautious 
observation of Romanov pretensions, he had not yet found 
himself faced with an occasion to contravene Russian wishes. 
On the contrary, he often had acted in close co-operation with 
them: in the early years against the machinations of Bona-
parte; in the days preceding and following Navarino; during 
the era of Egyptian expansion; in the Persian boundary 
dispute; on the apostasy question; and on a host of minor 
matters. It so happened that what was best for Turkey in 
each of these instances coincided, in his judgment, with the 
momentary desires of the Court of St. Petersburg, whatever 
its motives. 
Canning saw beyond the facade of the issue of the Danu­
bian principalities a wish on the part of the Czar to be within 
striking distance of Hungary where a determined effort of the 
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revolutionaries was imperiling the hold of the Hapsburg 
dynasty. Now Sir Stratford had no sympathy for radicals and 
revolution as such, but the Hungarian uprising was nationalist 
in character, and many of the country's finest aristocrats and 
leaders were playing a decisive role in the struggle. They 
had already declared their independence of Vienna and had 
achieved striking success. Much as he realized the necessity 
of a strong Austria to preserve the European balance (and 
in this, of course, he but echoed Lord Palmerston), he could 
not look with equanimity on the prospect of a Russian army's 
moving up the Danube Valley to crush the rebellion from the 
rear. There was also the danger that a Russian occupation 
of the principalities would become a permanent one, which 
meant the possibility of a conflict with Turkish troops and 
further encroachment on Ottoman sovereignty. Thus he 
recommended to the Turks that they avoid the expedient of 
military occupation except as a last resort. He suggested that 
they advise the Czar to the effect that the Sultan, until he 
knew better, regarded the Wallachian insurgents as mere 
political reformers who could best be dealt with by a civil 
commission of investigation. 
The Turks followed this advice, but in their simplicity did 
not sense the importance of strictly attending to it. On the 
fourteenth of July—and this was before Reshid was back in 
full control—a body of troops moved across the Danube to 
be in position should a summons come from the commis­
sioner in Bucharest. They were in no sense an occupying 
force, but the bare movement was sufficient signal for the 
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Russians to take corresponding measures, and the next day 
several thousand Russians crossed the Pruth and took up 
stations in Moldavia. Incidents occurred between the local 
populace and troops of both armies. Headstrong nationalists 
provoked skirmishes whenever and wherever they could, and 
as the instances multiplied, the Russian demands increased 
in severity. The Czar wanted to make a terrifying example of 
the insurrectionists while the Porte held out for leniency 
and compromise. In response to popular demand the Sultan's 
government expressed the intent of incorporating some meas­
ure of redress in the general settlement; the Czar, by contrast, 
responded with an unqualified refusal to meet any of the 
demands made under the banner of rebellion. 
There were few real secrets kept in the Seraglio, and the 
Czar was well aware of Canning's constant guidance behind 
the scenes. The intransigence of the Turks he attributed not 
to their own devices but to what he at first fancied, and later 
steadfastly believed, was a deep personal hatred for himself 
on the part of Stratford Canning. Nicholas concluded, with 
the agreement of his ministers, that this was so because he 
had not found other British statesmen with whom the 
Russians had contact subscribing to the inflexible policy of 
the Elchi.3 It was not found at Whitehall, according to the 
Russian Ambassador to London, nor was it evident in the 
conduct and declarations of Canning's counterparts in Vienna 
or St. Petersburg. Thus the Russians must have decided that 
they could push with impunity, as Canning's position did not 
appear to have the backing of London. 
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In part they were correct. Canning knew that he and 
Palmerston did not hold the same views on the intermediate 
positions to be taken. Canning looked with apprehension at 
the presence of large Russian forces in the principalities, while 
Palmerston chose to ignore the immediate danger on the 
theory that the Czar was likely to overextend himself and 
become entangled in a web of his own spinning. But Canning 
was equally certain that there was no disagreement between 
himself and his superior on ultimate ends. This was an 
important distinction which the Russian government failed 
to make, and the error was to lead to a humiliation. 
Correspondence between the two English statesmen at this 
time reveals that Canning was urging for more explicit assur­
ances of support for the Turks from London. Obviously he 
was being pressured by his proteges for a defensive alliance as 
a price for continued Turkish resistance. He was supporting 
the request as being a measure within the confines of what 
the Turks might reasonably expect. Palmerston, removed 
from the daily immediacy of the problem and viewing it as 
part of a total European problem, looked upon compliance 
with such a request as something that would be needlessly 
provocative.4 
The interchange of ideas, just as in earlier days, was largely 
academic, since the rapidly unfolding developments rarely 
allowed the anticipation of probabilities to keep pace with 
actualities. In spite of slow communications, nevertheless, 
each man was provided with a continued awareness of the 
final objectives. Hence, between Palmerston and Canning 
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there was a mutual confidence regarding the other's instinctive 
reaction in the urgency of sudden crisis. In the ensuing year 
of 1849, a series of episodes proved that each man had been 
correct within the limits of his particular prognostication. 
True to Canning's fears, Russia showed no intention of with­
drawing when the principalities were finally pacified. On 
the contrary, she proposed, in January, that a joint occupation 
of seven years be agreed to. In addition, she demanded 
permission for the passage of a punitive expedition into 
Hungarian Transylvania. The Turks rejected both proposals 
only to have the Russians defiantly ignore the objections by 
marching through the territory on a route of their own 
choosing. 
Initially at least, Lord Palmerston's estimate of Russian 
capabilities proved to be true also, as the Hungarians, instead 
of being crushed, wheeled about and inflicted a severe defeat 
on the new enemy. The Russians fell back in the face of 
this unexpected blow, but the defeat, far from having the 
effect desired by Palmerston, only gave the Czar new grounds 
for prolonged operations. Nicholas rushed reinforcements into 
Moldavia, where bases and depots were established for a full-
scale campaign in the spring. He increased his demands on 
the Turks for a convention or agreement of occupation and 
made it plain that, like it or not, they would face a large 
Russian army north of the Danube. 
Palmerston reacted strongly to this turn of affairs and 
berated the Russian ambassador, Baron Brunnow, on the 
illegality of these measures. Unfortunately, because of the 
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time-lag in communications, Palmerston's reaction came too 
late for the Turks. In light of his failure to extract the desired 
alliance from his home government, Canning was unable to 
hold the Turks in line any longer, and in April they entered 
into negotiations with a special envoy of the Czar. 
Canning might have been expected to bow to the inevit­
able and remove himself from further participation in the 
affair, but he was under no illusion that this would be the 
end of the matter. On the contrary, he saw in the offing a 
new flood of Russian requirements awaiting only the con­
clusion of the campaign against the Hungarians. If he must 
accept the fait accompli of Russian occupation, he wanted to 
confine the legal limits of that occupation so that there would 
be no further usurpation of Turkish sovereignty. With some 
welcome assistance from the representative of the newly 
organized French government, he was able to induce the 
Turks to seek and obtain a softening of the harshest and most 
dangerous aspects of the Russian demands, and the resulting 
Act of Occupation stipulated that the armies of both countries 
would continue in the principalities for a time "for the mainte­
nance of internal tranquillity and protection of the frontier." ° 
The tenure of the hospodars was limited to seven years for 
the purpose of keeping them under stricter control of the 
supervisory powers, and the assemblies were suspended pend­
ing the study by civil commissions of an 'organic reform'' in 
the administration of the provinces. 
The best Canning could say of the Act was that its terms 
''might have been worse," but in his foresight he had been 
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able to keep out of the agreement any clause which might 
have legalized Russian activities against Hungary. By the 
omission of such a clause, Canning had gained two objectives: 
the preservation of the neutrality of Turkey should the insur­
rection in Hungary be successful and an independent state 
emerge, and, more important, the refusal to recognize the 
right of one state to cross the borders of a neighbor on the 
pretext of subduing rebellion in a third state. Canning, with 
regard to the latter objective, foresaw the eventual defeat of 
the Hungarians and the flight of their leaders. The Hungarian 
patriots and the Poles who had joined them had but one road 
of escape, and that was into Ottoman territory. If the Sultan 
had legalized, by his consent, Russian pretensions to enter 
Hungary by marching across his domain, it would be difficult 
to refuse to co-operate to the same extent should the remnants 
of the insurgent army retreat across his borders. 
The wisdom of this move seems to have escaped the 
Russians in their haste for the immediate end they had in 
view, for although some minor figures of the revolt had 
already taken refuge in Ottoman territory, the Russian pleno­
pentiary made no attempt to include this problem in the 
terms of the settlement. Canning did not think for a moment 
that the Russians intended to forgo punishment of the 
'criminals'' and reasoned that they were counting on the 
ordinary procedure of extradition. He had so advised Palmers­
ton and was equally certain that public opinion in England 
and the world would finally rouse itself from lethargy to 
protest. 
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Almost as predicted, the revolt was crushed, and through 
the weeks of August and September of 1849, several thousand 
refugees crossed the borders and sought sanctuary. They 
included Kossuth himself, Bern, Dembinski, and a score of 
other notables.8 Within a matter of days the Austrian inter­
nuncio and the Russian ambassador at the Porte asked for 
their extradition as public criminals. 
1. Churchill, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, IV, 67. See 
also Yvonne Ffrench, The Great Exhibition (London: Harvill Press, 
i9So), pp. 3-6. 
2. See the letter to Dr. MacGuffog, June 21, 1847, for relay to Reshid 
Pasha. (Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 160-62). Again, Canning's constant 
awareness of the real status of the reform movement is shown by his 
explicit reference to a time limit for his next residence in Constantinople: 
"It is agreed that I shall be free from the end of next year [1848], and 
much as I should be mortified in leaving Turkey for ever without the 
fulfillment of my hopes, I could not be expected to make a holocaust of 
all other views, and of the claims of my family." 
3. This is true. Palmerston was not aroused until the refugee crisis 
broke. (Cf. Temperley, op. cit., pp. 259 ff.) 
4. Cf. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 182 ff. 
5. Ibid., p. 185. 
6. See Temperley, op. cit., p. 261. 
XVI

THE legality of extradition, as it applied to murderers, 
brigands, and other criminals, had long been recognized by 
the law of nations. Turkey had specific treaty agreements 
with both the Austrian and Russian empires—an arrange­
ment quite common between neighboring states—whereby 
the actual machinery of the process was formulated and 
defined. Tradition had limited the procedure to cases of 
ordinary criminals and offenders in time of peace, and no 
one in the civilized world considered Kossuth and his fellow 
patriots as falling within this classification. Thus the Turks 
sent a courteous note of refusal, phrased in consultation with 
the Elchi, to the Austrian and Russian representatives on the 
thirtieth of August. In it the Turks appealed to the require­
ments of their own honor as the determining criterion of their 
decision and pledged that the refugees would not be allowed 
to engage in any further conspiracy but would be disarmed 
and held to good conduct. 
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The guardians of absolutism had no intention of being so 
easily dissuaded from exacting cruel vengeance on those who 
had dared to take up arms against them. On the fourth of 
September a steamer entered the Bosporus from the Black Sea 
carrying Prince Michael Radzivil with an abrupt ultimatum 
from the Czar.1 The Hungarians and Poles were to be sur­
rendered at once or diplomatic relations would cease. Further­
more, pending their delivery to their masters, the escape of 
a single refugee would be taken as an act of war. 
It was natural that the Divan and the Council should be 
panic-stricken. But the Buyuk Elchi was near at hand, and 
the inevitable call for help went out to his villa at Therapia. 
It was the moment of crisis when a resolute ambassador must 
be able to count on the backing of his superiors, and Canning 
knew well the fiber of the man who presided over the Foreign 
Office. He was confident that the might of Britain stood 
behind him and was able to instil this same confidence in 
the Sultan and Reshid. He assured them that if they were 
to be attacked for defending the interests of humanity, they 
could certainly count on the active aid of England. His 
French colleague echoed the same sentiments on behalf of 
France, and the Turks took heart. 
Canning felt that a categorical refusal to comply with the 
ultimatum would have carried the most weight under the 
circumstances, but the Turks could not resist the temptation 
to evade. The Council, after several meetings, decided not 
to answer the envoys directly but to send a plenipotentiary 
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to treat with the Czar himself. On September 10, they 
communicated this offer to Prince Radzivil for relay to St. 
Petersburg.2 
Radzivil refused to receive the note, and there followed a 
week of ominous silence—a silence most unnerving to the 
Turks. It took all of Canning's restraint to hold them 
steadfast in their position, and even a mild threat that in 
yielding they might lose their close friendship with England. 
He put his assurances in writing the better to steel them and 
all but committed his country to war. He knew the Cabinet 
might repudiate him in spite of Palmerston, but had he not 
acted as he did, he knew the Porte would give in.3 
The Russian answer came on September 17, when the 
flags were lowered at both the Austrian and Russian embassies 
and the missions departed without a farewell audience. On 
the very same day two urgent messages were dispatched 
from the Buyuk Elchi. One went to Admiral Sir William 
Parker, who commanded the Mediterranean squadron of Her 
Majesty's Navy, and warned him of the possible need for 
his fleet in the Dardanelles. The other message went to 
Lord Palmerston to apprise him of the newest move and ask 
for official endorsement: " I felt that there was no 
alternative unattended with loss of credit and character," 
Canning wrote, "to say nothing of the unfortunate and highly 
distinguished men awaiting their doom The dishonour 
would have been ours, for everyone knows that even Reshid 
himself, with all his spirit and humanity, would not withstand 
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the torrent without us I am sure that you will feel the 
importance of coming to the rescue as far and as fast as 
you can."4 
With that the Ambassador had gone to the limit of his 
authorization, indeed, a shade or two heyond it, and he 
thanked God that it was Palmerston with whom he was 
treating rather than the Earl of Aberdeen. Now he had to 
maintain an air of tranquillity for a minimum period of six 
weeks before he could receive a reply from London while at 
any moment the Czar might make a rash move. There were 
massive armies north of the Danube and a powerful fleet at 
Sebastopol within easy striking distance of the Bosporus and 
Constantinople. 
Russian intemperance was not the sole danger he had to 
fear, for prudence required him to toe an extremely careful 
line with the Turks. Once he made a move such as he did, 
he found it necessary to exercise the utmost caution lest his 
nervous friends make more of it than was actually there. 
One day he would find them burrowing in the cushions, 
afraid to cast so much as a glance at the horizon, and he 
would have to remind them that he had summoned help. The 
next day they would just as likely be boasting of what they 
might do to the barbarian interlopers on their borders, where­
upon Canning would have to give them strict warning that 
they do nothing rash that would rob them of English sym­
pathy and destroy the possibility of assistance before the 
Western powers had time to assemble their forces. 
217 THE GREAT AMBASSADOR 
His messages brought the instantaneous response he had 
hoped for. Sir William Parker, realizing the need for haste, 
weighed anchor at once and moved his fleet in the direction 
of the danger zone. He would not approach the Dardanelles 
without express orders from London, of course, but he advised 
the Admiralty that he would be in the immediate vicinity 
awaiting the necessary instructions. Ahead of him he sent 
his fastest frigate with a dispatch for Canning informing 
him of his action. The vessel arrived at the Bosporus on the 
third of October, when the suspense was becoming tortuous, 
and the news it brought was well timed to convince the Porte 
that the Elchi had not been chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. 
In London, too, there was not a moment lost by Palmerston 
in translating the sympathy of people and government for the 
Hungarians and Poles into instantaneous action. The Cabinet 
of Lord John Russell ratified the proceedings without debate 
and sent immediate orders to Sir William Parker to move as 
directed by the Ambassador. Simultaneous response was 
sought for, and soon obtained, in Paris, and the two govern­
ments sent separate requests to the Austrian and Russian 
emperors that they desist in their pursuit of the patriots. 
Before sending these notes, however, Palmerston, leaving 
nothing to chance, sent his advices to Canning in triplicate 
by three separate messengers.6 One of these left London on 
the second of October with immediate reassurances, another 
was directed to go by steamer from Marseilles on the seventh 
with further notices, and still a third was sent overland on 
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the eleventh. All three messengers were ordered to use all 
possible speed on the journey, and the last one, the famous 
Captain Charles Townley of Byng Hall's The Queen's 
Messenger, rode day and night from Belgrade to Constanti­
nople, 82,0 miles away, in five days and eleven hours. He was 
not the first to arrive, as the others had gotten through without 
mishap, but the speed of all three is indicative of the urgency 
impressed upon them by Palmerston. 
By the end of October the two English statesmen, operating 
far apart from each other, had the situation well in hand. 
They now looked for the safest and quickest return to 
normalcy. They had not flinched from approaching the brink 
of war in order to preserve peace with honor, and their course 
was successful. Canning had made the emergency move on 
his own responsibility, and Palmerston had given him the 
fullest backing. Not only had he approved the action, but 
he had secured the support of the London Cabinet as well. 
Palmerston also had notified both Russia and Austria that 
England meant business, and in the face of this firmness the 
absolutist powers backed away from the precipice. 
In St. Petersburg Nicholas I received Fuad Pasha with 
courtesy when the intentions of the English became known, 
and he indicated that a way could be found to solve the 
dispute. Later he was to withdraw the demand for extradition, 
but before his pacific mood became known at Constantinople 
an almost fatal slip occurred. 
International treaty forbade the entrance of all foreign 
ships of war (except for dispatch vessels lightly armed) when 
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the Sultan was at peace.6 For Turkey to disregard that con­
vention would amount to a challenge to Austria and Russia. 
Once the British fleet stood outside the Straits, Canning told 
the Sultan and his ministers that they were not to ask for a 
further approach unless the Russians reacted with force. On 
the first of November a severe storm prompted Admiral 
Parker to seek the permission of the Turkish authorities to 
move his ships to a safe anchorage within the outer reaches 
of the Dardanelles. The permission was given and Parker 
moved in, with the doubtful assent of Canning. The Russian 
ambassador, Titov, who was still resident in the capital despite 
the rupture of relations, made a vigorous protest, and Canning 
at once ordered Parker to withdraw. Palmerston subsequently 
apologized to both Russia and Austria for the breach,7 and 
the incident was smoothed over. 
What followed was largely anticlimactic, as the Czar 
quickly lost interest in the refugees, and relations with the 
Porte were renewed before the close of the year. Austrian 
feelings were slower to soothe, and through the early months 
of 1850 she still demanded virtual imprisonment of the 
exiles, a demand which Canning refused to let the Turks 
countenance. Eventually most of them returned home under 
an Imperial (Austrian) amnesty while Kossuth and a few of 
the leaders secured passports for admission to the United 
States. They gradually departed from the scene. 
Canning treasured a personal note he received from Kossuth 
after the trouble was over: 
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I have my children again 
They all find not enough words to praise the benevolent 
kindness they met with at your Excellency's house. Myself 
and my wife will never cease to pray to God that 
He may bless your noble lady, and you sir, for the consola­
tion you afforded to our parental feelings.8 
Palmerston drew an important lesson from the experience. 
Previous to this crisis, he had continually counseled fore­
bearance in the matter of military support for the Sultan. 
He feared that direct aid of this kind would tend to make 
the Turks overreach themselves while it would, at the same 
time, needlessly irritate the Russians. Now he was ready to 
furnish the kind of help Canning had long been advocating. 
He attested to this change of mind in a letter he sent to 
Canning in October: 
Now is the time for the Turks to make all possible 
improvements in their army, their navy, and their defences. 
If they wish for any British naval officers . , let 
them ask and they shall have. . . The considerations 
which led me to think last year that it would be better 
for them not to make such a request no longer exist, and 
it might be well to strike the iron while it is hot. Upon 
the same principle they ought to set to work and to put 
the defences of the Bosphorus into good order without 
delay 9 
1. In Temperley, op. dt., p. 262, October 4 is the date given for 
Radzivil's entry and October 7 for his audience with the Sultan. This 
must be a printer's mistake, for a few lines further down the page we 
find: " the Turks remained firm so diplomatic relations were sus­
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pended on September 17 . and Prince Radziwill steamed back up 
the Bosporus to Sebastopol." 
2. Unknown to anyone, including Canning, the Sultan did actually 
send o representative, Fuad Pasha, to St. Petersburg. 
3. Cf. letter from Palmerston, October 28, 1849, indicating the Foreign 
Secretary's awareness of Canning's position (Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 202). 
4. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 192. 
5. According to Lane-Poole {pp. cit., 11,194th n.), a Lt. Robbins left 
London on October 2, immediately after the decision of the Cabinet. 
Temperley (op. cit., p. 263) says that notice was sent on October 7. It 
may be that the document dated October 7 is the one surviving in the 
archives. 
6. Straits Convention of 1841. 
7. Palmerston, by his apology, gained what he wanted: there was to 
be no interpretation of the Straits Convention by which a partial entrance 
would be permissible. Partial entrance by Russia would put her halfway 
down the Bosporus toward Constantinople. Better, in Palmerston's judg­
ment, to have both ends completely sealed. (Cf. Temperley, op. cit., pp. 
266-67.) 
8. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 203. 
9. Ihid., p. 201. 
XVII

THE eighteenth-month limit that Canning had set for his 
fifth residence at Constantinople had stretched into two 
years by the time the refugee question was settled. The 
final reforms he returned to accomplish were still as far off 
as ever.1 But he had never completely abandoned his original 
objective even in the darkest moments of the preceding two 
years. In audience after audience he had hammered away 
on the same theme. Though he had to include reform as a 
secondary matter on these occasions and refer to it against 
the background of the international scene, he took advantage 
of every opportunity to allude to it. Sometimes he would 
hold it over their heads as the price of continued support; at 
other times, he would ascribe lack of energetic English 
assistance to Turkish failure to initiate those reforms desired 
by London. 
He wrote to Palmerston that the Turks always listened 
avidly and promised much but did little. While they were 
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engrossed, along with him, in the affairs of the Danuhian 
provinces and terrified by threats of occupation, he could not 
wrest anything of consequence from them. Again and again 
Reshid and Rifat appealed to the existence of a revolutionary 
bloc in the shadow of the Seraglio itself led by no less a 
personage than Abdul Aziz, the brother of the Sultan. The 
island of reform was continually surrounded by a sea of 
enemies waiting to engulf it. 
Despite the admitted resistance to innovation, the Elchi 
was convinced that with sufficient prodding the leadership 
of the Porte was strong enough to put at least some of the 
desired changes into effect. After the powerful demonstration 
of English support just given, he pressed on with renewed 
perseverance. At the close of the year 1850, he was able to 
look back on several distinct improvements. Four years after 
he had obtained some recognition for Protestant rights in 
1846, he procured a firman, in November of 1850, which 
gave them legal status as a separate group and empowered 
them to name an agent to represent their interests at the 
Porte. The loathsome harach was partially abolished; instead 
of a head-tax on individuals, there was to be a tribute levied 
on religious communities as a unit. Mixed criminal courts 
were promised, in which not only Christian evidence was 
to be admitted but Christian magistrates as well as Moslem. 
He was not exclusively concerned with the status of 
Christians. He secured another firman which forbade the 
transportation of Negro slaves in Turkish vessels. And in 
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one of his letters he refers to the commencement of a system 
of macadamized roads as being of singular value in the good 
it could bring the internal administration of the Empire. The 
long list of benefits accruing to his mediation was something 
to be marveled at, but he found it personally disappointing 
that he had virtually to extort each one from unwilling 
fingers. "It is uphill work, requiring an immensity of patience," 
he complains in a letter to A. H. Layard, 'and what is done 
bears no proportion to what remains to be done. I would 
not lightly give up the task which Providence appears to have 
assigned to me. It seems, however, that the time is approach­
ing when I shall either have obtained all the concessions 
which can possibly be obtained for a certain period, or be 
called upon to throw down my cards in despair."2 The 
thought occurred to him that the Porte had been under too 
severe stress of late to undertake the broad social reconstruc­
tion entailed in his program and needed breathing space to 
assess its position and recast its plans for improvement. He 
suggested to Palmerston that the golden opportunity for a 
complete and fundamental renewal had slipped by and that 
for the present he would work for separate measures, leaving 
the whole in abeyance until the propitious time should 
present itself.3 
The "golden opportunity' to which he referred was the 
excellent chance to nail down real reforms during the height 
of the Russian advance into the principalities. At Canning's 
prompting, the Sultan and Reshid had agreed then to sign a 
treaty of defensive alliance with England which would have 
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included all the essential particulars of reform. But the 
Ambassador was rebuffed by London when he transmitted 
the offer, and, as the crisis dissolved, the convergence of 
circumstances necessary to pressure the Porte disappeared 
along with it. Six years, capped by a tremendous tragedy, 
were to pass before it became possible to exact similar 
arrangements. 
The persistent roadblocks he encountered in Turkey were 
expected and bearable as long as he had support at the Foreign 
Office, and Palmerston was swinging more and more to a 
strategy identical to Canning's. The harmony was short-lived, 
however, for, once the emotional interest in the Hungarian 
refugees subsided, apathy toward foreign affairs again became 
the order of the day in England. Preparations for the Great 
Exhibition of 1851 absorbed the nation's attention to the 
exclusion of almost everything else. The Exhibition was the 
darling of the Queen, whose beloved Prince Albert was its 
guiding spirit, and it became the paramount interest of the 
Cabinet of Lord John Russell. Anyone who failed to share 
the enthusiasm generated for the new era, symbolized in the 
great Crystal Palace, was unwelcome in circles of influence 
and became the object of antagonism on the part of press 
and public. 
Lord Palmerston was one of those whose fortunes thus 
went into decline. Although he tried to smother an actual 
antipathy to the commercial hysteria and its facade of inter­
national good will in deference to the Queen, he could not 
fully veil his opinion and seemed, at best, indifferent. When 
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he expressed a concern that the influx of foreign visitors 
might include radicals and political malcontents capable of 
causing untold embarrassment to the Queen and her ministers, 
he was accused of trying to sabotage the whole project. The 
abuse to which he was subjected, as a result, caused the breach 
to widen between himself and the Prime Minister and led to 
his resignation in December of 1851.4 
Palmerston's withdrawal from the government came at a 
time when the blue ribbon of the diplomatic service, the 
Embassy at Paris, was vacant. By all rights it should have 
been offered to Sir Stratford Canning, but because of his 
close connection with the discredited minister, it was not. 
To add insult to injury, the post was delegated to Lord 
Cowley, who had served his apprenticeship under Canning. 
The injustice was glaring but might have been more 
palatable had it been allowed to pass without comment. On 
the contrary, it was sharpened by a weak letter of explanation 
from Lord Granville, who had taken Palmerston's place. The 
new Foreign Secretary felt a compulsion to acknowledge 
Canning's merited claim to the position but pleaded that the 
need for haste was the dominant reason for passing over 
him when the eligible candidates were being considered.6 
Canning's natural impulse was to resign completely from 
the Foreign Service, but on reflection he felt that such a 
step would serve no purpose other than to close his career 
on an ignoble note. In addition to the considerations of his 
own dignity, he had too high a regard for the diplomatic 
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service as a whole to degrade it to a level where it might 
appear subject to the whims of personal ambition or pique. 
Moreover, Canning was forced to admit to himself, he 
probably would have turned down the assignment rather than 
to abandon forever the possibility of carrying to a definite 
termination his still lively vision of Turkish reform and 
regeneration. His reply to Lord Granville was generous and 
open, frankly acknowledging that he would have welcomed 
the option of going to Paris as a mark of consideration deserved 
by him. Nevertheless, he pledged his continued loyalty and 
indicated his willingness to continue his service at the Porte.8 
Ironically enough, the same delay in communications which 
was the alleged reason for his being passed over in the Paris 
appointment caused Granville's letter to reach him after the 
whole Russell government, the new Foreign Secretary in­
cluded, had collapsed. There was no consolation in this, 
however, because this news contained an even crueller blow. 
The evolving party realignments in Parliament had made 
it apparent for some time that the Whig government of Lord 
John Russell was living on borrowed time. Indeed, it had 
almost crumbled early in the preceding year (1851) but was 
saved by the indisposition of its presumed successors to be 
enmeshed in the nets of the Great Exhibition. Early in 1851, 
the leader of the Conservative opposition in Parliament, Lord 
Stanley, had written to Canning seeking to ascertain whether 
or not the Elchi would enter a Conservative Cabinet as 
Foreign Secretary should the change of ministry come to pass.7 
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In his reply Canning stated that he would regard the summons 
as a call to even greater duty than the sphere in which he 
was currently engaged. He made it perfectly clear that he 
understood the offer was provisional, being contingent upon 
the former's actual succession to office, and he signified his 
willingness to accept it should this come to pass. 
For the reason stated above the Russell government sur­
vived for almost a year, finally collapsing in February of 
1852, and Stanley, having succeeded to his father's earldom 
of Derby in the meantime, became the Prime Minister of the 
Queen. When the composition of the Cabinet was announced, 
the Earl of Malmesbury was named as the Foreign Secretary, 
although nothing had transpired to lead to the conclusion 
that Sir Stratford Canning had changed his mind. 
Derby's letter of apology followed hard upon the bitter 
pill which Granville had awkwardly sent to the disillusioned 
statesman in Constantinople. The prescription was com­
pounded of the same elements, and it had the same bitter 
taste. Time, the nobleman explained, was of the essence and 
•'compelled me to apply at once to those upon the spot." 
Contrary to the usual procedure, the Earl indicated, the new 
ministry was formed and approved by the Queen within 
forty-eight hours of Derby's summons to the Palace, and 
the rapidity with which everything was accomplished pro­
duced, according to the new Prime Minister, "a most favorable 
impression on the public mind." 
Regardless of the reasons, the rudeness of the double jolting 
could not be veiled, and Derby, sensible of the obvious hurt, 
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sought to make amends by announcing to Canning that his 
first act as Prime Minister had been to propose to Her Majesty 
the elevation of her Envoy to the Sublime Porte to the 
peerage as a Viscount of the United Kingdom. Her Majesty, 
the Prime Minister assured Sir Stratford, had given her 
delighted assent to the proposal.8 
There was, in this long-delayed honor, a possible hidden 
meaning which Sir Stratford Canning found quite inadmis­
sible. Although he was uncertain in his own mind whether 
or not the multiplication of grievances was causing him to 
fancy another where none existed, he took pains, in his 
response, to dispel any illusions that might have arisen as to 
his future. He would accept the honor, he told Derby, as 
a reward for "past" service but certainly not as a substitute 
for "effective office/ nor was it to be construed as "an 
honourable consignment to the shelf."9 
Though he could be passed over at the pleasure of others, 
Canning had no intention of being retired against his own 
will. That decision, he had determined, would be one of his 
own time and his own choosing. The laurel wreath of the 
peerage was not to be looked upon as the conclusion of his 
public career, and he was fearful that an application for 
leave, submitted earlier to Granville, which Derby alluded 
to as having been already granted by Malmesbury, would be 
interpreted as signaling his readiness to retire. Canning 
suddenly found himself very unready to do so. A postscript 
to his letter of acceptance admonishes the Prime Minister 
that, should the occasion arise of referring to the matter in 
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Parliament, "His Lordship should place the matter before 
the public on its proper grounds.' 
Saddened by what he considered his failure at the Porte— 
though his departure brought tears to Moslem and Christian 
alike, both Turk and foreigner—and disheartened by a succes­
sion of false promises and shattered hopes, Stratford Canning 
left Constantinople, "perhaps for the last time/' in June of 
1852. The fact that he traveled under his new title of 
Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe10 did not bring the satisfaction 
that should have attended it. 
1. Cf. Bailey, op. cit., p. 219: "The events of 1848, especially Russia's 
entrance into the Principalities while the rest of Europe suffered from 
national and social uprisings, tended to shift Englishmen from the thought 
of reform." 
2. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 213-14. 
3. Letter to Palmerston, April 5, 1851, ibid., p. 215. 
4. See Ffrench, op. cit., pp. 149 ff., for reference to Normanby incident. 
5. Letter from Granville, February 5, 1852, Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 
225. 
6. Letter to Granville, March 4, 1852, ibid.. 
7. See correspondence between the two, March-April, 1851, ibid., II, 
220-22. 
8. Letter from Derby, March 4, 1852, ibid., 222-23. 
9. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 224. 
10. From the Church of St. Mary Redcliffe in Bristol, which was built 
under the auspices of a fourteenth-century ancestor. 
XVIII

QUITE unknown to himself, the curtains had already opened 
for the first scene in the climax of Stratford Canning's career. 
The players were remote from the central stage and the 
dialogue seemed unrelated to the whole drama, but the 
play itself turned on familiar themes: the conflict between 
absolutism and political freedom, the clash between autocracy 
and constitutional democracy, the struggle between oligarchic 
privilege and legal equality. Across the channel from England, 
the Second French Republic was being buried, and a Bona-
parte was presiding over the obsequies. 
Louis Napoleon, a nephew of the first Bonaparte, had been 
elected President of the Second French Republic after the 
Revolution of 1848. At the time he had given ample 
evidence of being a sincere and convinced believer in political 
democracy and republicanism. There is no question now, 
however, that from the very first he was intent on restoring 
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the imperial glory of France under a Bonapartist dynasty, 
that he planned methodically and brilliantly to seize the 
power of France and make it his own. He frightened the 
conservative right, which was mostly monarchist in its sym­
pathies, by continually unearthing "plots" and schemes of 
anarchists and socialists. He kept the republicans under his 
wing by appealing to the threat of a Bourbon restoration. 
Meanwhile he used with genius a small but disciplined island 
of Bonapartists to anchor himself in a sea of divergent parties 
and splinter causes. Slowly and quietly the Bonapartists were 
placed in key positions in the War Ministry, in the Ministry 
of the Interior, and in critical spots throughout the country. 
The favor of the anti-republican army, which had been 
roughly handled by the citizenry of Paris in '48, was carefully 
nurtured. 
On the second of December, 1851, a cleverly planned 
coup d'etat was executed with precision. Key members of any 
conceivable opposition were arrested and imprisoned; strate­
gically located army units were moved into Paris; pressure 
was put on the remaining members of the National Assembly 
by the military; the constitution was duly suspended and 
martial law declared. All communications between Paris and 
the provinces were under the control of the Ministry of the 
Interior, and this ministry was safe in Louis' grasp. Proclama­
tions of a gigantic plot against France were heard all over 
the country by the next day, and the necessity for M. le 
President to rule by decree was unquestioned.1 
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Of course, there was bloodshed in Paris as the tenacious 
and heroic people of that city recoiled from the bewildering 
shock, but the army was waiting and eager. Resistance was 
fierce but futile, and the blood ran in the streets to no 
purpose.2 Before the month was over Louis Napoleon had 
been elected to a ten-year term as president, and a subsequent 
national plebiscite had restored the Empire of France. In 
deference to the wishes of his countrymen, Louis Napoleon 
consented to assume the imperial mantle of his uncle and 
to wear his crown. In a mark of respect to the memory of 
the tragic "eaglet," however, he insisted on being designated 
as Napoleon HI. He began to reign, thus enobled, in Decem­
ber of 1852. 
An absolutist requires personal glory and an emperor must 
needs have an imperial sway. If Louis Napoleon had laid 
his plans inside France with consummate care, he had not 
neglected to look outside as well. Ramifications of his coup 
were already being felt in the sphere of Stratford Canning. 
In the latter part of 1851, the French Ambassador at the 
Porte, De Lavalette, acting under instructions of President 
Napoleon, had suddenly suggested to the Porte the reactiva­
tion of a century-old treaty8 appertaining to the shrines in 
the Holy Land, whereby Christians of the Latin rite were 
assured of free usage of the sacred places connected with the 
earthly life of Jesus Christ. Superficially considered, the 
request was simple and innocent and, in normal conditions, 
would have called for a proportionately simple affirmative 
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response from the Turks. The circumstances, however, were 
far from normal. 
In the first place, the original treaty had been concluded 
in 1740 with the France of Louis XV, and history has recorded 
the tremendous changes effected in century that followed. 
France moved from a monarchy with a state religion all the 
way to official atheism at the depths of revolutionary chaos, 
back to agnosticism and indifference. There was absolutely 
no interest shown in the shrines at the cradle of Christianity. 
Russia, in the same century, had become an empire, and 
her concern for Christianity in the realms of the Sultan had 
increased in direct proportion to French neglect. More than 
that, the Russian state church was doctrinally and liturgically 
connected with the overwhelming majority of the Porte's 
Christian subjects, and from the time of Catherine the Great 
the rulers of Russia had claimed to be the protectors of the 
millions of Christians within the Ottoman Empire. Further 
still, by lack of counterclaim on the part of any other 
Christian power, this status had, at least, the force of 
immemorial custom. It had been recognized and acceded to 
by the Porte in countless instances,4 and a long chain of 
imperial firmans and vezirial letters were extent in testimony 
to this fact. These decrees had gradually put the Holy Places 
in complete control of the Greek Church, and the small 
handful of Latin Christians in Jerusalem and the vicinity 
entered these shrines only at the sufferance of the Greek 
Patriarch and the monks who administered them. The Latin 
pilgrims who trickled in from western Europe were similarly 
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subject to the overriding convenience of the droves of Ortho­
dox visitors whose needs and desires were given precedence. 
This arrangement would be threatened if the terms of the 
ancient treaty were to be enforced in compliance with French 
demands, for it would entail a complete reversal and put the 
administration of the Holy Places under control of the Latins 
or, at best, make them coequal to the Greeks in a way that was 
completely out of proportion to their numbers. 
Now if this overturning of the existing situation affected 
local sensibilities alone it would have been serious enough 
for the Porte to grapple with, but it went far beyond that. 
To acquiesce in French demands implied the annulment of 
decrees and pledges made at the behest of a succession of Rus­
sion czars. In short, it involved a serious affront to the dignity 
of Nicholas I, both as emperor and head of the Church. 
It must be remembered that this proposition was advanced 
when Nicholas had barely had a chance to recover from the 
indignity of his defeat in the Hungarian refugee crisis. Only 
the most nai've initiate into the European scene could have 
contemplated his indifference to this added slap, and Louis 
Napoleon was neither nai've nor a newcomer.6 De Lavalette, 
of course, took whatever pains were neecssary to be certain 
that the Russian Embassy would hear of his demands and, to 
no one's surprise, the Russian Ambassador entered a forceful 
protest against any change in the status quo. 
The poor Turks were in another quandary. They could 
not placate France without offending Russia. They could not 
bow to Russia without abrogating treaty obligations to France. 
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Canning was still resident in Constantinople when this 
freshest dispute had arisen, but he was momentarily expecting 
a summons to assume the direction of the Foreign Office. He 
was trying to conclude his affairs at the Porte and did not 
wish to add to his burdens. Moreover, as the motives behind 
the French request were hidden from him as much as from 
everyone else, he did not attach any great significance to the 
matter. 
When, however, De Lavalette became somewhat menacing 
in his words and mentioned the possibility of French naval 
action along the coast of Tunis, it was quite natural for the 
Turks to seek the advice of the Elchi. Since there was a legal 
basis for the representations made by France, Canning saw no 
harm in concurring with the decision already made by the 
Porte to acknowledge their validity. A note was issued to 
the French on February 9, 1852, which granted to the Latin 
monks two keys to the main door of the church in Bethlehem 
and a key to the grotto of the Manger. 
Sensing a probable Russian demurrer to this step, the poor 
Turks had a firman waiting to mollify the Czar. When the 
expected protest materialized, they blithely issued this docu­
ment on February 15. It proclaimed that the privileges re­
cently granted the Latins were in no way to detract from the 
existing status and administration of the shrines in question— 
a remarkable contradiction of the French note. The firman 
noted that an exhaustive study of all pertinent documents had 
been made—and there were many, going as far back as the 
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seventh century—and that the firman was the definite will of 
the Sultan. The Porte also assured the Russian Ambassador 
that somehow or other the Pasha of Jerusalem would avoid an 
actual transfer of keys to the Latins! 
A ready answer was at hand, too, for the certain storm of 
protest to come from De Lavalette on this one. He was told 
that although the firman was issued, it would not be read in 
Jerusalem. A firman affecting a local situation was not con­
sidered to have the force of law until it was read to the pasha, 
the cadi, and councillors of the place. "So the Latins had 
received a key which was not to open a door, and the Greeks 
had received a firman which was not to become law."8 
By this time the Divan was deep in a morass of evasion. 
Then the Sultan hit upon the scheme of moving the dispute 
from his doorstep to the scene of conflict. He informed the 
several ambassadors that a commissioner would be sent to 
Jerusalem to confer with all concerned and arrive at a solution. 
Canning hoped that the transfer of negotiations to the soil 
trod by the Prince of Peace Himself would bring the two 
Christian powers to their senses and put an end to the scand­
alous nonsense. Confident that good will would prevail, he 
left Constantinople in June and returned to England and 
peerage. 
France kept up an incessant pressure, however. De Laval­
ette had hurried home for consultations after the Greek firman 
and made his return passage up the Straits in a ninety-gun, 
three-decker screw steamer, hardly within the classification 
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of a "lightly armed dispatch ship." The lesson was not lost 
on anyone, and Russia, Austria, and England all entered vig­
orous protests. France apologized according to form, but she 
had made her point. The Turks were quite impressed, not 
with the apology, but with the demonstration. The swift 
passage of the heavily armed steamship made them weigh the 
relative strength of France and Russia. Later on, in July, a 
French squadron appeared in the harbor of Tripoli (Syria) 
demanding the surrender of two deserters.7 When the ships 
stripped for action, the Pasha meekly surrendered the pair, 
and another show of force paid immediate dividends. 
The Turkish commissioner, Afif Bey, arrived in Jerusalem 
in October and late in the month assembled the disputants, 
including a Russian consul-general, in the Church of the 
Virgin at Gethsemane. The Russian official was on hand to 
certify to the reading of the firman, but instead of the firman 
the assemblage heard a speech permitting the Latins to cele­
brate Mass once a year in that shrine on condition that they 
make no change in the liturgical appointments of the altar. 
A cry of rage went up from the Latins over the impossibility 
of such a procedure, and a riot broke out. Afif Bey apparently 
gave up in disgust and left, hastening all the way back to Con­
stantinople a few days later. 
Whether the riot was provoked by Turkish design or not, 
the firman, at all events, had not been read, and in December 
the silver star of France was solemnly placed in the Church of 
the Nativity at Bethlehem, with local Turkish dignitaries very 
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much in attendance.8 A set of keys was given to the Latin 
monks and the degradation of the Orthodox was a fact. 
A constant flow of reports heaped one doleful notice after 
another on the desk of Nicholas I, and the growing weight 
became more than he could tolerate. On December 30, he 
ordered two army corps to the frontiers of the Danubian prov­
inces. Count Nesselrode wrote to Baron Brunnow, who 
represented the Czar at the Court of Queen Victoria: "The 
mischief is then done and there is no longer any ques­
tion of preventing it. It is now necessary to remedy it. The 
immunities of the orthodox religion which have been injured, 
the promise which has been violated, call for an act of 
reparation. It is to obtain this we must labor."9 These were 
not empty words. A new set of circumstances had emerged 
which the Czar and Nesselrode saw as being all to their ad­
vantage, and they were confident that Russia could gain the 
reparation that Nesselrode referred to. 
The brightest spot on the Russian horizon was a ministerial 
change in London, where the Derby Cabinet fell in the same 
month of December. The apparent successor was a ministry 
being formed by none other than the Earl of Aberdeen. Now 
Aberdeen was a deeply religious man and a public champion 
of peace. He was much to the Czar's liking. More partic­
ularly appealing to Russian policy was the pointed relegation 
of Palmerston to a back seat in the Home Office. As if this 
were not delightful enough, the news of the Cabinet change 
was capped by the dizzying revelation that Viscount Stratford 
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de Redcliffe had seen the handwriting on the wall and had 
resigned his embassy to the Porte. 
With Palmerston and Canning both removed from his path, 
Nicholas anticipated little difficulty in managing Aberdeen.10 
Brunnow had already reported to the Czar that Aberdeen was 
nervous about the intentions of the new French Emperor.11 
Thus Nicholas saw an opportunity to break England away 
from France, especially on the Eastern question. 
By vagueness, if nothing else, Lord Aberdeen had already 
been instrumental in allowing Czar Nicholas to form a fixed 
misconception of English policy. Nicholas was a firm be­
liever in personal diplomacy, that is, in his own personal 
diplomacy. He seems to have been unable to comprehend 
the difference between the personal assurances of an absolute 
monarch and the comments of a minister in a constitutional 
democracy.12 He believed that he had a firm understanding 
with Aberdeen on the question of Turkey. The Czar's mis­
apprehension arose in the course of a state visit he had paid 
back in 1844 to the Court of the youthful Victoria. In a 
series of talks with Sir Robert Peel, then the Prime Minister, 
Aberdeen, who was Foreign Minister, and the Duke of Well­
ington, Nicholas had aired his conviction that the Ottoman 
Empire was fast approaching dissolution. He suggested that 
there ought to be an agreement between Russia, England, and 
Austria as to what should take place in that eventuality—and 
he claimed to be speaking for Austria both by virtue of treaty 
obligations13 and personal agreement between himself and the 
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Austrian emperor. Apparently he concluded that the English 
statesmen found no objection in principle to such an under­
standing, for his verbal approach was later put into writing 
and a memorandum was sent by Nesselrode to Aberdeen in 
December of that same year. In the Nesselrode Memoran­
dum the Czar's position is reiterated in plain language, and 
this statement is found: 
This notion was in principle agreed upon during the Em­
peror's last residence in London. The result was the event­
ual engagement if anything unforeseen occurred in Turkey, 
Russia and England should previously concert together as 
to the course which they should pursue in common.14 
Nothing had been done to counteract the impression left in 
Nicholas' mind that this 'gentlemen's agreement" was bind­
ing. The recollection of these talks burned brightly in the 
Czar's mind as Aberdeen came to power, and he was to re­
turn to them again and again in the course of the coming year. 
Another auspicious event coincided with this happy Out­
come on the London front. An outbreak of rebellion against 
the Turks in Montenegro was churning the waters in the 
Balkans. The usual barbarous excesses which resulted when­
ever the Balkan mountaineers and Turkish soldiers met in 
combat had compelled an Austrian intervention. Austria 
mobilized a small force on the border and was sending a 
plenipotentiary, Count Leiningen, to the Porte to mediate 
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the dispute and seek restraint on the part of the Turkish 
soldiery. 
Now if Nicholas had presumed to speak for Austria in his 
conversations with the English Cabinet in 1844, when the 
illustrious Metternich was still in the saddle, then he had 
assumed what amounted to a paternal responsibility for the 
young Francis Joseph after the revolution of '48. His inter­
vention in the Hungarian revolt bears witness to this assump­
tion of protective responsibility.15 The prospect of unilateral 
Austrian intervention in the Montenegrin crisis at the begin­
ning of 1853 was both inviting and somewhat disturbing. 
It was inviting because Nicholas could associate himself with 
the action and use it as a pretext for gaining the desired repara­
tion of the insult he had just suffered over the Holy Places. 
On the other hand, he was disturbed by this unlooked for 
independence of action by Vienna. Such independence could 
threaten his presumption of primary responsibility for the 
Christian subjects of the Porte. 
The question of these subjects was, of course, very much 
in his mind. The Holy Places dispute had raised it again, 
and the Czar was excited by the sudden emergence of support 
from an unexpected quarter. Reshid Pasha, formerly Strat­
ford Canning's prize tool at the Porte, had begun to make 
secret overtures to St. Petersburg. He suggested to the Rus­
sian court that it might base its claims with respect to the Holy 
Places on certain articles in the old Treaty of Kustchuk-Kain­
ardji. Those articles, Reshid intimated, gave the Russian 
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Czar a right to consider himself as the protector of all the 
Orthodox Christian subjects of the Porte.16 
Without bothering to check the provisions of the Treaty 
carefully, Nicholas made up his mind to act. He decided to 
send a plenipotentiary to the Porte to back up the Austrian 
demands and to obtain redress on the matter of the Holy 
Places. The Imperial Russian representative was to secure a 
new firman guaranteeing existing Greek privileges. He was 
to offer to the Porte, if need be, a defensive alliance against 
French threats. Most important of all, he was to extract a 
second firman from the Sultan guaranteeing for the future 
full privileges to Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire 
and acknowledging Russia's right to protect them. The right 
of protection was t" be ''embodied in a Sened, or Convention, 
having the force of a Treaty."17 
To execute this plan Nicholas I chose one of his most 
trusted lieutenants, and one of the most devout Orthodox 
laymen, the Lord High Admiral, sometime Governor of Fin­
land, his serene Highness, Prince Alexander Sergeievitch 
Menshikov. He was ordered to proceed to Constantinople 
in February and to leave it in three days if his demands were 
not met. 
1. For a vivid account of Louis Napoleon's history and the details of 
the coup d'etat see Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea (6 vols.; New 
York: Harper and Bros., 1864), I, 142-209. 
2. Estimates vary from several hundred to several thousand dead. 
Temperley Qop. dt., p. 290) says merely that "the Paris boulevards were 
red with blood and the ablest Frenchmen were in gaol." 
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3. The Treaty of Capitulation of 1740, by which the Porte recognized 
the right of France to safeguard Latin rights in the Holy Land. 
4. Principally, by the Treaty of Kustchuk-Kainardji, July, 1774. 
Russia's stand was based on an interpretation of Articles 7 and 14 of the 
Treaty, an interpretation that broadened considerably as the dispute pro­
gressed. (Cf. Hurewitz, op. cit., I, 55 ff.) 
5. French motives in raising the question at this time are a matter of 
some dispute. I have adopted Kinglake's view (as developed in his afore­
mentioned work) that Napoleon wished to have an external irritant 
available in order to divert the French people from any subsequent reap­
praisal of his coup. Temperley's judgment that "the Prince-President 
would not have raised the question of the Holy Places at all but for his 
desire to secure the political support of the Catholics" (op. cit., p. 280) 
seems to me an oversimplification. For it raises the question: Which 
Catholics? The French Church was badly split at the time on political, 
social, and ecclesiastical policies. It was rent by the ultramontanist-
Gallican controversy, deeply divided on the matter of De Lamennais and 
his Avenir circle. To suppose that it could have suddenly formed a unity 
on such an obscure matter as the Holy Places seems unreasonable. An 
astute politician—and no one denies that Louis Napoleon was astute-
would hardly have known which group to seek out. The only sources 
cited by Temperley are contemporary and local accounts which seem to 
be too full of anti-Jesuit bias to make them trustworthy. At the end of 
his notes on the matter Temperley seems to admit the lack of good 
sources when he says: "The French political side of the Holy Places 
dispute is hardly touched by Jean Maurain in 'La Politiqut ecclesiastique 
du second Empire de 1852-69,' Paris, 1930. But he leaves no doubt that 
the inspiration was Catholic and Jesuit." 
Furthermore, Temperley's explanation glosses too easily over Napoleon 
Ill's relations with the Vatican, where he was most suspect. He had taken 
part in an early Carbonari insurrection against papal authority (cf. Sophie 
de Buxhoeveden, "Bonapartes and Carbonari," Dublin Review, April, 
1944, p. 153 f.). He was known to be for a united Italy (under French 
hegemony if possible, but in any case to use against Austria), and it is 
highly doubtful that the Vatican would have listened eagerly to any 
scheme proposed by him. As a matter of fact, he was unable to persuade 
Pope Pius IX to come to Paris to place the Imperial Crown of France 
upon his brow. Temperley's readiness to interpret the affair as he does 
becomes even more mystifying when he adds (op. cit., p. 284): "The 
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Pope saw the need of conciliating the ultramontane party.'' The 
ultramontanists were the extreme supporters of papal supremacy so the 
Pope would hardly have had to conciliate them! Moreover, the Vatican 
had lately been making overtures to the Orthodox Churches in the interest 
of unity and would hardly have been willing to embitter them by taking 
part in such a silly dispute. 
Finally, Temperley seems to contradict himself and to accept Kinglake's 
theory when he says: "On December 4, 1852, Napoleon attained the 
summit of his ambitions and was solemnly proclaimed Emperor of the 
French. He had no longer the same need to pursue a dangerous foreign 
policy" (op. tit., p. 297). 
6. Temperley, op. cit., p. 291. Cf. also the account in Kinglake, 
op. cit., I, 46-55. 
7. Temperley, op. cit., pp. 292-93, for an account of both incidents. 
8. Cf. Kinglake, op. cit., I, 52-54. 
9. Quoted in ibid., p. 54. 
10. Cf. Temperley, op. cit., p. 299. 
11. Ibid., pp. 298-99. The Czar, in fact, interpreted Aberdeen's fear 
of Napoleon III as a symptom of the cowardice and weakness of England. 
12. See ibid., chap, x: "How Nicholas Negotiated." 
13. Treaty of Munchengratz, September, 1833. Cf. Hurewitz, op cit., 
I, 107. 
14. For the complete text, see Hurewitz, op. cit., I, 130-32. 
15. It is worth noting here, in view of subsequent developments, that 
at the time of Russian intervention in '48, Metternich's successor, 
Schwartzenberg, said that "Austria will surprise the world with her 
ingratitude" (quoted in Vernadsky, op. cit., p. 154.) 
16. It is not clear just what Reshid hoped to accomplish. Out of office, 
disillusioned over the failure of reform, and embittered toward those he 
felt responsible for the failure, he may have been seeking his own restora­
tion by turning to Russia, or perhaps it was simple revenge. At any rate 
he had become personally weak and dissipated. Cf. Temperley, op. cit., 
p. 244. 
17. Ibid., p. 306. 
XIX

THE tempest brewing in the shadows of Hagia Sophia was 
not yet a matter of breakfast-table comment in England, but 
the Parliamentary murmur was beginning. The obvious dis­
advantage of feeble representation at the Porte was abund­
antly clear. An embassy under the direction of a charge 
d'affaires could not claim to be heard with the consideration 
that protocol afforded to envoys enjoying higher status, nor 
could the Sublime Porte look upon a power thus represented 
in a moment of crisis as one which was greatly concerned 
about Turkish affairs. Already voices were heard in Parlia­
ment asking whether anyone but the Buyuk Elchi himself 
was fit to step in. The prospect was distasteful to the Cabinet, 
but the decision was unavoidable. Reluctantly, Lord Aber­
deen and Lord Russell, the Foreign Secretary, requested Vis­
count Stratford de Redcliffe to forgo the pleasures of "honour­
able retirement" and to resume his post in Constantinople. 
Canning had resigned his post in January, 1853, upon the 
accession of the new ministry. At the age of sixty-six he had 
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no disposition to be treated like a schoolboy, nor did he relish 
the prospect of an open rupture with a government of the kind 
he felt Lord Aberdeen would lead. His retirement had been 
fortunate because when he was recalled to duty in less thaiv 
six weeks he was able to respond on his own terms. The in­
structions which he received on February 25, 1853, were 
couched in his own language, for they were "largely bor­
rowed" from his own memorandum.1 The instructions were 
very general, and thus he had the latitude to choose his own 
method of operation. He was to strive for an equitable solu­
tion to the dispute of the Holy Places in a manner which he 
was to decide after he had acquainted himself with all points 
of view. In order to prepare himself more surely he was to 
travel by way of Paris and Vienna so that he might know the 
attitudes of the French and the Austrians. He was to refresh 
them, in turn, with a restatement of Britain's aim: the mainte­
nance of equilibrium in the East. 
To the Porte he was to indicate what co-operation was re­
quired in order that she might merit the friendly consideration 
of Europe. At the very least this demanded resolute and im­
mediate reform along the lines laid down for many years: 
strict justice and equality for all its citizens so as to preclude 
forever the occasions for foreign intervention. 
The only specific direction in the instructions stated 
that in the event of imminent danger to the existence of the 
Turkish Government your Excellency will in such a case 
despatch a messenger to Malta, requesting the Admiral to 
hold himself in readiness, but you will not direct him to 
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approach the Dardanelles without positive instructions from 
Her Majesty's Government.2 
T h e annex is curious in that it supplied him with a pitiful 
amount of pressure when compared with the tremendous 
arrays at the disposal of Prince Menshikov and Count Lein­
ingen. Later allegations represented this direction as an in­
strument of restraint imposed upon him to guard against any 
impetuosity on his part. But this is unlikely, for then one must 
assume that the Cabinet had entrusted a delicate mission to 
one in whom they had little confidence. Actually it was 
common in ambassadorial commissions and was most likely 
inserted by mutual consent. Both Canning and Aberdeen 
believed, at this time, that the whole problem was a minor 
dispute that had, somehow or other, gotten absurdly out of 
hand. All that was needed was a calming influence, and 
neither considered fleet movements as necessary. Canning 
had been armed with even stronger power in 1849 and had 
usd it with consummate skill. He did not consider this crisis 
nearly so dangerous. 
Aberdeen and the Cabinet should have realized that it was 
far more serious, for they had already received the first of 
Sir Hamilton Seymour's urgent messages from St. Petersburg 
and were in a position to interpret the Czar's mind more 
exactly than Canning.3 Certainly the Cabinet knew that the 
Czar was thinking of more than the keys to the shrines in 
Jerusalem. In that respect Canning went out ignorant of 
the true nature of the enemy he was to meet. 
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He departed for Paris as quickly as he could, and further 
evidence that he viewed his assignment as temporary is the 
fact that Lady Stratford and his daughters remained at home. 
Otherwise his entourage included a formidable array of tried 
and trusted assistants: Alison, Pisani, and Layard, who, 
though a Member of Parliament at the time, begged to ac­
company the group as an observer. 
In the midst of his conferences in the French capital he 
found time to write to Lady Stratford about the prospects for 
a settlement: 
France, I think, is inclined to move with us, and I question 
whether Russia even is ready to bring on a crisis, provided 
she be satisfied, which is by no means impossible, with re­
spect to the Holy Places. * 
His confidence that the Czar could be placated arose, un­
doubtedly, from his exchanges with the newly crowned Em­
peror of the French. As he wrote in a memorandum to Clar­
endon: 
He spoke of the Holy Places . He desired nothing 
better than to finish the affair. He was not disposed to make 
difficulties and he would not object to the maintenance 
of the Sultan's firman [reaffirming Greek privileges], sup­
posing France to retain what had been previously accorded.5 
He felt that Louis Napoleon had derived satisfaction from 
being treated by England on a basis of equality with her 
 250 THE GREAT AMBASSADOR
Queen and that the minutiae of a settlement in the East no 
longer concerned him. He wrote, on March 14, 1853, in a 
particularly shrewd report to Clarendon: "The impression 
left upon my mind is that Louis Napoleon, meaning to 
be well with us, at least for the present, is ready to act politi­
cally in concert with England " But then he added a 
prophetic note of caution: 
As it appears, moreover, that the maintenance of his own 
personal position is the mainspring of his policy, . he 
[cannot] be expected to abstain from any attempt required 
in his judgment by the circumstances of the time to consoli­
date his power or to avert any danger that may threaten its 
continuance. It may, therefore, be doubted whether his 
cooperation even in the East can be accepted by us without 
some shades of caution; nor would it apparently be safe to 
rely upon his goodwill 8 
His misgivings about the dependability and direction of 
French policy were soon to receive a rude confirmation, al­
though some time was to pass before he learned it. When 
he left Paris for Vienna he was necessarily out of contact with 
events. Telegraphic communication was just linking major 
cities at the time, and there were no intermediate exchanges 
on his route. A railway breakdown, adding to the normal 
delays caused by late winter snows, impeded his journey 
across southern Germany, and it was nearly the end of March 
when he arrived in Vienna. He felt this absence of news 
keenly, too, as witnessed by a letter to his wife written during 
one of these delays: 
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As for me, when I am not reading or sleeping, and at times 
when I am, my thoughts are divided between London and 
Paris, Vienna and Constantinople. I am very anxious 
to know more and to be on the spot. At Vienna we shall 
probably get some further intelligence.7 
The "further intelligence'' which he anticipated would be 
forthcoming at Vienna was, initially at least, most welcome. 
Despite some smoldering resentment over the "Kossuth af­
fair," his reception at court was hospitable and courteous, 
and he was pleased to learn from the Emperor, Franz Joseph, 
and the Foreign Minister, Count Buol, that the Montene­
grin crisis had been satisfactorily settled. The facility with 
which the Porte and Vienna had come to terms, incidentally, 
strengthens the conjecture that the Hapsburg court was al­
ready looking askance at the extension of Russian interest in 
the direction of the western Balkans, an area which Austria 
regarded as being exclusively within her own sphere of in­
fluence. The sending of Prince Menshikov to the Porte, 
ostensibly to back up the mission of Count Leiningen, im­
plying that Austria lacked sufficiency of strength and purpose 
to bear her own burdens vis-a-vis the Porte, apparently did not 
sit well with the Austrians, either. All in all, it appeared to 
Canning that Czar Nicholas had unwittingly, by his forward 
action, hastened a modus vivendi in Montenegro. One of 
the avowed grievances of the Menshikov mission was thereby 
disposed of. 
But this welcome turn of events was counterbalanced by 
a disturbing communication from Lord Clarendon in London. 
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The Foreign Secretary reported that the Porte had suddenly 
been seized by some fright upon the arrival of Menshikov 
in Constantinople and had asked for an appearance of French 
and British warships at the entrance to the Dardanelles. The 
British charge d'affaires, Colonel Rose, had presumed to trans­
mit this request to the British admiral at Malta who, wisely, 
had refused to move except upon express orders from London. 
These orders, of course, were not given, but the French fleet 
did sail to the Bay of Salamis. Clarendon described the 
French decision as "precipitate"': obviously, it would ruffle the 
Czar's sensibilities. There was no doubt in the Foreign Sec­
retary's mind that the development was, in some way, con­
nected with Menshikov, although he discounted the serious­
ness of the situation: "After all the solemn and personal as­
surances given to us by the Emperor of Russia, we do 
therefore believe that the independence and integrity of the 
Turkish Empire are not endangered by the mission of Prince 
Menshikov."8 Canning was urged to proceed posthaste to 
Constantinople. 
Canning was now in a quandary. In the first place, he 
knew nothing of the ''solemn and personal assurances'' given 
by the Czar in connection with the Menshikov mission. These 
assurances, of course, were being given to Sir Hamilton Sey­
mour, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, and they were 
being kept secret by London. Yet it was obvious that there 
was more involved than what met the eye. Secondly, he 
could not divine the motives of Napoleon III. Thirdly, he 
feared a grave mistake on the part of his own government in 
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London in that Clarendon was apprehensive over future Rus­
sian moves only as they might come in reaction to the French 
naval display. Canning was beginning to sense that Russian 
plans were quite independent of any other events. In a reply 
to Clarendon he echoed the Foreign Secretary's dismay over 
the provocative act of the French but coupled with it an al­
lusion to ulterior Russian motives: 
Russia, without meaning downright mischief just now, is 
probably seeking to restore her old prepotential influence, 
and unfortunately France has given her the opportunity. 
She has the vantage ground with respect to the Holy Places, 
and there would be little wisdom in tempting her further.9 
Canning was not even sure where the final sympathies of 
Aberdeen and Clarendon would lie, but he added the last 
sentence because of an editorial in the London Times which 
he saw in Vienna and interpreted as a possible expression of 
support for Russia in the matter of the shrines. He added 
this searching comment, as if to evoke some response: "She 
[Russia] will, however, in my humble judgment, require to 
be closely looked after, especially as she has found so able an 
advocate in the Times." 
He spent no more time than protocol demanded in Vienna, 
and heedless of the deep snows, the sixty-six-year-old diplomat 
journeyed across the Alpine passes to take ship at Trieste. 
He crowed rather triumphantly about this: "I am too old and 
tough to be the worse from this, but younger constitutions 
find it trying."10 By the time he boarded H.M.S. "Fury" in 
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Trieste on Wednesday, March 30, 1853, much of the mystery 
had been cleared away, for Stephen Pisani had come to meet 
him from Constantinople and was able to report that Menshi­
kov was demanding more than a mere settlement of the Holy 
Places dispute. The Porte had admitted this much though 
it refused to tell the dragomans the exact nature of the de­
mands. Canning felt a kind of kinship to David on his way 
to meet Goliath, as he indicated to his wife in this final letter 
of the journey: 
The Russian demands and accompanying demonstrations 
seems to mean the acquirement once for all of a preponder­
ating influence or some act of territorial encroach­
ment by way of substitute. . The prospect is more than 
enough to make one nervous; but there is hope to be de­
rived from the best of books, and possibly a pebble from 
the brook by the wayside may be found once more the 
most effectual weapon against an armed colossus. My pebble 
is the simple truth u 
On the morning of April 5, 1853, the "Fury" dropped anchor 
off the Golden Horn and the Elchi, Viscount Stratford de 
RedclifFe, was back at the palace of the British Embassy. As 
one historian has put it, "It was the angry return of a king 
whose realm had been suffered to fall into danger."12 
I. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 234, quoting Clarendon. The instructions 
were signed by Clarendon because he had replaced Russell in the Foreign 
Office in the interval between Canning's summons and the date of the 
instructions. Lord Russell remained in the Cabinet as a minister without 
portfolio. 
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2. Ibid., p. 235. 
3. Cf. chap. XXI below, on the Seymour Correspondence. 
4. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 236. 
5. Ibid., pp. 236-37. 
6. Ibid., pp. 238-39. 
7. Ifcid., pp. 240-41. 
8. Ifcii., p. 240. 
9. Ibid., p 244. 
10. Ifcid. 
11. Letter to Lady Stratford, April 4, 1853, ibid., p. 244. 
12. Kinglake, op. cit., I, 128. Temperley says that Canning still knew 
of no Russian danger. Not from his London advices, it is true, but the 
dragoman had brought him disturbing news, as the letters to his wife show. 
XX

PRINCE Menshikov had arrived more than a month prior to 
Canning's appearance. Ostentatiously following in his train, 
and to all intents and purposes under his direct command, 
was a large staff of military officers including the commander-
in-chief of the Black Sea fleet and the chief of staff of the 
army group poised along the Pruth. Whatever his diplo­
macy was to be, it would be highly colored by military hues. 
In order to give an immediate and forceful demonstration 
of his determination, he brushed aside the nicety of protocol 
that required him to wait upon the convenience of the Reis 
Effendi and demanded an immediate audience with the Grand 
Vezir. The Turkish ministry at this time was led by Ali 
Pasha with Fuad Pasha functioning as the Foreign Minister. 
Fuad, bristling with anger at the direct insult, offered his resig­
nation to the Sultan. It was an opportunity for Abdul Medjid 
to insist upon the etiquette of his court and thereby take some 
of the wind out of the Russian sails. Unaccountably, and to 
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the panic of the Divan, the Sultan accepted the resignation 
without comment, thus indicating to his shocked advisers that 
he was already frightened into a state of abject compliance. 
It was the urgency of this fear that had sent the Grand Vezir 
flying to the haven of the British Embassy evidencing symp­
toms of total collapse,1 and this, in turn, which prompted 
Colonel Rose to summon the Mediterranean fleet. The highly 
imaginative Turks had become convinced that by some means 
unknown to them Prince Menshikov had contrived to threaten 
the Sultan with instantaneous attack, and they managed to 
communicate this fear to the British charge. 
Although the summons was nullified by London, it had not 
been entirely futile. The transmission of the request for a 
movement of the fleet gave the Turks a breathing space in 
which they could recover their composure. And the denial 
of the request by London had a good effect in St. Petersburg, 
for Czar Nicholas took it as added proof that his high-level 
negotiations with London were bearing fruit. Aberdeen's un­
hesitating disavowal of Rose's impulsive gesture was ample 
confirmation of the Czar's fixed conviction that England would 
avoid any and all recourse to force. Consequently, Prince 
Menshikov did not receive any orders to quicken the pace of 
his proceedings and lapsed into a policy of persuasive diplom­
acy. He had lost the hoped-for imbroglio in Montenegro as 
a main bargaining point and was thrown back on the sole 
matter of the Holy Places as far as public issues were con­
cerned. His utterances on this matter became mild and con­
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dilatory, and he coyly hinted that he had much to offer the 
Porte. Before he would expatiate on the hidden proposal, 
however, he enjoined the need for absolute secrecy on the 
Grand Vezir and on Rifat Pasha, who was once more the 
Reis Effendi, following Fuad's withdrawal. He told them 
he had a secret treaty to offer in the name of the Czar, but 
that should its terms be revealed to either England or France, 
he and his mission would instantly quit Constantinople. 
T h e necessity for such clandestine agreement lay, he as­
serted, in habitual English jealousy and in the bellicose ag­
gressiveness of the upstart imitator who grandiloquently 
described himself as the Emperor of the French. Russia 
well knew, he intimated, the straits to which the Porte had 
been driven by the pressure of France, and for that very ap­
preciable threat the Czar was ready to conclude a treaty of de­
fensive alliance with the Sultan, guaranteeing him an army 
of 400,000 men and the whole of the Black Sea fleet against 
any power or combination of powers. The quid pro quo 
sought in return was a Russian protectorate, with the Greek 
patriarchate and the whole of the Orthodox community under 
the guardianship of the Czar.2 
This entailed far more than recognition of the Czar's right 
to intervene on behalf of his coreligionists for that was already 
established by custom and precedent. Moreover, it had been 
exercised constantly. Heretofore, however, there had never 
been even an implied doubt as to where legal jurisdiction lay. 
T h e Czar's intervention, when it occurred, always cast the 
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Russian sovereign in the role of amicus curiae, never as the 
legal magistrate. The appeal was made to the Sultan as the 
constituted authority, and it was made in behalf of subjects 
owing allegiance to the Sultan as their lawful sovereign. 
The background of this custom arose from the social and 
political structure of the Ottoman Empire whereby non-Mos­
lems were arranged in religious or racial groupings—the millet 
system. The millet system had a twofold origin. On the one 
hand, it was an adaptation of the original Islamic society 
which was a tribal society, where tribal decision, tribal custom, 
was law. When the first Islamic empire swept over non-Arab 
peoples and into urbanized societies, it encountered the highly 
developed civilization of the Byzantine state. Tribal law could 
not administer complex urban societies nor could Islamic law 
countenance non-Moslem law. 
Fortunately the Romano-Byzantine law already possessed a 
traditional dichotomy which could be successfully adopted by 
Islamic law to take care of the non-Moslem. For Roman law 
had long recognized the difference between civil law and 
tribal or group law. As the Roman Empire extended over the 
Mediterranean world and northwards into Europe, the dis­
tinction between the gens Romana and the nationes generated 
the distinction between the law for Roman citizens, the jus 
civile, and the law for subject peoples, the jus gentium. The 
priority of Roman law was never questioned, but the national 
or group law was considered fully binding upon those who 
came under its sway. Hence the refusal of Pilate, for example, 
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to interfere in the religious trial of Jesus. Conversely, the 
appeal of the Roman citizen, Paul, to the higher jurisdiction 
of Rome as opposed to a local court functioning under local 
law. 
Thus the Islamic state found a convenient legal system, 
completely compatible with the demands of Islam, to take 
care of the practical administration of non-Moslem peoples. 
These people had no Islamic legal entity, but they had their 
own scriptures and laws to live by. The tribal aspect endured 
in that the recognized head of the community of non-Moslems 
was responsible for the behavior of his group or millet.3 
When the Ottoman Turks swept across the corpse of the 
last of the Paleologues in the dust of Constantinople, the only 
centers of authority left there were the patriarch and the 
bishops of the Greek Church. To them was given the respon­
sibility of the Christian millet. It bears repeating that as far 
as Islam was concerned the Christian millet had no rights in 
law. Its members lived by sufferance rather than by right. 
The Sultans did not concern themselves with the individuals 
of the millet, but dealt only with the patriarch and the bishops. 
At the zenith of Ottoman glory this was quite sufficient. 
Additionally, it was a source of revenue, as appointments to 
bishoprics and to the patriarchate could be purchased. Largely, 
however, the Orthodox were left to their own laws. When 
Ottoman power began to decline in relation to the West, the 
power of the patriarchs increased in the same proportion. 
When they felt injustice was being done, they naturally ap­
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pealed to one or another of the Christian powers for inter­
vention in their behalf. (The predominance of Russian in­
tervention can be explained by the fact that the Greek Or­
thodox Church and the Russian Church were closely related.) 
By the nineteenth century this was a common practice. 
This clarifies the perpetual insistence of Canning and the 
reformers for a code of law that would equalize Moslem and 
Christian subject alike. Only such equalization would do 
away with the appeals for outside help, and without such 
appeals the grounds for foreign intervention would disap­
4pear.
Up to this time, to reiterate, the legal sovereignty of the 
Sultan had never been called into question by the intervening 
power. The European powers had sought leniency or justice 
for his subjects, not for theirs; they demanded equitable adju­
dication of problems under his jurisdiction, not under their 
civil codes. No matter how forceful their representations had 
been, even to the extent of war, there had never been any 
attempt to destroy his sovereign rights. 
Now it became the definite, declared intention of imperial 
Russia to overthrow and eradicate once and for all this cen­
turies-old legal tradition. By the stroke of a single treaty the 
Czar seemed to be asking the Sultan to surrender irrevocably 
all semblance of authority over more than fourteen millions 
of his subjects. The nomination and investiture of all pa­
triarchs and bishops was to be the prerogative of the Emperor 
of Russia, as head of the Orthodox Church. Their police and 
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civil powers, their magisterial tribunals, the property holdings 
of the Greek Church—all were to be under his direction and 
his alone. In short, Nicholas was demanding what seemed 
to amount to extraterritorial sovereignty over a vast segment 
of the Ottoman Empire.5 
The Turkish ministers were stunned when the true purpose 
of the Menshikov mission was finally revealed to them, but 
they listened to Prince Menshikov in silence and agreed to 
give some time to serious study of the project What the Rus­
sian plenipotentiary did not know, of course, was that the 
news had come to them, and it was welcome to even the most 
reactionary members of the Council, that the Buyuk Elchi 
was wending his way across Europe and would soon be at their 
side. They could temporize until he came, and the Russians 
seemed confident enough to be patient for their answer, 
Turkish hesitancy in responding did not imply in the slightest 
an inclination to bow before these demands; the Turks were 
merely searching for the best possible means of refusal. 
Curiously enough, when Canning did arrive, they were not 
completely frank with him, and although they entered into 
immediate discussions with him, they failed to relate the full 
scope of the transactions. Whether they were trying to ob­
serve as far as they were able the secrecy stipulated by Prince 
Menshikov, or whether they feared to admit to the Elchi 
that they had so much as listened to the Russian, is difficult to 
ascertain. They did seek his advice on a hypothetical situation 
somewhat akin to the real one without admitting that this 
situation had already been thrust upon them. 
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Canning, from his own reflections and from subsequent 
conversations with the Embassy staff, had succeeded in form­
ing a fairly accurate idea of what was behind the Russian 
mask, but before he could commit himself to a proper diag­
nosis he had to know precisely what was at stake. In the 
meantime die Embassy dragomans had become quite certain 
that the Russian position had been committed to writing and 
handed to the Porte. These emissaries were flatly refused 
when they ventured to ask for a copy to show their master, 
whereupon Canning sent word to Rifat that the Porte could 
hardly expect guidance on a matter whose details were un­
known. On April 7, 1853, the Grand Vezir sent word that 
the Elchi would be furnished a copy as desired, and by the 
elevendi of April, Canning was able to transmit the substance 
of the Russian project to London.6 
Now he could set to work in earnest and employ all his skill 
to meet the enemy head on. As he reviewed the picture the 
following facts stood out: Ostensibly, Prince Menshikov had 
come to Constantinople to obtain redress for the alleged 
insult suffered by the Czar as a result of developments in the 
Holy Land. That was the public issue. Secretly, it was but 
a lever that the Czar wished to use to force his will on a far 
greater matter. Undue intransigence on the part of the Turks 
regarding the Holy Places would serve as a public pretext 
for the Russian legions to march, and in the current state of 
opinion, especially in England, the balance of justice would 
be awarded to the Czar. If the Czar were to march on this 
issue, he would accomplish his ulterior goal either through di­
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rect surrender or as a result of internal collapse in Turkey. 
This result would appear to have come about as a matter of 
course rather than by design. If, however, the public issue 
could be successfully settled, it would leave the Czar without 
a pretext, and then he would have either to abandon his ulti­
mate aim or be cast in the role of an aggressor. This, Canning 
was sure, would not be appealing to the Czar, who was well 
aware that the other powers would not stand idly by. 
The question naturally arises, then, of why a public pre­
sentation of the case was not immediately made, and the 
answer is that such a disclosure might have forced the hand 
of the Czar and compelled him to set his armies in motion 
or face an intolerable loss of prestige at home and abroad. 
And in April of 1853, as far as anyone could tell, the Czar 
could have acted with impunity since no one else was ready, 
England least of all. It was Canning's hope that, having been 
informed of the serious nature of the crisis, the Aberdeen 
government would see the handwriting on the wall and look 
to its defenses. 
There was never any doubt on Canning's part that the Czar 
could eventually be checked by England alone or by a coalition 
of interested powers, but it would take a war to do it and be­
fore the coalition could be organized the Ottoman Empire 
might be destroyed. This is what he hoped to avoid. The 
chances for an awakening of the powers were immeasurably 
greater if, in the face of a peaceful solution to the dispute 
of the shrines, the Czar reopened negotiations for the treaty 
alone or, by failing to demobilize, hinted at action still to 
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come. It was necessary to bring Austria, at least, into con­
cert with England and France, and that could be done only 
if the intrigues at St. Petersburg could be clearly revealed, 
as Vienna felt that Russia was justified on the public issue. 
His instructions to the Turks, then, were to keep the par­
ticulars of the Holy Places entirely separate from the terms 
of the treaty.'1 They must be courteous, he told them, and 
sympathetic to Russian religious sentiment on the matter of 
the shrines. Above all, they must be definite in their pro­
posals with regard to the details of the shrines, discussing even 
doors and cupolas, sanctuary lamps and altar decorations. 
Meanwhile they could plead for patience on the treaty as a 
whole, promising nothing, refusing nothing. 
He turned his personal attention to the Prince, and the 
hapless Russian was no match for the shrewd Elchi. Initially, 
their conversations ran to generalities, until they gradually 
came around to the central issue of the Russian complaints. 
By patient listening and a few sympathetic comments Can­
ning led Menshikov to believe that England had been won 
over to the inherent justice of the Czar's stand. The English 
government felt that the traditional arrangements in the Holy 
Land should not be altered in any substantial way and was 
prepared to use all of its good offices to support the moderate 
and just demands of the Czar. It was fortunate, Canning 
intimated, that from the vantage point of a secure and stable 
dynastic history both the Queen and the Czar could ap­
preciate the pretty actions of Napoleon III and could afford 
to be generous and condescending. England was counting 
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very heavily on the reiterated pacific intentions of the Czar 
to lead the way to a solution that would be just and at the same 
time offer a measure of recognition to the French Emperor. 
Canning was receiving a stream of assurances from London 
that such was the declared position of St. Petersburg, as com­
municated to Sir Hamilton Seymour by Count Nesselrode 
and the Czar himself, and he was most happy to show them 
to Prince Menshikov. Imperceptibly he maneuvered the 
Prince into the position of either acceding to a negotiated 
settlement of the Holy Places dispute or contradicting the 
assertions of his master. 
While he convincingly cajoled the Prince, he could not 
afford to ignore the pressure from the French end of the line, 
but here he was tangibly aided by the freshness of his own 
personal contacts with Louis Napoleon. In a parallel series 
of conferences with De la Cour, who had succeeded De 
Lavalette at the Porte, he advanced the suggestion that the 
dignity of France had already been deferred to in the matter 
of the star and the key and that the majesty of the French 
Emperior did not depend on needless hair-splitting that could 
block a desired conclusion. He persuaded De la Cour that 
his Emperor was not disposed to prolong the debate so long 
as what was granted was not withdrawn. Finally, he asked 
the Frenchman to imagine how absurd Menshikov would 
appear if, after all his labors, he went home with nothing to 
show but a firman redefining what Russia already had. If it 
was important to Russia, it was little short of comical to the 
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rest of Europe, and it was all to French advantage to treat 
it as such, for which treatment they would merit the gratitude 
not only of the Porte but of England as well. 
With the French and Russian envoys now disposed to accept 
his point of view, Canning's next step was to offer his services 
to Menshikov in the matter of procuring from the Porte a 
firman that would precisely delineate Greek precedence in 
each and every particular brought forth in the Russian agenda 
and a similar decree that would unmistakably confine the 
recent gains of the French. "I thought," he modestly reported, 
"it was time for me to adopt a more prominent part in reconcil­
ing the adverse parties." 
By the nineteenth of April he had brought Menshikov and 
De la Cour to agreement on the text of the firmans that were 
to be addressed by the Sultan to the Turkish authorities in 
Jerusalem. The major points, picayune as they actually were, 
covered a number of items. As to the French privileges they 
were to remain as granted; that is, the Star of France would 
remain in the Grotto of the Nativity and the key to the main 
door of the church would remain in the custody of the Latin 
Monks. However, a Greek priest would remain as the actual 
doorkeeper with no right of preventing entry to any and all 
pilgrims. The custody of the key did not confer ownership, 
and no change was to be made in the appointments of the 
sanctuary to impede the proper celebration of the Greek 
liturgy. The repairs on the shrine were to be made by the 
Sultan, but under the direction and supervision of the Greek 
 268 THE GREAT AMBASSADOR
Patriarch of Jerusalem. The crowning genius of the arrange­
ments, however, was the solution reached for the vexing 
problem of precedence. Here priority was given to the 
Greeks, but it was declared to be a temporal precedence alone, 
based not on inherent right nor on greater intrinsic dignity 
but established solely as an accommodation to the difference 
in canonical hours of the respective rites. Since the Greeks 
had always celebrated the Divine Liturgy at a much earlier 
hour than the Latins did the Mass, neither side could take 
umbrage at a continuation of their respective customs nor 
could either claim a signal victory. 
In fifteen days of unremitting labor Canning had solved 
an argument that had arisen eighteen months previously. It 
had not been easy on the veteran diplomat, as he testified 
to his wife: "I am well, thank God! but my brain is half on 
fire, and my fingers worn down to the quick. I get up at five; 
I work the livelong day and I fall asleep before I reach my 
bed "8 It was not yet over, however, for on the very 
day the firmans were being drawn up the whole apple cart 
was very nearly upset. 
It will be recalled that the French fleet had moved from 
Toulon to the vicinity of Salamis in mid-March. It is not 
known exactly when the Czar became cognizant of this fact, 
but at any rate it is certain that when he did the intended 
irritant must have been weakened somewhat by the knowledge 
that England had already thwarted any idea the French had 
entertained of joint action. As he had declared in a message 
to Lord John Russell: "When we are agreed, I am quite with­
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out anxiety as to the rest of Europe; it is immaterial what the 
others may think or do." 
Although the French move must have rankled considerably, 
the confidence that he was walking arm in arm with England 
allowed Nicholas to stifle any hasty response to this sword-
waving. When, however, to cap this insolence, he had to 
suffer the re-emergence of Stratford Canning, and when it 
become very plain that the Menshikov mission had ground to 
a halt, undoubtedly against this same hated barrier, he turned 
back to the French move and seized upon it as the occasion 
to order the Prince to press for the treaty without delay. 
The new orders reached Prince Menshikov in almost the 
final hours of the preceding negotiations, and the plenipotenti­
ary was at a loss as to what he should do. The pace the Eng­
lish Ambassador had set for all concerned had left no op­
portunity for Menshikov to communicate with St. Petersburg 
quickly enough to submit the terms of the proposed settlement 
before his acceptance of them on behalf of the Czar. More­
over, there appeared to be no necessity for doing so, as Lord 
Stratford seemed to be winning more in the matter of the Holy 
Places than the Czar himself had dreamed possible. Now 
he was ordered to return to the peremptory language and be­
havior that had marked the start of his embassy. Yet Men­
shikov knew that it was possible to lose what he had gained 
by an overextension of effort at this stage. 
In his dilemma the Prince chose an alternative that was 
most foolish for him, and most fortunate for the Elchi. He 
was not so naive as to suppose that Canning knew nothing 
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of the additional project, for the Englishman had alluded, 
more than once, to the rumor of ulterior proposals, but in each 
reference the English Ambassador himself had been quick to 
dismiss the reports as baseless since they were in direct con­
trast to the pledges the Czar was making to Lord Aberdeen.9 
These dismissals Prince Menshikov had avidly concurred in, 
and to corroborate his agreement he had gone so far as to 
acknowledge that he was empowered to enter into treaty dis­
cussions, but they were to relate to nothing more than a re­
affirmation of existing generalities, and the question of peace 
or war did not depend on their conclusion. At most, a refusal 
on the part of the Porte might lead to a temporary strain, but 
nothing more than a break in negotiations. 
Since he had not found Lord Stratford to be the demon 
he was made out to be, Menshikov decided to discuss with 
him the treaty the Czar was desirous of making. That he did 
so was an indication, first of all, that he himself did not see 
the full force of the consequences of such a proposal and, 
secondly, that he had resigned himself to the fact that ulti­
mately he would be dealing with Canning anyway. He 
might receive the formal replies from the Grand Vezir or 
from Rifat Pasha, but the actual acceptance or rejection was 
the Elchi's, and since he had found him amenable thus far, 
he might as well have the treaty in such a form as to merit 
acceptance. His duty was to effect an agreement, and if by 
prior consultation with the Elchi he could speed it up, there 
was no harm done. 
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Now it was Canning's turn to be in a quandary. He could 
not, of course, signify assent, but, on the other hand, an abrupt 
rejection would spoil everything. He needed Menshikov's 
public acceptance of the forthcoming firmans before all else. 
Then let come what may. He engaged in a classic equivoca­
tion that took the poor Russian in completely. Without com­
menting on the treaty as a whole, he did, after reading it over, 
question whether the language used in reference to the patri­
archs would be considered admissible by the European powers. 
He went so far as to suggest some alteration in the language 
of this section before it was submitted to the Porte. By so con­
centrating on this single item, he let Menshikov draw the con­
clusion that he had no serious objection to the engagement as a 
whole.10 His success can be gauged by the lengths Menshikov 
went to later on to show that Canning at first approved the 
treaty and then reversed himself after the agreement on the 
shrines was concluded. But there is not a single item on 
record other than Menshikov's unwarranted inference that 
this was so. 
Regardless of Menshikov's subsequent recriminations, the 
strategem worked, and the altered draft was presented to the 
Porte with the assumption that it had been approved by the 
Elchi. Meanwhile the firmans were completed and accepted 
by all parties, and the dispute over the question of the Holy 
Places was over in the manner planned by Canning, and just 
seventeen days after he had returned to Constantinople. 
Prince Menshikov, not realizing that the rug had been pulled 
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out from under the Czar's feet, avidly tendered his public 
gratitude to the Elchi. The Czar was left without a pretext, 
and what was to come all depended on his mood and purpose. 
"But we are not yet out of the wood," Canning admitted 
sadly to Lady Stratford. "Russia wants what the Porte can­
not give, and it remains to be seen whether Menshikov will 
be satisfied with what I may conscientiously advise the Turks 
to give him. I am, so far, on good terms with all the 
world."11 
1. See Kinglake, op. cit., I, 81-82. 
2. See Temperley, op. cit., p. 315. 
3. With regard to the relation of the millet system to a Romano-
Byzantine legal heritage, Toynbee Qop. cit.. VII, 291) quotes from 
Goldziher as follows: " 'It was quite natural, from the changed conditions 
after the conquests, that the formation of law . was greatly influenced 
by what the authorities on the development of law in Syria and Mesopo­
tamia were able to learn of Roman law, sometimes of the special law for 
particular provinces.'" Toynbee himself states more specifically (ibid., 
p. 258, n. 3 ) : "Moreover, the capitulations, as well as the millets, had 
been a going concern in the parochial states whose place the Ottoman 
Empire had taken." 
4. "The more the Turkish Government adopts the rules of impartial 
law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of Russia find 
it necessary to apply that exceptional protection . . " (Lord John 
Russell to Sir Harrison Seymour, in Hurewitz, op. cit., I, 140). 
5. Temperley emphasizes (op. cit., pp. 315-16, 320, 332) that the pro­
posed treaty included laymen as well as clergy. Rifat Pasha said that "it 
would give a foreign power the right of mixing in our internal affairs 
and protecting our subject peoples" (ibid., p. 316). 
6. Cf. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 251-53. 
7. Temperley Cop. cit., p. 317) says: "It has been absurdly suggested 
that Stratford deliberately separated the question of the Holy Places from 
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the other disputes in order to put Russia in the wrong.'' I am not sure 
to which part of the proposition Temperley ascribes the absurdity. If he 
means that it is absurd to state that Canning's motive was "to put Russia 
in the wrong," I agree with him. His motive was to remove Russia's 
legitimate grievances on the matter of the Holy Places. If, after that was 
accomplished with justice, Russia persisted in unreasonable demands, 
then she would have to answer for her own actions. On the other hand, 
Temperley means that Canning did not consciously strive to separate the 
two questions, I disagree. Cf. Canning's instructions to his chief dragoman, 
April 23, 1853 (Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 258): " . what I have so 
often urged, the importance of keeping the question of the Holy Places 
apart from that of the Protectorate." 
8. Lane-Poole, op. dt., II, 260. 
9. See Kinglake, op. cit., I, 97-98. 
10. Canning was not simulating. He believed the controversy could 
and would be settled. Menshikov had agreed to delete the clause creating 
the patriarchs for life. (Cf. Temperley, op. cit., p. 317.) 
11. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 260. 
XXI

THE Aberdeen government was well satisfied with Stratford 
Canning's handling of the Holy Places dispute. Lord Claren­
don described the Ambassador's action as being "most judici­
ous and pacific."1 But at the same time the Cabinet was 
falling victim to an inertia and blindness which ultimately 
eroded the chances for peace and set in motion the drift to­
ward war. Advices had been coming from Sir Hamilton Sey­
mour, their ambassador to Russia, which should have opened 
their eyes to the realization that the matter of the Holy Places 
was not the sum of the Czar's interests. 
The content of this correspondence from Seymour was not 
to come to light until almost a year later, and it was only by 
chance that it was made public then. On February 17, 1854, 
when it was generally thought to be a matter of a few days 
before war was declared, Lord John Russell rose in the House 
of Commons, and, speaking in behalf of the government, he 
laid the entire blame for the coming conflict at the door of 
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Czar Nicholas I. Lord Russell accused the Czar of having 
misled the English Cabinet with regard to his intentions. This 
speech evoked a bitter countercharge which was carried in the 
semi-official St. Petersburg Journal of March 2, 1854. The 
Russian reply claimed that the English government had re­
ceived ample information from the Russian court with respect 
to its views on the Turkish situation, and that the transmission 
of these views had begun when Lord Russell himself was still 
Foreign Secretary (January, 1853), "before ceding to Lord 
Clarendon the direction of foreign affairs."2 Moreover, the 
same article noted without reservation, the Russian position 
was stated by Czar Nicholas himself and was forwarded to 
the Aberdeen Cabinet by Sir Hamilton Seymour at the Czar's 
own request. 
So grave was the Russian charge, implying a deceptive 
silence on the part of Lord Aberdeen's ministry, that the Earl 
of Derby saw fit to ask the Prime Minister for an explana­
tion, and to produce the alleged documents for Parliament. 
Whether Lord Aberdeen would ever have seen fit to publish 
them is a moot point for, in response to this demand, the 
papers were laid before Parliament. It seems eminently fair 
to say of the Seymour Correspondence that, at the very least, 
the exchanges should have put the Cabinet on guard. The 
crisis was deeper than a dispute over church keys. 
Two facts must be kept in mind during this review of the 
record. One is that the Nesselrode Memorandum of 1844, 
implying an understanding among Russia, Austria, and Eng­
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land on the future of Turkey (see Chapter XVIII above, p. 
241), had never been disavowed. The other is that the 
Foreign Minister who, according to the Czar, by his tacit 
acceptance had approved the generalities of the memorandum 
was now the head of the English government. Czar Nicholas 
saw a close connection between these widely separated events. 
He met Seymour at a party in the palace of the Grand Duch­
ess Helena in St. Petersburg on January 9, 1853, shortly after 
the formation of the Aberdeen Cabinet. After requesting 
that his good wishes be conveyed to Lord Aberdeen, the Czar 
launched into a discussion of the European scene and dwelt 
on the necessity for English and Russian co-operation. 
'When we [Russia and England] are agreed (d'accord'), 
I am quite without anxiety as to the west of Europe; it is 
immaterial what the others may think or do." 
Then, according to Seymour's summary, he turned specifically 
to the matter of Turkey: 
He said . . "The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorgan­
ized condition; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces 
it is very important that England and Russia should 
come to a perfectly good understanding upon these af­
fairs 
And the Czar, Seymour reports, characterized Turkey as 'a 
sick man—a very sick man." 
Seymour concluded the report of this initial meeting with 
a succinct comment on the policy difference between England 
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and Russia. After offering his advice on the necessity of an 
understanding, he wrote: 
The sum is probably this:—That England has to desire a 
close concert with Russia, with a view to preventing the 
downfall of Turkey; while Russia would be well pleased 
that the concert should apply to the events by which this 
downfall is to be followed.3 
This dispatch was received at the Foreign Office by Lord 
Russell on the twenty-third of January. It was followed by 
another message in which Sir Hamilton reported what tran­
spired when the Czar, as he had promised in their first meet­
ing, sent for him. This was five days later, (January 14, 
1853). Seymour recorded the Czar's recurrent theme: 
"Now, Turkey . has by degrees fallen into such a state 
of decrepitude, that, as I told you the other night, eager as 
we all are for the prolonged existence of the man , he 
may suddenly die upon our hands ; and I put it to 
you, therefore, whether it is not better to be provided be­
forehand for a contingency, than to incur the chaos, confu­
sion, and the certainty of a European war, all of which must 
attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and 
before some ulterior system has been sketched? This is the 
point to which I am desirous that you should call the 
attention of your government." 
Seymour ventured an immediate response: 
"With regard to contingent arrangements, her majesty's 
government, as your majesty is well aware, objects, as a 
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general rule, to taking engagements upon possible eventuali­
ties, and would, perhaps, be particularly disinclined 
in this instance. [A] great disinclination (repugnance) 
might be expected in England to disposing by anticipation 
(.d'escom-pter) of the succession of an old friend and ally." 
"This rule is a good one," the emperor replied ; 
''still it is of the greatest importance that we should under­
stand one another, and not allow events to take us by sur­
prise " 
His imperial majesty then alluded to a conversation which 
he had held the last time he was in England with the Duke 
of Wellington [the circumstances culminating in the Nessel­
rode Memorandum] . ; then, as now, his majesty was, 
he said, eager to provide against events which, in the ab­
sence of any concert, might compel him to act in a manner 
opposed to the views of her majesty's government. 
T h e Russian Emperor then turned to the events of the day 
for a moment, and assured Sir Hamilton that no troop move­
ments had yet taken place over the Holy Places dispute; this 
was a patent falsehood since Seymour had already been able 
to report the flow of troops to the Danube. However, the 
Emperor warned that if there was any French movement of a 
military nature, he would unhesitatingly send his forces into 
Turkey, and 
that if the result of such an advance should prove to be 
the overthrow of the Great Turk, he should regret the event, 
but should feel that he had acted as he was compelled to do. 
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The Czar ended the conversation with a request that Seymour 
communicate "What has passed between us to the queen's 
government, and you will say that I shall be ready to receive 
any communication which it may be their wish to make to 
me upon the subject.1' Seymour concluded the dispatch with 
a recommendation phrased in plain language: 
I would now submit to your lordship that this overture can­
not with propriety pass unnoticed By her majesty's govern­
ment. . . . the conversation held some years ago with the 
Duke of Wellington proves that the object in view is one 
which has long occupied the thoughts of his imperial 
majesty. If, then, the proposal were to remain unanswered, 
a decided advantage would be secured to the imperial 
[Russian] cabinet, which, in the event of some great catas­
trophe taking place in Turkey, would be able to point to 
proposals made to England, and which, not having been 
responded to, left the emperor at liberty, or placed him 
under the necessity of following his own line of policy in 
the East.4 
To this second report, received in London on the sixth of 
February, Seymour appended a note, stating that before send­
ing the report on to London in accordance with the Emperor's 
wishes, he had made a separate visit to Count Nesselrode to 
make sure that he was giving his own government "a correct 
summary of the conversation." Seymour recognized the 
gravity of the Czar's words respecting the probable effect of 
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a military advance by Russian troops into the Ottoman Em­
pire. He had also advised London that Russian mobilization 
was in process north of the Danube. Surely, with Count 
Nesselrode's confirmation that the report represented the mind 
and policy of the Czar, Seymour expected a reaction from the 
English Cabinet. Of course, he practically goaded Russell into 
a reply, and he received one, but it was hardly the kind he 
expected. On February 9, Lord John Russell sent the British 
representative a response remarkable for its several unusual 
distinctions as to what the Cabinet considered to be internal 
Turkish affairs and what they did not. Lord Russell seemed 
to be arguing that the troubles vexing Turkey were really 
matters that were problems to neighboring countries and not 
signs of malaise at the Porte: 
The question raised by His Imperial Majesty is a very 
serious one [though not serious enough to be brought to 
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's attention a few days later]. It 
is "whether it is not better to be provided beforehand 
for a contingency than to incur the chaos, confusion, and 
the certainty of a European war 
In considering this grave question, the first reflection 
which occurs to her majesty's government is, that no actual 
crisis has occurred which renders necessary a solution of 
this vast European problem. Disputes have arisen respecting 
the holy places, but these are without the sphere of the in­
ternal government of Turkey, and concern Russia and 
France rather than the Sublime Porte. Some disturbance 
of the relations between Austria and the Porte has been 
caused by the Turkish attack on Montenegro; but this, again, 
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relates rather to dangers affecting the frontier of Austria 
than the authority and safety of the sultan 
The Czar did not have to wonder very long about the mean­
ings hidden in this bit of logical dexterity, for when Lord 
Russell went on to discuss the proposal for an arrangement 
of the kind the Czar was seeking, he seemed to object not 
to the injustice inherent in such a project, but rather to the 
difficulties involved in keeping it secret and to the embarrass­
ment that would accrue to England and Russia once it were 
known: 
In these circumstances it would hardly be consistent with 
the friendly feelings towards the sultan which animate the 
Emperor of Russia, no less than the Queen of Great Britain, 
to dispose beforehand of the provinces under his dominion. 
Besides an agreement made in such a case tends very 
surely to hasten the contingency for which it is intended to 
provide. Austria and France could not, in fairness, be kept 
in ignorance . It is to be inferred that as soon as 
Great Britain and Russia should have agreed on the course 
to be pursued, they should communicate their inten­
tions to the great powers of Europe. An agreement thus 
made, and thus communicated, would not be very long a 
secret; and while it would alarm and alienate the sultan, 
the knowledge of its existence would stimulate all his 
enemies to increased violence and more obstinate conflict. 
Instead of the forthright and vigorous rejection of any plan 
of partition or disposal of the Ottoman Empire that Sir Hamil­
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ton Seymour hoped to be able to show to Nicholas, the 
Aberdeen ministry seemed to object only to the timing and 
mechanics of the proposal. Indeed, who could blame the Czar 
for such an interpretation when he found, a little further on, 
the assurance that the English government "will enter into 
no agreement to provide for the contingency of the fall of 
Turkey without previous communication with the Emperor 
of Russia"?5 To a man of Nicholas' frame of mind the English 
reply was not in the least a negative one. It questioned only 
the imminence of Turkish collapse and the prudence of an 
immediate understanding. Lord Russell promised, on the 
other hand, that England would, indeed, enter into a dis­
cussion with the Czar if and when conditions should point 
to an imminent collapse. 
Seymour had to make the best of this reply when he 
brought it to the attention of the Czar on the evening of 
February 20, 1853, at a soiree. The conversation was brief 
and informal, but the Czar directed his remarks to the 
question of the imminence of the Turkish downfall and 
expressed his doubt that the English government had reliable 
information : 
" . I will tell you that, if your government has been 
led to believe that Turkey retains any elements of exist­
ence, your government must have received incorrect in­
formation. 
So insistent did the Czar seem to have become on the subject 
of an imminent fall of the Ottoman regime that Seymour 
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injected his own opinion by way of a warning to London and 
an implied suggestion that the Foreign Office should consult 
Austria about the possibility of an Austro-Russian agreement: 
It can hardly be otherwise but that the sovereign, who 
insists with such pertinacity upon the impending fall of a 
neighbouring state, must have settled in his own mind that 
the hour, if not of its dissolution, at all events for its dissolu­
tion, must be at hand. I reflected that this assumption 
would hardly be ventured upon unless some, perhaps gen­
eral, but at all events intimate understanding, existed be­
tween Russia and Austria.6 
Seymour reported this brief but important exchange imme­
diately, even though he was scheduled to meet the Czar in 
a formal audience the next day. According to Sir Hamilton, 
the meeting on the following day lasted for one hour and 
twelve minutes. In the course of it the Czar amplified his 
proposals in order to meet what he considered to be an English 
reluctance to make positive commitments: 
the emperor observed, that her majesty's government 
did not appear to be aware that his chief object was to ob­
tain . some declaration, or even opinion, of what ought 
not to be permitted in the event of the sudden downfall of 
Turkey. 
When Seymour asked for some concrete examples of what 
he had in mind, the Czar was at first reluctant to express 
himself, but then he went on to specify that he would not 
tolerate the occupation of Constantinople by any foreign 
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power, including Russia; that he would not allow the restora­
tion of a Byzantine empire or the expansion of Greece; still 
less would he suffer the "breaking up of Turkey into little 
republics, asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis, and other 
revolutionists of Europe." Later on in the conversation the 
Czar went on to suggest that 
it might be less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory terri­
torial arrangement than was commonly believed. "The 
principalities [Moldavia and Wallachia] are," he said, "in 
fact an independent state under my protection; this might 
so continue. Servia might receive the same form of gov­
ernment. So again with Bulgaria. As to Egypt, I 
quite understand the importance to England of that territory. 
I can then only say, that if, in the event of a distribution of 
the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the empire, you 
should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objections 
to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia [Crete] 
I do not know why it should not become an English 
possession." 
As for the position of Austria with regard to Eastern affairs, 
a question put by Seymour had, much to his surprise, caused 
the Czar immediately to reply: 
" you must understand that when I speak of Russia 
I speak of Austria as well . . ; our interests as regards 
Turkey are perfectly identical."7 
T h e separate reports of these conversations, the one of the 
evening of February 20 and that of the daytime audience 
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of February 21, were both received in London on the sixth 
of March. In the light of all this intelligence at their disposal, 
one can only wonder how Aberdeen and his Cabinet were 
interpreting the total situation. They were sending Stratford 
Canning back to the Porte to take a hand in the negotiations 
about to begin between Prince Menshikov and the Turks, 
but they told him nothing of these dispatches from St. Peters­
burg. Did they see no connection between the two sets of 
circumstances? Or did they fear that the added burden of 
such knowledge would needlessly complicate his position? 
In either case, they were sending a negotiator who was 
dangerously ignorant of the total position of one of the parties 
to the dispute. 
One might argue that Aberdeen and his advisers felt bound 
to observe an honorable secrecy concerning these dispatches 
from Sir Hamilton Seymour on the grounds that they repre­
sented the private confidence of a friendly sovereign. It is a 
reasonable conjecture, but they were guilty of staggering 
ineptitude once they had knowledge that the Czar claimed to 
be speaking for Austria, and they had that knowledge well 
before Canning reached Vienna, where he was officially 
charged to ascertain the posture of the Austrian government 
relative to the Holy Places dispute in particular and the 
Turkish situation in general. There were ample means at 
the disposal of the government in London to find out, without 
violating any confidences, whether or not the Czar of Russia 
was empowered to speak for the Emperor of Austria in regard 
to either or both of these matters. It could have been done 
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through Lord Westmoreland, the English ambassador to 
Vienna, or through Canning himself. N o attempt was made 
to confirm or give the lie to this claim of Nicholas. 
Sir Hamilton Seymour had seen the need for some definite 
clarification from London once the Czar had declared himself 
on specifics, and at the conclusion of the last-mentioned report 
he asked for "some expressions which might have the 
effect of putting an end to the further consideration of 
points which it is highly desirable should not be regarded 
as offering subject for debate." In spite of this plea London 
allowed almost three weeks to pass before it responded. When 
a reply to the Russian overtures was finally sent—from Lord 
Clarendon on the twenty-third of March—it was verbose, 
repetitive of the first reply, and consequently open to serious 
misconstruction: 
The generous confidence exhibited by the emperor entitles 
his imperial majesty to the most cordial declaration of 
opinion on the part of her majesty's government, who are 
fully aware that, in the event of any understanding with 
reference to future contingencies being expedient, or indeed 
possible, the word of his imperial majesty would be pre­
ferable to any convention that could be framed. 
Clarendon then expresses agreement with the negative propo­
sitions put forward by the Czar with the qualification that 
such pre-determinations, of themselves, would not constitute 
a guarantee against a conflict among the powers should the 
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contingencies under discussion actually come to pass. The 
Foreign Secretary also disavowed any ambition, on the part 
of England, for territorial aggrandizement as a result of 
previous partition plans and indicated that England would 
look askance at the enrichment of any other power by such 
means. This was the closest he came to rejecting any of the 
Czar's overtures, and it was hardly the categorical type of 
response called for. And even this weak rebuff was further 
eroded by Clarendon when he expressed the general feelings 
of the English government: 
They feel entire confidence in the rectitude of his imperial 
majesty's intentions, and, as they have the satisfaction of 
thinking that the interests of Russia and England in the 
East are completely identical, they entertain an earnest hope 
that a similar policy there will prevail, and tend to strengthen 
the alliance between the two countries 8 
No other document of any significance came from London 
after this, and the correspondence was concluded by a trio of 
messages from Seymour. They relate the final understanding 
left in the mind of the Czar by Clarendon's reply, and the 
last of them, sent from St. Petersburg on April 21, 1853, 
picks up the Foreign Secretary's use of the word alliance," 
which Nesselrode, speaking for Nicholas, refers to: 
His majesty congratulates himself on perceiving that his 
views and those of the English cabinet entirely coincide 
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on the subject of the political combinations which it would 
be chiefly necessary to avoid 
He readily accepts the evidence offered by the British cabi­
net of entire confidence in the uprightness of his sentiments, 
and the hope that, on this basis, his alliance with England 
cannot fail to become stronger.8 
O n that note the Seymour Correspondence was closed and 
consigned to the files. There was nothing sinister in the 
Czar's efforts; they were a frank expression of policy. But 
the policy was clear, and the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen did 
not see it. T h e ambiguity of the English government's replies 
was freely accommodated to his own desires by Nicholas I, 
who was convinced that he knew Aberdeen well enough.10 
H e became certain that England would never go to war, and, 
although he drew more than he should have out of the 
exchanges, the Aberdeen Cabinet was greatly responsible for 
his mistake. 
1. Temperley, op. dt., p. 317. 
2. For the complete article see Henry Tyrrell, The History of the 
Present War with Russia (3 vols.; London and New York; London 
Printing and Publishing Co., n.d. [ca. 1855-57]), 83-84. 
3. Ibid., pp. 85-86. Tyrrell quotes the whole of the Seymour Corre­
spondence; Hurewitz (op. dt., I, 135-41) includes only what he considers 
to be the most important documents. 
4. Tyrrell, op. cit., I, 86-88. In his commentary introducing the 
Seymour Correspondence, Hurewitz Cop. dt., I, 135) says that insofar as 
it illumines the respective policies of Britain and Russia, its importance 
"can hardly be exaggerated." As does Temperley, he relates the Seymour 
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Correspondence and the Nesselrode Memorandum as a link in the chain 
of Nicholas' diplomacy. 
5. Tyrrell, op. cit., 1, 88-89. 
6. Ibid., p. 90. 
7. Ibid., pp. 91-93. Cf. also Temperley, op. cit., p. 461, n. 410, for 
partition plans. 
8. Tyrrell, op. cit., I, 96-97. 
9. Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
10. Cf. Temperley, op. cit., p. 299. 
XXII

THE secret exchanges between London and St. Petersburg 
had concluded on a theme that was entirely satisfactory to 
the Czar. The evolution of negotiations in Constantinople 
stood in sharp contrast to his own personal success. The 
futility of further dickering at the Porte presumably led the 
Czar to order Prince Menshikov to bring his mission to a 
successful conclusion or to break off talks and depart. 
To return to the chronology of the negotiations in Con­
stantinople, then, it will be recalled that Prince Menshikov 
had assumed agreement between himself and Lord Stratford 
de Redcliffe on the substance of the proposed convention 
between the Porte and Russia. On the nineteenth of April, 
accordingly, he forwarded to Rifat a draft which he thought 
would be acceptable. Confident of the outcome respecting 
this part of the discussions, he gave his assent, on April 22, 
to the compromise solution of the Holy Places question. 
When the new instructions came from St. Petersburg and 
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nothing seemed to be issuing from the Porte, Menshikov once 
again began to exert pressure on the Turks. 
On the fifth of May he sent to Rifat Pasha another draft 
of the desired treaty together with a stern note that required 
an answer within five days. Failure to comply, the Prince 
said, could be taken in no other light than 'a want of respect 
toward his Government, which would impose upon him the 
most painful duty.1' The meaning of the ultimatum was 
plain, and the object of the divisions concentrating along 
the Pruth was clear. Clear also was the next move of the 
Turks, and the Reis Effendi was not slow in appealing to 
Lord Stratford for advice. 
The new move was ample evidence that the Czar intended 
to push to the utmost in an effort to accomplish his end, and 
although the Elchi did not pretend to have certain knowledge 
as to how far that was, he was sure that sooner or later powers 
other than Turkey and Russia would become involved. It 
was important, then, to allow the Russians to propel them­
selves as far as possible into such an advanced position that 
their aggressive and imperialistic aims would be manifest to 
all of Europe. It would require all the patience and restraint 
he could muster from the Turkish ministers to keep the 
negotiations going on until they were ruptured from the 
Russian side. 
His advice to Rifat, therefore, was to continue the courteous 
and dignified tactics he had been using all along, admitting 
what was admissible, deferring to the wishes of the Czar 
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where it could be done without sacrificing the dignity and 
sovereignty of the Porte. Canning analyzed the Russian 
note in a lengthy memorandum.1 He saw it as containing 
three elements, two of which were merely reaffirmations of 
traditional arrangements, and these he thought could be the 
substance of a new firman, for "a readiness ought to be 
shown to remove any abuse and redress any grievance.1' What 
was objectionable, of course, and hence inadmissible, was 
the treaty arrangement which would give Russia the legal 
right to interfere anytime a Greek cleric might complain of 
injustice or even inconvenience. Moreover, the language of 
the proposed agreement implied that the privileges of the 
Greek Church were being renewed solely as a result of 
Russian intervention, thereby derogating from the authority 
of the Sultan and the historic fact that these had been granted 
before Russian interest had reached the current proportions. 
On the eighth of May he took it upon himself to address 
a private letter to Prince Menshikov begging that plenipo­
tentiary to soften his demands and bring them into accord 
with the temperate and pacific language emanating from the 
Czar himself. The Western powers, the Elchi asserted, were 
in complete sympathy with the Russian desire to better the 
lot of the Orthodox Christians, but they could not counte­
nance a situation in which Russia would have the right to 
interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire by 
treaty arrangement. It was a letter which evoked the peaceful 
character of Nicholas' quarter-century reign on the throne of 
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Russia and his repeated declarations in favor of tranquillity 
among nations. Although it was written in the sincere hope 
that it might bear fruit, it was also framed with the realization 
that the Russian position was firm. He knew that Menshikov's 
answer must either express a disposition to soften his demands 
in the face of concerted opposition or reveal the final aims of 
the Romanov government with respect to Turkey. The answer 
indeed confirmed his worst fears: Russia could no longer be 
content, the Prince replied, with une position secondaire in 
Ottoman affairs. The pretext of the Holy Places was gone; 
the pretext of Montenegro had ceased to exist; there remained 
only the question of paramount influence at the Bosporus. 
It was critically necessary, as the Elchi saw things at this 
period, that the position of the Turks be just as clear as 
Russia's so that the world might compare the morality of 
their aims. That very same night, with no doubt as to what 
Menshikov's answer would be, Lord Stratford departed from 
protocol and visited the villa of the Grand Vezir on the 
Bosporus. He had learned from the French Ambassador, 
earlier in the day, that there seemed to be some weakening 
in the Porte's willingness to withstand Czarist pressure. He 
found the Reis Effendi and the Seraskier there in conference 
with Ali Pasha, and once more he urged them to hold the 
door open for negotiations in their reply. He advised that 
as a substitute for the treaty they promise a firman guarantee­
ing complete religious freedom to be sent not only to Russia 
but to all the five major European powers. The Turks listened 
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and gave ready assent to all the Elchi's words of wisdom, but 
the true extent of their fear was revealed when the Grand 
Vezir asked if they could look forward to the approach of 
the English fleet to counterbalance the Russian threats. "I 
replied," reported Canning, "that I considered the position 
in its present stage to be one of a moral character, and con­
sequently that its difficulties or hazards, whatever they might 
be, should be rather met by acts of a similar description than 
by demonstrations calculated to increase alarm and provoke 
resentment."2 
It would have been very easy for Stratford Canning to tell 
the poor Turkish ministers that he was empowered to alert 
the English fleet at Malta, but he did not want them to 
proceed on that basis. He was certain that all the powers 
would recognize the justice of the Porte's position, and he 
desired, above all else, that the Porte reject the Russian 
demands on the basis of their intrinsic injustice rather than 
look to outside help as the condition for continued resistance 
to Russian pressure. He wanted to lay the groundwork for 
international censure of Russia rather than let it appear that 
England would proceed alone. After the Divan signified its 
conviction that this was the course it would follow, he asked 
for an audience with the Sultan on the following day. 
On the morning of the ninth of May, the Reis Effendi 
conducted him to the apartments of Abdul Medjid and then 
withdrew. The Elchi and the Sultan faced each other at a 
precarious moment in history. To the north powerful armies 
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were poised to strike; at Sebastopol a battle fleet was armed 
and manned to sweep down to the Golden Horn. Behind the 
Sultan was the decaying power of a once great nation, while 
the Ambassador knew he spoke for a government that did 
not know its own mind and shrank from the very thought 
of conflict. To oppose the Russian juggernaut Stratford Can­
ning had nothing but the words "moral resistance.' 
He reviewed the whole situation calmly and congratulated 
the Sultan on having ministers who stood ready to defy the 
Czar on the grounds of strict justice. He frankly admitted 
that to spurn the overtures of Prince Menshikov would be 
to invite a rupture in relations between the Porte and St. 
Petersburg which, quite possibly, might result in an occupa­
tion of the Danubian principalities. Even in that event, 
though, "I conceive that the true position to be main­
tained by the Porte is one of moral resistance to such demands 
as are really inadmissible on just and essential grounds, and 
that the principle should even be applied under protest to the 
occupation of the Principalities, not in weakness or despair, 
but in reliance on a good cause, and on the sympathy of 
friendly and independent governments." 3 
When the Sultan expressed, in return, his reliance on the 
Elchi and on the English people, then, as if in reward for 
his faith, Canning confided to Abdul Medjid that in the 
event of imminent danger he was empowered by his govern­
ment to instruct the English admiral at Malta to hold his 
squadron in readiness. The power in the Elchi's hands was 
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not extended to anything more concrete, but the effect of 
this information, imparted in the given circumstances, was 
the same as if he had spoken of huge armies in motion. The 
Ambassador knew, moreover, that the renewed faith of the 
Sultan would be quickly transmitted to his advisers and would 
thus have a far greater psychological effect than if it had been 
announced to them in the course of ordinary proceedings. 
Canning was not surprised, then, when the Turkish reply 
was delivered to Menshikov on the following day. It was 
courteous—deferring to Russia in the matter of privileges and 
precedence at the Holy Places, reaffirming traditional guaran­
tees relative to the position of the Greek churches, but politely 
and definitely negative with respect to the protectorate 
envisaged by the proposed treaty. On the eleventh of May, 
Prince Menshikov angrily replied that he could not accept the 
decision of the Divan as their final answer and gave them 
three days in which to reconsider. Their failure to do so, 
he threatened, would compel him to acknowledge that his 
peaceful mission had come to an end and leave him no alterna­
tive but to depart from the capital with all his delegation. 
The responsibility for the consequences of such a move, he 
warned, would rest with the Turkish ministers and not with 
himself. 
Notwithstanding the extension of the time limit he gave 
them to answer his note, he importuned one Turkish official 
after another to pay heed to the dangers on the horizon and 
finally demanded an audience with the Grand Vezir on the 
afternoon of the thirteenth. Then he committed an unfor­
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givable breach of etiquette by failing to keep the appoint­
ment. Instead, he brusquely pushed himself into an audience 
with the Sultan at ten o'clock that morning. Abdul Medjid 
received him, which was wrong, but simply referred him to his 
ministers for action on his requirements; and for Menshikov 
this was tantamount to throwing him back upon the wiles 
of Stratford Canning. But to have allowed Menshikov to 
force an audience was an unfortunate manifestation by the 
Sultan of lack of confidence in his ministers, and the Cabinet 
thereupon resigned. The Sultan allowed the resignation in 
a forlorn attempt to mollify Menshikov. 
One might hazard the guess that the resignation of the 
ministry was a ruse seized upon by the Divan to prolong the 
negotiations, for the new ministry was not such as to be 
any more obsequious to the overbearing Russian.4 Actually 
it was little more than a reshuffling; the former Grand Vezir, 
Ali Pasha, became Seraskier, and was succeeded as Grand 
Vezir by Mustapha Pasha, who had been President of the 
Council. That office, in turn, was assumed by Rifat Pasha, 
who moved over from the Foreign Office to make way for 
none other than Reshid Pasha. The new ministry was in 
office on the fourteenth, the day appointed by Menshikov 
for Turkey's final answer, and Reshid asked for a few days 
delay so that the new government could study the problem. 
Menshikov was in a real dilemma. He had apparently 
received orders to terminate his mission at once, yet courtesy 
and circumstances demanded that he wait until he was sure 
there was no change of heart. At any rate, he replied, on the 
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fifteenth, that his mission to the Porte was at an end and 
that there could be no further communication of an official 
nature between the Seraglio and himself. He intimated, 
however, that it would be a few days before he could leave 
Constantinople and thus left the door open for the Turks to 
bend to his imperial master's will. 
In spite of the official break in relations as announced by 
the Prince, Reshid Pasha made one last attempt to stay the 
Russian's hand. He made a personal visit to him on the 
eighteenth and reiterated Turkish willingness to satisfy the 
Czar's concern for his coreligionists in the Ottoman Empire 
and to guarantee Russo-Greek privileges in the Holy Land, 
but at the same time he told him that the Council had again 
overwhelmingly rejected the treaty proposal.5 A written Rus­
sian reply, delivered that same day, once again declared that 
negotiations were at an end, that Russia had received fresh 
injury, and that the refusal of the Porte to give the guaran­
tees in the form demanded left the Emperor of all the Russias 
no alternative but to seek the desired end in his own way 
and through his own power. Any infringement on the rights 
of the Eastern Churches would be regarded as an act of 
hostility. And, finally, Menshikov declared that both the 
extraordinary mission headed by himself and the regular staff 
of the Russian Embassy were departing with him. 
On the next morning, the nineteenth, the English Ambas­
sador assembled the envoys of Austria, France, and Prussia 
at his home. It was now time to establish a four-power united 
front against the Czar. Stratford Canning was certain that 
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there would not be a war—not that he believed the Czar 
was incapable of going to war against the Turk, but that in 
face of a coalition of the powers, Nicholas would back down. 
It was the first order of business to give him the chance to 
retreat without public humiliation. 
The representatives of the powers were unanimously agreed 
that the conduct of the Porte had been rigorously correct, and 
each attested to the fact that the projected treaty arrangement 
would be frowned upon by his own government. They 
jointly designated their Austrian colleague, consequently, to 
approach Prince Menshikov for yet another attempt at recon­
ciliation. This was done on the twentieth of May. The 
Prince finally made a change in his demands. If the major 
objection of the powers was to the word "treaty,'' he would 
accept the guarantees in the form of a note or declaration. 
This offer was to be transmitted to Reshid Pasha by the 
conference of ambassadors. Actually the same demands were 
there, to be promised just as solemnly as they would have 
been in a treaty, and the several ambassadors could see no 
substantial alteration. They therefore advised Reshid that 
they considered him the best judge of what should be done 
with this amended demand. It was not answered; and on the 
twenty-first of May, the Russian arms and flags were removed 
from the embassy building, and the entire Russian mission 
steamed up the Bosporus for Odessa. 
Stratford Canning had come back to Constantinople on the 
fifth of April under instructions to mediate the dispute that 
had arisen regarding the Holy Places in Jerusalem. This 
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he had done to the declared satisfaction of all the parties 
involved. When, in the course of effecting this settlement, he 
had ascertained the broader aims of the Russian government 
and its Emperor, he had determined that if he held the Turks 
to a policy of just amends then any further Russian project 
would be answered by the world. 
When Prince Menshikov left for Odessa on the twenty-
first of May, he did so with the strong disapproval of all the 
major powers represented at the Porte. There was a four-
power European front in being, and it seemed amply capable 
of bringing the Czar to an abrupt halt. 
1. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 264-65. 
2. Kinglake, op. cit., I, 115; see also Temperley, op. cit., p. 322. 
3. Kinglake, op. cit., I, 116; Temperley, op. cit., p. 323. 
4. Temperley says the ministers were dismissed at the behest of 
Menshikov, who wanted Reshid back in the Foreign Office. Reshid's 
appointment was certainly not at the behest of Canning, who had virtually 
lost all faith in the Pasha. 
5. The vote of the Grand Council was 42 to 3 against submission. 
(Temperley, op. cit., p. 327.) 
XXIII

THE summer of 1853 has been described as the season of a 
continent-wide diplomatic ball game, "whereof," in Stanley 
Lane-Poole's words, "the exact name and rules were appar­
ently not understood, at least by the players. There were 
four corners to this game: one was Paris, another was London, 
a third Vienna, and the fourth Constantinople: indeed, Berlin 
considered itself a fifth, but this was premature. The object 
was to throw a ball,—which they called by various names, 
as Note, Project, Declaration, Convention,—from Constanti­
nople to the goal at St. Petersburg. But the most extraordinary 
accidents happened on the way. Sometimes the ball, after 
being thrown from corner to corner, got hopelessly lost. 
Sometimes, after much careful preparation, it never started 
on its way at all. But most often two balls were projected 
from opposite corners at the same instant, and meeting in 
mid-air broke each other in pieces. About a dozen of these 
missiles were flying about Europe in the summer of 1853, 
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and the strangest part of the performance was that each was 
so timed as to arrive at its destination (if it did not burst on 
the way) exactly at the moment when another missile had 
been sent off. One only reached the Petersburg goal in 
safety, and that was found to contain some explosive matter, 
and was hastily dropped by the players. 
It would be hard to discover in the history of 
diplomacy a more painful example of good intentions egre­
giously, we had almost said ludicrously, foiled by their own 
superabundance. Every Great Power, as represented by its 
Foreign Secretary, was laudably eager to have its share in 
the work of healing, and managed its contribution so 
skilfully that it was certain to be neutralized by some other 
prescription."1 
The foregoing description, for all its irony, does not strain 
reality. To attempt to find some direction or coherence in 
this maze of diplomacy—with its futile digressions, reversals, 
and blind alleys—is almost impossible. For those who would 
pursue all the details there is an excellent account in the 
second volume of Lane-Poole's oft-cited work (pages 276­
338). Kinglake, also, in his first volume, provides an exhaus­
tive account (running from page 127 to page 142 and from 
page 214 to page 298), but that historian's editorial rhetoric 
must be carefully separated from his presentation of factual 
material. His propensity for the rhetorical style is, in the 
opinion of Temperley, responsible for much of the adverse 
criticism to which Stratford Canning has been subjected by 
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later observers who failed to sift fact from flights of purple 
prose. Though it was far from Kinglake's purpose, his glow­
ing description of Canning's power and influence lends 
credibility to the thesis advanced by many of his contempo­
raries that Stratford Canning, by failing to stem the Turks 
at the later moments of the negotiations, suffered the war 
to happen, so to speak. This thesis has now been discredited, 
even though it was held by Queen Victoria herself and 
stated by others in private correspondence. The record 
indicates that such accusations were nothing more than an 
attempt to find a scapegoat for the tragedy that ensued. 
In demonstration of this assertion we shall try here to 
follow the thread of the negotiations; but before doing so, 
several propositions ought to be stated which suggest this 
writer's interpretation of the events leading to the Crimean 
War. 
First and foremost of these is the incontrovertible fact that, 
at the moment of Prince Menshikov's departure from the 
Golden Horn, Canning had achieved unanimity with respect 
to the four major powers who were not parties to the direct 
dispute. This unanimity progressively diminished in direct 
proportion to the degree in which negotiations were removed 
from his direction. Secondly, the chances for peace were 
lost as the direction of the plans for peace came under the 
control of men who could not comprehend the totality of 
the situation. That inability stemmed both from the lack 
of a Weltanschauung proper to the times and from wishful 
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thinking that peace could be maintained so long as it was 
desired. Thirdly, general war resulted because the Aberdeen 
government could not, or would not, opt firmly either for 
peace or for war. Had the English government made clear 
its readiness to go to war, the Czar of Russia would have 
backed down.2 On the other hand, had it firmly advised its 
Ambassador in Constantinople that the Porte could not look 
to England for support, the Turks would either have given 
in to the Russian demands or engaged in a limited, though 
futile, war. 
The immediate reaction of the Aberdeen government to 
Menshikov's departure was to give vigorous support to its 
Ambassador at the Porte and the ministers who had been 
following his advice. On the twenty-sixth of May, Lord 
Clarendon informed the Elchi that it was "indispensable to 
take measures for the protection of the Sultan, and to aid 
his Highness in repelling any attack that might be made 
upon his territory,' and that "the use of force was to be 
resorted to as a last and unavoidable resource for the pro­
tection of Turkey and in defense of her independence which 
England is bound to maintain."3 Corresponding orders went 
to the fleet commander at Malta to consider himself under 
the orders of Viscount de Redcliffe. At the same time, the 
Foreign Secretary sent a dispatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour 
in St. Petersburg which stated the views of the Cabinet in 
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unequivocal terms: "No sovereign, having a proper regard 
for his own dignity and independence, could admit proposals 
so undefined as those of Prince Menshilcov, and by treaty 
confer upon another and more powerful sovereign a right 
of protection over a large portion of his own subjects."4 
Similar expressions of reproof came from Paris, Berlin, and 
Vienna, signifying that the concert of the four ambassadors 
in Constantinople had resulted in a superior coalition on the 
part of their respective governments. The Porte, meanwhile, 
went ahead with plans for a new decree guaranteeing freedom 
to all its Christian subjects and this firman, or hatti-sherif, 
was duly circulated among all the European chancelleries on 
the sixth of June. 
This declaration of intent notwithstanding, the Russian 
government countered with a note from Count Nesselrode to 
Reshid Pasha demanding compliance at once under pain of 
Russian occupation of the principalities. The Turks were 
given eight days to consider the consequences of their action. 
The Turks, of course, refused, but their reply was still 
couched in terms of courtesy and bespoke a readiness to do 
everything possible to maintain peace with honor. 
At this juncture there occurred the first in a long series of 
contradictory moves made by London. After having placed 
the disposition of the Mediterranean fleet in Lord Stratford's 
hands, the Cabinet unaccountably bypassed him and, at the 
instance of Paris, suddenly ordered the naval forces to proceed 
to the vicinity of the Dardanelles in company with a French 
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squadron.5 Not only was it needless sword rattling and an 
unnecessary challenge to the Czar, but, more importantly, 
it was the beginning of a series of independent military moves 
by France and England which derogated from the interna­
tional coalition then crystallizing. Additionally, the martial 
spirit implied by the move was consistently belied by the 
irenic utterances of Lord Aberdeen and his subordinate min­
isters. Just as in the case of the Seymour Correspondence, the 
Czar chose to believe only what he could interpret to his own 
liking. 
The Anglo-French naval movement was followed almost 
immediately by the long-threatened invasion of the principali­
ties, an operation that was completed early in July.6 It would 
be difficult to prove that there was a cause and effect relation­
ship involved here, for the two moves seem to have been 
made independently. Yet it is obvious that it would have 
been increasingly difficult to return to a peaceful atmosphere 
after these steps had been taken.7 And a moment's reflection 
will show how difficult this action made Canning's efforts to 
maintain the peace. 
The Elchi had already warned the Sultan that the invasion 
was most likely. He had appealed to the Turks to restrain 
themselves on the occasion of this warlike move and continue 
in their position of moral resistance. The Divan had gone 
along with him thus far; its members had reaffirmed the 
position and privileges of the Orthodox Church; they had 
reasserted the Sultan's desire for justice to all non-believers; 
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they had done all that human patience could have expected 
of them. They now had to suffer an invasion of their domains, 
an affront to their sovereignty and dignity. Just when the 
Turks were beginning to seethe under the lid of restraint 
imposed by the English Ambassador, the government in 
London chose to adopt the forward position of a naval move­
ment that implied gathering strength for the Sultan's cause. 
If the Czar could choose to attend only to the pacific utter­
ances of London, the Turkish extremists could, with equal 
logic, choose to observe nothing but the martial display of 
the same government. So, while Canning was pressuring 
Reshid for a continued attempt at rapprochement with the 
Russians, the English government sharpened the ardor of 
the reactionaries by weak compliance in the wishes of the 
French to move the fleets closer to the scene of action. The 
effect this move had on the Turkish war party is manifest, 
for, on the seventh of July, the Sultan precipitately removed 
Mustapha and Reshid from office. They were the ones, the 
Grand Vezir and the Reis Effendi, who were following 
Canning's instructions. It is unfortunate, from Canning's 
position as interpreted by some of his detractors, that there 
was not more public notice of this incident, for it would 
have undoubtedly revealed the pressures he was fighting at 
the Porte itself. Had there been a ministerial crisis or inter­
regnum at the time, it might have brought home the fact 
that the desires of the Turks had to be considered in the 
subsequent negotiations. But so great was the crisis as 
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Canning saw it that he leaped in immediately, and the 
deposed ministers were reinstated on the following day. It 
proves beyond shadow of doubt that Stratford Canning was 
working for peace so long as it could be maintained with 
honor, but he made so little of this ministerial fluctuation in 
his dispatches that it was passed over without notice at home 
and has been lost sight of in subsequent histories. It is most 
probable that had he remained aloof from this cabinet change 
the Turks might have begun hostilities forthwith along 
the Danube. 
Canning was hoping, however, that the Russian occupation 
would provoke an Austrian protest, for that was the one 
power above all others who could not look on complacently 
while Russian legions established themselves along the lower 
Danube and threatened further incursions into the Balkans. 
The Czar's actions did produce the Austrian reaction hoped 
for by Canning, and, at the time, Prussia was following the 
lead of Austria. The Austrian foreign minister, Count Buol-
Schauenstein, gave vent to strong expressions of Austrian 
displeasure, and significant reinforcements were sent to the 
frontier garrisons. Buol announced, moreover, that Austria 
was of one mind with England and France on the matter of 
the dispute, and, in a move to cement the relationship, he 
summoned the several ambassadors to a mutual consultation 
in Vienna. 
This was all desirable from the point of view of unanimity, 
but the net effect of the resulting Conference of Vienna was 
deleterious in that it removed the pivotal negotiations from 
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the more informed and skilled hands at Constantinople and 
deposited them in less capable hands at Vienna. By this time 
the powers were all sufficiently aroused to the dangers threat­
ening European peace to the extent that each cabinet began 
to scramble for a means to preserve peace and prevent Russian 
hegemony over the European portion of the Ottoman Empire. 
The various peace plans referred to at the outset of this 
chapter began to emanate from the several capitals, one after 
another, before any single plan could be digested and assimi­
lated; and although all the governments entered wholeheart­
edly into the Vienna proceedings, none of them had the 
patience to wait for that Conference to produce something 
substantial. There was indeed unanimity of purpose to be 
found through the summer of 1853 but absolutely no agree­
ment regarding the means to achieve the end in view. Above 
all, the busy searchers for peace seem to have become oblivious 
to the fact that the Porte was a party to the dispute and in 
effect so proceeded as to intimate that the Turk would have 
to be content with whatever scheme was agreed upon by the 
mediating powers. The Western ambassadors in Constanti­
nople were put in the position of having to inform the Porte 
of decisions made in Vienna or Paris or London involving 
sovereign prerogatives of the Turks. 
These were the general conditions which led to the failure 
of the Vienna Conference, and their application to the circum­
stances of the famous "Vienna Note" affords an example of 
the workings of the Conference which was typical of all its 
well-intentioned effort. 
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Canning had welcomed the union in Vienna, never sup­
posing that it was to supersede the close association of the 
ambassadors in Constantinople, but rather that it would rein­
force the work begun at the Porte. By the end of July he had 
drawn up what was to be a final Turkish offer to appease the 
sentiments of Czar Nicholas. The offer went as far as possible 
in its efforts to satisfy Russian claims but also noted that if 
Russia failed to agree and to withdraw her forces from the 
principalities, the Turks would have no alternative but to 
reassert their authority in the principalities and move to eject 
the Russians by force of arms. The "Turkish Ultimatum," as 
it was called, was a mild one, which looked for confirmation 
in Vienna.8 It arrived in Vienna at a time when the diplomats 
working there had just concluded a peace plan of their own 
which was to be known as the "Vienna Note.1' The note 
which the Elchi submitted had already been approved by 
the Porte and was to be transmitted to Russia by the Vienna 
Conference in the name of the Sultan and—it was hoped 
at the Porte—with the unanimous recommendation of the 
powers. Canning and his diplomatic colleagues had every 
reason to feel that it would be agreed to by St. Petersburg, 
especially if the respective allied cabinets would add their 
own words of warning in their separate recommendations that 
it be adopted. 
The men in Vienna, however, presumed to interpose them­
selves between the Porte and St. Petersburg, for they had 
contrived to draw up a solution which took into account only 
the grievances of Russia. The Vienna Note, which they 
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forwarded to the Czar in place of the Turkish Ultimatum, 
while it did not allow the treaty provisions specifically 
demanded by the Menshikov mission, did, nevertheless, grant 
the same ends. It did so by binding the Sultan anew to 
respect the stipulations of the former treaties of Kustchuk-
Kainardji and Adrianople, and the language in which this 
promise was stated was open to the interpretation that these 
agreements gave the Russians the same right to interfere that 
the Turks now refused to grant. Secondly, the language of 
the Vienna Note implied that whaever privileges the various 
Christian communities presently enjoyed in the Ottoman 
domains were a result of Russian intervention rather than a 
Turkish desire for justice. The intrinsic injustice of this 
implication seems to be borne out by the fact that the Vienna 
Note was accepted eagerly by the Court of St. Petersburg. 
Unfortunately, the Turks had not been consulted, and they 
found both of these points inadmissible. They did agree to 
the Note, however, with some amendments of language 
which served to remove the questionable interpretation noted. 
There were three such clarifications inserted, and they read 
as follows (the text of the Vienna Note is given first in each 
instance, followed by the Turkish alteration, which I have 
italicized):9 
i. If at all times the emperors of Russia have shown their 
active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and 
privileges of the Orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman 
Empire, the sultans have never ceased to confirm them 
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This language, in the view of the Porte, implied that the 
sultans acted only in response to Russian initiative, which, 
according to the Turks, was historically incorrect. They 
therefore proposed the following wording: 
If at all times the emperors of Russia have shown their ac­
tive solicitude for the worship of the Orthodox Greek 
Church, the sultans have never ceased to watch over the 
•maintenance of the immunities and privileges of that wor­
ship and of that Church in the Ottoman Umpire and to 
confirm them 
i. The undersigned . . declare . the government of 
the Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and the spirit 
of the stipulations of the treaties of Kustchuk-Kainardji 
and of Adrianople relative to the protection of Christian 
worship 
Here the phraseology left in doubt to whom these treaties 
give the right of protection, and the Divan desired an 
amendment: 
The undersigned . . declare the government of the 
Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and the spirit of the 
stipulations of the treaty of Kustchuk-Kainardji, confirmed 
by that of Adrianople, relative to the protection by the Porte 
of Christian worship 
The following quotation completes the declaration begun in 
Number 2. 
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3. and that His Majesty regards it as a point of 
honour with him . to allow the Greek worship to par­
ticipate in the advantages conceded to other Christians 
by convention or special agreement. 
In this passage there were two ambiguous elements calling 
for modification. For one thing, the Turks thought it some­
what hazy as to which "His Majesty1' the language referred. 
Secondly, the Porte could envision the Russians demanding 
for the Orthodox Greeks privileges accorded to chapels in 
diplomatic embassies, for example, privileges amounting to 
the extraterritorial sovereignty demanded by the Menshikov 
mission. They sent this wording back to Vienna: 
. . and that His Majesty, the Sultan, regards it is a point 
of honour . to allow the Greek worship . . the ad­
vantages accorded, and which may he accorded, to other 
Christian communities, Ottoman subjects. 
It is chiefly with regard to the controversy over these passages 
in the original text of the Vienna Note that Stratford Canning 
has been blamed for the downfall of peace negotiations. 
Nothing could be further from the truth, and the charge 
contradicts the record and sequences of exchanges, as well 
as the testimony given by the subsequent behavior of all 
parties to the proceedings. 
The Turkish Ultimatum, it will be remembered, was sent 
to Vienna before the text of the Vienna Note was known at 
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the Porte. It arrived in Vienna, by courier, the day after the 
Vienna Note had been sent to St. Petersburg and Constanti­
nople. The Vienna diplomats decided to suppress the Turkish 
Ultimatum because they had already ascertained Russian 
willingness to accept the Vienna Note. Moreover, Lord 
Westmoreland (the British ambassador in Vienna) had 
Lord Clarendon's approval of the Note. Unfortunately, 
Vienna had telegraphic communication with London whereas 
Canning did not (either with London or Vienna), but West­
moreland had the good sense and courtesy to send immedi­
ately to Canning a copy of Clarendon's approval of the Vienna 
text. This relay from Westmoreland reached Canning on the 
ninth of August. The record shows that on the fourth of 
August, after he had received the text of the Vienna Note 
but before he knew of the suppression of the Turkish Ulti­
matum and the substitution of the Note for it by the Vienna 
Conference, Canning sent a response to Lord Westmore­
land. His explanation is ample evidence that there was not 
the slightest chance for Turkish agreement to the Note even 
had they known it had the approval of London: 
There is an old proverb . about broth suffering from 
the zeal of too many cooks, and I hope we are not about to 
have a new proof of its truth. 
Reshid Pasha told [us] that the Porte will hear of 
nothing but the Ultimatum, which has probably been in 
your possession since Monday, and which goes on to St. 
Petersburg—if, as I trust, you send it on,—uniting all voices 
here and all chances in its favour with the advantage of 
springing out of Clarendon's instructions to me. 
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He then added a private opinion on the Vienna Note: 
The Convention [Vienna Note], even if it had arrived in 
time, would not have been accepted by the Sultan's min­
isters. I am free to say, between ourselves, that even to my 
humble judgment, it does not seem to be a safe form of ar­
rangement, if taken seriously, as Russia would necessarily 
understand it. Excuse all this and let me live in hope that 
the Porte's "Ultimatum" will be accepted with your assist-
On the twelfth of August Canning received the disap­
pointing, but official, instruction from Clarendon to urge 
acceptance of the Vienna Note upon the Porte. Simul­
taneously the news arrived in Constantinople that the Note 
had been approved by Czar Nicholas. Without hesitation the 
British Ambassador sought an audience with Reshid Pasha in 
the course of which he followed his instructions: 
I called the attention of Reshid Pasha to the strong and 
earnest manner in which the Vienna Note was recommended 
to the acceptance of the Porte, not only by her Majesty's 
Government, but also by the Cabinets of Austria, France, 
and Prussia. I reminded him of the intelligence which 
had been received from St. Petersburg, purporting that the 
Emperor of Russia had signified his readiness to accept the 
same Note. I urged the importance of his engaging the 
Porte to come to a decision with the least possible delay.
repeatedly urged the importance of an immediate decision, 
and the danger of declining, or only accepting with amend­
ments, what the four friendly powers so earnestly recom­
mended and what the Cabinet of St. Petersburg had accepted 
in its actual state.11 
 I 
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Reshid listened graciously to the Elchi but informed him 
that sentiment was already in favor of rejecting the Note. 
He promised, however, to relay the Elchi's words to the 
Council of Ministers at their meeting scheduled for the 
fourteenth of August. At this meeting of the Divan there 
was stormy discussion, with the Grand Vezir, Reshid Pasha, 
and one other minister arguing for acceptance of the Note 
with suitable modifications (those later entered by the Porte). 
Eight other members, including Rifat Pasha (the powerful 
President of the Council), Ali Pasha, the Sheik-ul-Islam, and 
the Ministers of Finance and the Navy, refused to counte­
nance the Note in any form, while five ministers abstained 
from voting. The meeting broke up without any decision.12 
On the following day Reshid Pasha informed Canning 
that there was no hope of obtaining a majority vote in the 
Council to accept the Note as it stood, and no certainty that 
it would be accepted even with due amendment. Even here 
the Elchi had not exhausted all means of following out the 
instructions of the London Cabinet. He suggested to Reshid 
that the Porte could accept the text of the Note as it stood, 
signifying, at the same time, the construction it put upon the 
questionable passages, and rely for its security on the support 
and guarantee of the four powers which supported the Note. 
This assurance, he promised on his own certainty, would be 
readily forthcoming. 
In spite of the Elchi's personal guarantee, nothing could 
sway the adamant majority of the Council. It would have 
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been better, Reshid told Canning, for England to have 
abandoned the Porte at the outset than to have carried her 
thus far only to desert at the last moment. The patience of 
Turkish patriotism and Islamic ardor had gone as far as it 
could go without an explosion.13 The best Reshid could do 
was to secure the permission of an expanded Great Council 
of the Empire, including, in addition to the Divan, all im­
portant persons of the ulema, the aristocracy, merchants, etc., 
to return the Note to Vienna with the modifications already 
noted above. This was done on the twentieth of August. 
The shock of the Turkish rejection had, at least, the effect 
of returning some semblance of reality to the Conference of 
Vienna. After the initial chagrin over the unlooked for 
'obstinacy of the Turks' had passed away, the assembled 
diplomats were able to take a second look at the Turkish 
modifications and appraise them in the light of the immediate 
past. When that was done they were seen to be not unreason­
able, and, on the twenty-eighth of August, they were dis­
patched to the Czar with the recommendation that they be 
accepted. If nothing more, they could be the basis for further 
negotiation. 
If the Conference of Vienna could be described as being 
shocked by the refusal of the Porte to accept the Note, then 
the Czar and his ministers can safely be pictured as shudder­
ing with rage. They categorically rejected the amended 
document and ranted at the Turks and all the warlike 
influences at work in the Seraglio (among which they un­
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doubtedly included Stratford Canning). In fact, they went 
too far in their recriminations, far enough to reveal that the 
Turkish objections were well founded. In an imposingly 
titled "Analysis of the Three Modifications Introduced by the 
Ottoman Porte into the Vienna Note," delivered to the 
Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg for transmission to 
Count Buol-Schauenstein, the Russian foreign ministry im­
plicitly admitted what Canning and the Turks feared about 
the Vienna Note. After rejecting the thesis that the Sublime 
Porte had, of its own volition, watched over the immunities 
and privileges of the Orthodox Church, Count Nesselrode, 
either unthinkingly or in desperation, unveiled the true 
Russian objective: ' It is precisely the reverse of what 
is thus stated," he says of the Turkish alteration, " which 
has compelled us to apply a remedy to it, by demanding a 
more express [my italics] guarantee for the future." In other 
words, the promise of the Sultan is insufficient for the future. 
He goes on to say, further, that "there is an appearance of 
throwing a doubt upon the right [my italics] we possess of 
watching over the strict fulfillment of that promise."14 
These baldly stated remonstrances prove that Russia would 
be satisfied with nothing less than the right by treaty of 
intervening in the internal affairs of the Porte whenever 
and wherever she judged such intervention to be warranted. 
The truth was out, at last, and Tyrell quotes the London 
Times (no date is given) in this wise: 
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It cannot be denied that in this matter of the Vienna Note 
there had been a singular amount of diplomatic blundering. 
Four trained diplomatists had drawn up a document to 
secure a certain object, which object such document left 
substantially unsecured; and, what is more, the oversight 
remained undetected by their respective governments, and 
even unappreciated after its detection by Turkey, until Rus­
sia herself came forward with a demonstration of the fact 
All that can be said is, that when the mistake became 
apparent they did their best to remedy it This course 
the governments of France and England adopted, and while 
still earnestly advocating a pacific settlement, they resolutely 
backed the Porte in its rejection of the Vienna Note.15 
When the news of the Russian refusal to accept the 
compromise note submitted by the Porte reached Constanti­
nople (September 25), it was apparent that only a miraculous 
reversal of events could prevent the outbreak of war between 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Still, Canning tried again. 
He again appealed to Reshid and the Divan to accept the 
original Note along with a guarantee from the four powers. 
But the specter of revolt from below had already made itself 
felt within the confines of the Seraglio, and the appeal was in 
vain. On the twenty-sixth the full Grand Council of the 
Empire, 172 members strong, examined the Koran and the 
facts and decided that there was no choice but to go to war. 
The determination of the date for the proclamation was left 
to the Caliph himself, but it was a decision he dared not 
ignore. As Charles Alison described it in a letter to Lady 
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Stratford, ' It was a hint which the Sultan dared not 
throw away, for they would very shortly have produced 
another text, such as, for instance, 'and when one of the 
rulers of the faithful shall incline his ears unto the counsels 
of the ungodly, slay him, lest he be thereby perverted, and 
save his soul to the Lord.'"18 Alison, the Orientalist, who 
had been through it all with the Elchi, knew whereof he 
spoke. 
1. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 276-77. 
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XXIV

THE ill-fated Conference of Vienna was a noble attempt to 
save the peace of Europe. Rather than a gathering of victors 
united to dictate the terms of peace, like its more famous 
predecessor, the Congress of Vienna, it was an attempt to 
prevent war and may be fairly said to have contained in 
embryo the peace-maintaining machinery of the United 
Nations: a collective effort to persuade diverse parties to 
compromise their differences. The Vienna Conference cannot 
be condemned because it ultimately proved incapable of its 
purpose; more than a century later and after more horrible 
conflicts, the several nations have not yet devised a method 
of preventing war between major powers. The European 
unanimity which found expression in Vienna through the 
summer and fall of 1853, a unanimity which Stratford 
Canning prayed for and worked for, did actually delay the 
outbreak of general war for more than half a year after the 
nations began to totter on the brink. Why, or how, did it 
finally fail? 
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Certainly, it did not founder because of any intrinsic 
imperfection of concept. As long as the idea of united action 
prevailed, it was successful. It was only when this unity 
suffered damage by peripheral actions that the central theme 
was lost sight of and was buried in confusion and contra­
diction. 
When, after Nesselrode revealed Russia's aims in his inter­
pretation of the Vienna Note, Czar Nicholas I realized that 
he faced the possibility of a united four-power coalition 
ranged against him, he did indeed waver and soften. He 
met the Austrian emperor at Olmutz and disavowed the 
interpretation that had been put upon his minister's com­
ments. He expressed a willingness to accept the substance 
of the Turkish amendments in the form of an international 
agreement that such was the understood meaning of the 
Note.1 
The Russian softening came too late, for jingoism had been 
born in England.2 Within days after the publication of 
Nesselrode's analysis, Aberdeen had lost the press and the 
public. He was even losing his Cabinet whose members had 
shortly before been ready to recall Viscount Stratford de 
Redcliffe on the mistaken notion that he had been responsible 
for Turkish rejection of the Vienna Note. Palmerston had 
not been part of this; he had long been for close action with 
France even if it meant war, which he did not think it did. 
Now Russell swung toward Palmerston, and Clarendon 
wavered and gave up hope for peace. There remained only 
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the Prime Minister himself, and Gladstone, still looking for 
peace. Aberdeen was now at a loss, and instead of attempting 
to lead he became a follower. 
The leadership was provided by France, and the Cabinet 
insisted that the Prime Minister follow. It has already been 
noted (page 306) that England and France, while supporting 
and participating in the inchoate alliance in Vienna, engaged 
nevertheless in a series of independent moves of a military 
nature. These moves were always instigated by the French 
government, and Austria and Prussia were never consulted 
nor were they invited to participate. The idea naturally grew 
in the minds of the Germanic ministers that the western 
maritime powers were quite prepared to be the military 
executors of the four-power association. Hence Austria and 
Prussia wondered if they were to be dispensed from the 
obligation of following their word with deeds. 
The question of French motives is not germane to this 
study. The fact is that the moves were made, often im­
pulsively and at critical moments. The motives might have 
been very high-minded and the maneuvers might have been 
salutary as far as warning the Czar was concerned, but any 
possible beneficial effect was weakened by the continued 
assurances of English statesmen that war was out of the 
question. In his innermost thoughts the Czar could not 
believe, until the very end, that Aberdeen would take England 
into war. It is also worth noting that when, in June of 1853, 
the French and English fleets were transferred to Besika Bay 
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at the mouth of the Dardanelles, the Czar was, in effect, 
publicly challenged. He could not suddenly exhibit fear by 
pulling his forces back from the principalities without suffer­
ing irreparable loss of prestige. More than that, he knew 
from the Seymour Correspondence that the English govern­
ment was unable to abandon the Sultan without reason. He 
might well have decided, therefore, that the fleet movement 
was a gesture and nothing more, and thus did not substantially 
alter the situation. 
On three successive occasions before the outbreak of hostili­
ties, the Paris government urged England to join with it in 
sending the fleets up the Dardanelles to the Bosporus.3 This 
would have been a direct violation of the Treaty of 1841 by 
which the five major European powers pledged themselves 
to respect the inviolability of the Straits except when the 
Sultan was at war. On the thirteenth of July, Napoleon's 
Minister of Foreign Affairs declared to the London Cabinet 
that if the Russian occupation of the Danubian principalities 
continued, the French fleet could not long remain at anchor 
in Besika Bay. Again on the nineteenth of August, when 
the Sultan rejected the Vienna Note, Paris advised London 
that it was absolutely necessary that the fleets proceed up the 
Straits. True, the Aberdeen Ministry did not succumb to 
these entreaties, but neither did it reject them as being incon­
sistent with the aims of the Vienna Conference. On the 
contrary, it allowed itself to be drawn into expressions of 
special unity with the Emperor of the French, so much so 
that the Queen in her speech at the close of the Parliamentary 
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session of 1853 in August, spoke of being "'united" with the 
Emperor of the French whereas there was a weaker expression 
of association with the procedures of the Vienna Conference. 
In this same month of August, when both governments 
were officially supporting the Vienna Note, Stratford Can­
ning's French colleague at the Porte, De la Cour, was also 
consulting with the Turks as to the best landing places for 
French troops should the need arise. On August 18, and 
again on the twenty-second, "he asked Reshid Pasha to give 
instructions to the Pasha of the Dardanelles to let the French 
fleet pass up, should Admiral Hamelin so desire, without 
reference to any corresponding movement on the part of 
Vice-Admiral Dundas [British naval commander]."4 
But Canning continued to fight for peace. However, his 
restraining influence, as we have seen, faced an increasingly 
complex mixture of patriotism and fanaticism in Constanti­
nople during the month of September, It is not surprising 
that as this ardor grew in intensity there were public demon­
strations demanding that the Sultan go to war. There is no 
question that the demands became insistent and inflammatory, 
nor that they eventually influenced the Grand Council to 
vote for war; but when theological students began pasting 
up placards calling for "holy war,'' the French Ambassador 
panicked and telegraphed his government that unless some­
thing was done the lives of all Christians in the capital would 
be in danger. This was on the twentieth of September, before 
the final Russian rejection of the amended Vienna Note was a 
certainty, and before the Council had decided on war. On 
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receipt of this information the French foreign minister for 
the third time implored London to move at once to protect 
the lives of its own subjects and the countless rayahs in 
the capital. 
Although Lord Clarendon had some misgivings, apparently, 
since he had heard nothing of the kind from Lord Stratford, 
nevertheless both he and the Prime Minister gave way before 
the onslaught of French insistence, and on the twenty-third 
he dispatched an order to Canning to summon the whole fleet 
to Constantinople. The Russian Ambassador in London, 
Baron Brunnow, informed the government at St. Petersburg 
at once and at the same time protested vigorously to the 
Foreign Office that the order was a clear violation of inter­
national agreement. 
This was the only instruction Canning disobeyed. He 
knew the facts, both with regard to the spirit of the Moslem 
populace and the legality of the situation. He had, indeed, 
anticipated the possibility of intermittent riot and a display 
of public emotions which might get out of hand by sending 
for three small steamers in accordance with recognized diplo­
matic privilege. By the time the orders reached him the 
popular disturbances had quieted down (the Council had 
already bowed to the inevitability of war), and he was able 
to write Clarendon on the fourth of October: 
I fear that nothing can now prevent the declaration of 
war. There is just the possibility of something coming 
through Vienna before the formal declaration is pub­
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lished. But the better chance is that after the declaration 
no actual hostilities will take place . . and that a strenuous 
interposition of the Four [powers], if that be possible, may 
produce a reconciliation while blood is still undrawn. 
We have nothing to apprehend from disturbances here, 
and I regret that the French have shewn so little disposition 
to send away their extra force when the danger has passed 
away. I make no comments on M. de la Cour's telegraphic 
despatch 
The French would seem to have some motive of their own 
for bringing up the squadrons. . . and are ever and anon 
endeavouring to carry out some by-object of their own under 
pretence of acting for the common cause.5 
His resignation to the declaration of war lay in the publi­
cation on the same day of a proclamation by Abdul Medjid 
which stated that the continued occupation of the principali­
ties was a casus helli and gave notice that the Turkish general 
in the area, Omar Pasha, was instructed to notify the Russian 
commander, Prince Gortchakoff, to this effect. Omar was to 
give the Russians fifteen days to initiate the withdrawal of 
their troops and upon conclusion of that period, or upon 
receipt of a negative reply, was to commence hostilities. 
The tremendous strain and labor that this situation involved 
for the aging diplomat—he was nearing his sixty-seventh birth­
day-is attested to in a note that he "scribbled" to his wife: 
We have narrowly escaped a sanguinary revolution, and 
we have escaped it only to go full tilt into war. The Sultan 
and the General Council have resolved upon war, and the 
Russians will soon be summoned to march out of the prov­
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inces, preparatory to hostilities if they don't, as they won't,
comply. 
This is an awful prospect I have done what I 
could to avert it, but circumstances swollen by mismanage­
ment have carried all before them . . . My feet are liter­
ally sore with standing at the upright desk for the last eight 
hours. I shall be asked to bring up the squadrons, and feel 
embarassed beforehand 6 
Despite the growing probability of a state of war between 
Russia and Turkey, he was still hopeful of containing the 
war, and he was unwilling to do anything that might widen 
its sphere. That is why he did not obey Clarendon's order 
to bring up the fleet: he was certain the Czar would not 
willingly engage in a general war and was unwilling to force 
it upon him. If England and France moved too hastily, there 
could be no turning back. On the other hand, as long as 
they observed the strict letter of international agreement, 
there was yet chance for peaceful "interposition."' Once the 
state of war actually existed, the Sultan could legally invite 
the fleets to enter, and Canning's original instructions were 
to summon the fleet only to "protect" the person of the Sultan 
if the need should arise. "I wished to save her Majesty's 
Government,' he amplified his explanations to Clarendon on 
the sixth of October, "from any embarrassments likely to 
accrue from a premature passage of the Dardanelles."7 
Again the Elchi's estimation proved to be the correct one 
in that he divined exactly what was going on in the minds 
of the Russians. When the time limit of the Turkish ulti­
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matum expired, the Sultan declared that a state of war existed 
between him and the Czar of Russia. Russia, protesting that 
war was declared by the Sultan and not by its government, 
circularized the European governments to declare that 
we shall content ourselves with maintaining our posi­
tion there in the Principalities, remaining on the defensive 
so long as we are not forced to abandon limits within which 
we desire to confine our action. We will await the attack 
of the Turks without taking the initiative of hostilities. It 
will then entirely depend on other powers not to widen the 
limits of the war, if the Turks persist in waging it against 
us, and not to give to it any other character than that which 
we mean to leave to it. After the declaration of war, it is 
not to Russia that it belongs to seek for new expedients, nor 
to take the initiative in overtures of conciliation. But if, 
when better enlightened as to its interests, the Porte shall 
manifest a disposition to propose or receive similar overtures, 
it is not the emperor who will place any obstacles to their 
being taken into consideration. . They [our intentions] 
furnish an additional proof of the desire of our august master 
to limit as much as possible the circle of hostilities, if they 
should unhappily take place, and to spare the consequences 
of them to the rest of Europe.8 
These protestations of restraint and injured innocence were 
by no means haphazardly chosen. The Czar had lately con­
cluded a week-long meeting with the young Francis Joseph 
of Austria at Olmutz; and despite the deep personal affection 
between the two men, Austria's increasing objection to the 
amassing of Russian armies on or near her frontiers was made 
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unmistakably clear. Austria pointedly warned that she would 
consider the outbreak of war in the Danube a menace to her 
own peace and tranquillity. The Czar was faced not only 
with ominous naval mobilization on the part of France and 
England but with land mobilization by Austria as well. 
Indeed, the time was ripe for the "strenuous interposition'' of 
the four powers to which Canning had alluded on October 4. 
Diplomacy had not yet surrendered to the god of war, and 
Stratford Canning was busy framing a new note which would, 
first of all, call for an armistice, then a meeting of plenipoten­
tiaries at a neutral place, then negotiations on the basis of a 
collective European guarantee of the privileges of the Eastern 
Church as outlined in the Sultan's latest firmans. At the 
same time he was under increasing pressure to bring up the 
fleet—a move he resisted until the very end (i.e., until the 
fifteen days of the Turkish ultimatum expired). Actually, 
the state of war existed before this, for Prince Gortchakoff 
had curtly refused to withdraw and that refusal, of itself, was 
sufficient to legalize the state of war. 
Even at this late date Canning extracted a promise from 
Reshid for a ten-day delay in the opening of hostilities. It 
was, as he described it, a "forlorn hope" but one he felt in 
duty bound to attempt. The Porte agreed to his note, 
Clarendon agreed to it, but the French pressure for entrance 
into the Dardanelles and their threat to enter alone (and thus 
undermine the concerted action he deemed necessary) forced 
his hand, and he agreed to the summons on the twentieth of 
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October. But he resolutely refused to sanction a passage into 
the Black Sea as being entirely uncalled for. The presence 
of the English fleet at the Golden Horn was sufficient 
guarantee of the Sultan's safety. 
Stung by this action the Czar naturally ordered the 
Sebastopol fleet to put to sea to interdict Turkish commerce. 
Now the instructions to the British admirals and to the 
Ambassador were to the effect that if this occurred then the 
fleets were, in fact, to enter the Black Sea. Again this explains 
Canning's reluctance to summon them at all, for he knew 
the Czar would be constrained to take countermeasures. Yet 
there was nothing to be done but follow the orders from 
home. Curiously enough, it was now France's turn to hold 
back: their ships were not seaworthy enough to face the 
winter storms that buffeted that landlocked body of water. So 
the fleets rested at anchor while the Russian ships ranged 
over the eastern and southern shores. 
Stratford Canning implored the Turks not to send their 
fleet out to a hopeless contest just yet, and they listened to 
him.9 They kept their heavy ships in the anchorages about 
the capital but unfortunately allowed some of their lighter 
vessels to cruise along the Asiatic shores. On November 30, 
a trim Russian squadron appeared off the coast of the minor 
naval base at Sinope and completely destroyed a Turkish 
squadron at anchor there. Those Turkish ships that did not 
sink burned until they were charred wrecks, and at least two 
thousand Turkish seamen perished. 
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When the news reached Constantinople, the Turks were 
in a fury, at the Russians, of course, but also at their pur­
ported protectors whose ships remained serenely at anchor. 
They would have no more of diplomacy, and once again 
there was near revolt. The latest peace plans were lost in the 
excitement. 
The news hit London like a thunderbolt about the tenth 
of December. Lord Palmerston resigned from the Cabinet, 
ostensibly in protest over the weak policies of Aberdeen, 
Clarendon, and Gladstone.10 For ten days he remained out­
side the government and re-entered only after waging a 
vigorous campaign at public meetings to meet fire with fire. 
A warlike rage swept through London and the other cities. 
The Ministry wavered, then gave in. Palmerston returned to 
the Home Office which he had held, but on his own terms: 
that the Cabinet place England in resolute, united action 
with France to curb the crimes of the Czar. 
The disaster at Sinope had indeed delivered a mortal 
wound to peace, but the diplomats tried anew to ply their 
trade. On the fifth of December, through a protocol sug­
gested by Stratford Canning and approved by Clarendon and 
the Conference of Vienna, the four powers declared that the 
existence of Turkey in the limits assigned to it by existing 
treaties was necessary for the maintenance of European peace. 
Again, however, the French interfered. The French govern­
ment, on receipt of the news of Sinope, reversed the deci­
sions of its admirals in the Levant and proposed to London 
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that the combined fleets enter the Black Sea. France also 
proposed that the two governments inform the Russian 
government that all Russian ships would be forcibly limited 
to the waters adjacent to Sebastopol and, furthermore, that 
any attempt or act of aggression against Ottoman territory 
or against the Turkish flag would be repelled by force. It 
was tantamount to a defensive alliance with the Turks and 
could mean nothing but war at this stage. Aberdeen saw it 
as a chance for peace, and agreement to it was Palmerston's 
price for returning to the government. Agreement was given, 
and the appropriate orders and notes were sent forth from 
London. 
This was while the protocol of the fifth of December, 
strengthened by the incorporation of a request for a ten-day 
cessation of hostilities—Canning's "forlorn hope'' of mid-
November—was being studied at St. Petersburg. There was 
every reason to feel that the Czar would assent. The rising 
pressure of concerted opposition was unnerving him, or, at 
least, his generals. Russian honor, moreover, had been vindi­
cated by the victory at Sinope and minor success in Asia. The 
time was once more propitious.11 
On January 4, 1854, the Anglo-French fleet moved into 
the Black Sea, and on the twelfth the Czar was ordered by 
France and England to keep his warships in their anchorage 
or risk their destruction. He sent orders to his ambassadors 
at London and Paris to close their embassies and come home. 
By the twenty-first of February diplomatic relations between 
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France and England, on the one hand, and Russia, on the 
other, were completely broken. 
1. I do not think too much should be made of Nicholas' pacific 
protestations at Olmutz. He had little choice, as Austrian "ingratitude" 
(see above, chap. XVIII, n. 15) was already evident. Austria was demand­
ing evacuation of the principalities. 
2. See Leon Dennen, Trouble Zone (New York: Ziff-Davis., 1945), 
p. 15: "In the 1850's the word 'jingoism' was born in the London music 
halls, and good Englishmen sang: 'We don't want to fight, but, by jingo, 
if we do,/We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the 
money too.' " 
3. For a discussion of the various fleet movements see Temperley, 
op cit., pp. 350 ff. 
4. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 306. 
5. Ibid., pp. 302-3. 
6. Ibid., p. 302. 
7. Ibid., p. 308. 
8. Tyrrell, op. cit., I, 44-45. 
9. The Turks had proposed to send their line-of-battle ships on a 
sweep around the full perimeter of the Black Sea (see Temperley, 
op. cit., p. 369). 
10. Palmerston actually resigned over a domestic dispute but was 
content to let the press interpret it as a foreign policy dispute. 
n  . The Turkish leaders were favorably inclined, but the rush of events 
swallowed that chance for peace. 
XXV

FROM this point on it is almost impossible to write a separate 
diplomatic history of the events that finally culminated in 
the Crimean War. In the first place, the remaining diplo­
matic activity is overshadowed by transactions of a military 
nature. Secondly, there was little initiative left to diplomacy, 
and whatever took place was little more than the backwash of 
efforts previously set in motion and still floating about, aim­
lessly subject to the incoming tide of war. 
As for Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, he was too much 
of a realist to suppose that he could do anything more to 
stem this onrushing tide. He could hope only that it might 
be effectively channeled and blocked by the barrier of the 
still-enduring quadripartite association functioning in Vienna. 
With the rupture of relations between the western European 
powers and Russia, all further overtures in the direction of 
St. Petersburg were, perforce, abandoned to the agency of 
the central European powers, and this meant, for all practical 
purposes, to the initiative of Austria. 
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If in retrospect one tends to dismiss the prospects for thus 
containing the impending disaster, one does so at the cost of 
ignoring the realities of the then current conditions. For the 
Austrian government still expected to be called upon to fill the 
role her own interests logically destined for her. On February 
22, 1854, her foreign minister declared to the French ambas­
sador: "If England and France will fix a day for the evacua­
tion of the Principalities, the expiration of which shall be 
the signal for hostilities, the Cabinet of Vienna will support 
the summons."1 These words were quickly relayed to London 
and Paris where their meaning must have been amply clear. 
Austria had mobilized, and increased her military appropria­
tions; Prussia had done likewise. And each had informed the 
Czar of its complete support of the Anglo-French position in 
the crisis. 
Napoleon III had already sent a personal letter to the Czar 
(January 29) , in which he presumed to speak for the Queen 
of England as well as for himself, asking a Russian evacuation 
of the principalities in return for Anglo-French evacuation 
of the Black Sea.2 Since the answer to that letter was negative, 
although not conclusively so, the French seized upon the 
Austrian suggestion at once, and the French Foreign Minister, 
Drouyn de Lhuys, pressed London for an immediate response. 
T h e two governments should, he argued, contact Nesselrode 
without delay and press for an immediate withdrawal, to be 
concluded at a given time, "say the end of March."3 Now 
here, above all, was the opportunity of sending a joint draft 
to Vienna for concurrence, and for subsequent dispatch from 
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there to St. Petersburg. That, surely, was the intention of the 
Austrian invitation. Unaccountably, no such obvious step 
was taken. Instead, each government drafted separate, though 
nearly identical, notes and sent them to the Czar not through 
the medium of the Vienna Conference but through their 
chief consular agents remaining in the Russian Empire. The 
notes demanded an affirmative answer, within six days of 
their receipt, that such withdrawal would be concluded by 
the thirtieth of April. Failure to reply, or refusal to comply, 
would be considered a cause for war. 
The Czar could scarcely have been expected to bow to such 
ultimata; and on March 19, Count Nesselrode informed the 
same consuls that Nicholas I refused to answer such a degrad­
ing summons. On the twenty-fourth, Russian troops crossed 
the Danube and pushed south into Ottoman territory. 
On March 27, the sovereigns of England and France 
announced in separate addresses from the throne that they 
were now in a state of war with the Czar of Russia for the 
defense of Turkey and justice. On the tenth of April, France 
and England concluded a treaty of alliance by which they 
bound themselves to use all the land and sea forces necessary 
to re-establish peace and set free the dominions of the Sultan. 
They pledged themselves to refrain from a separate peace 
and to withdraw from Turkey as soon as that peace and the 
independence of the Ottoman Empire were secured. Turkey, 
of course, became a party to that same treaty, but Austria was 
not specifically asked or invited to do so. Indeed, through 
May and June she still stood ready; and notwithstanding the 
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separate military moves of France and England, she main­
tained her mobilized forces on the frontier and repeatedly 
demanded Russian withdrawal.4 Those demands, coupled 
with the gathering of French and English armies in the East, 
finally swayed the Czar, and in the summer the Russian 
armies did retreat. 
W h e n the withdrawal came, it should have been another 
opportunity for peace, but by that time jingoism was in 
sway. Tha t is a story that anticipates somewhat the military 
history of the war and will be treated below. It is mentioned 
here to conclude the dismal account of how the English 
government drifted into war, and the lengths to which Austria 
went to implement the four-power concept of Stratford 
Canning. 
T h e portents in the sky had been sufficient to warn 
Canning that he must look ahead to the war that was coming 
and the demands that would be made upon him. In mid-
January he had written to his wife: 
The importance of the work in hand goes on increasing. 
It is like the cloud on the horizon, no bigger than a man's 
hand at first, but destined to cover the whole vault of heaven 
If we have war, as I expect, it will be a war of giants 
and we must make the sacrifices necessary for success, 
and obtain results equal to the sacrifices. . . it was exactly 
because I foresaw the depth and extent of the contest that 
I was against having out the squadrons in the first instance, 
that I was for peace if attainable with safety and honour to 
the Porte, and endeavouring to obtain peace by confronting 
the danger at once and imposing on Russia the necessity 
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of either giving way to European principles, clearly and 
stoutly asserted, or of throwing off the mask and picking up 
the gauntlet without further prevarication. 
What might and ought to have been done more than six 
months ago is now at last in operation, but under circum­
stances which make arrangement far more difficult, and a 
war, more or less general, far more probable. 
Yet, in spite of his resignation to the inevitability of war, he 
obviously thought, as the last sentence quoted implies, that 
the diplomatic coalescence achieved at Vienna would be 
carried over to the military operations. In this respect he saw 
the possibility of much good coming out of the evil, for it 
presaged a wide and final settlement of the Eastern question: 
I always thought that the great struggle of the East would 
not be in my time, and that I was destined only to fall in 
the ditch that others more fortunate in later times might 
pass over with less difficulty. It seems to be otherwise or­
dained, and with Heaven's grace I accept my lot, and will 
apply what little remains of me to reach the promised land.5 
This cautiously expressed optimism respecting the final good 
to be achieved was perhaps the only mistaken estimate he 
formed during the whole of the crisis, but even Stratford 
Canning was human and had to have hope that there was 
still some good to be attained. If humanity had not yet found 
the way to peace through reason and good will then, at least, 
there were ends worth fighting for, and he now made it his 
resolve that those ends be realized. 
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That it was his place to begin to hold up these ends for all 
to see is, perhaps, an indication that in his heart he had 
already begun to fear that all was not well in this respect. On 
all sides there were signs that less noble, less ideal goals were 
coming to the forefront, that farseeing people and groups 
were already jockeying for positions whereby they could reap 
the benefits of the suffering bound to ensue. The war party 
was naturally in the ascendant in the Seraglio, and it was a 
party to whom patriotism was equated with extreme nation­
alism and reaction. The Turkish mobilization had already 
brought a host of primitive recruits and tribal irregulars into 
the otherwise respectable ranks of the Sultan's army. Extrem­
ists in the ulema had long been crying for a jihad, or holy 
war, and these inflamed irregulars had already begun to hurt 
the Sultan's cause by their violence toward the innocent 
rajahs among the Sultan's subjects. These crimes naturally 
met with forceful resistance on the part of Greeks living in 
Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly, and Epirus, and the budding 
spirit of revolt was aided and abetted openly by the Greek 
government at Athens. The confusion was compounded when 
still more of the irregulars (Bashi-Bazouks) were hurriedly 
moved out against the revolutionaries, and any Greek, peace­
ful or otherwise, became fair game for their cruelty ("If they 
were paid by Russia they could not serve her cause better,"6 
the Elchi wrote at the time). 
While the English government was even then "muddling 
through" (the Cabinet asked for increased military appropria­
tions only at the beginning of the new session of Parliament 
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in January), the French were hard at work preparing for the 
future, both politically and militarily. As early as November 
of the preceding year, they had replaced their ambassador at 
the Porte, De la Cour, who, though an experienced diplomat 
and loyal servant of his Emperor, was not warlike enough to 
suit the realities of the situation. In his place Napoleon had 
sent a general, Barraguay d'Hilliers, who came for no other 
purpose than to prepare the way for the French army, which 
was to follow. His main concerns, and they were honest and 
intelligent in view of the facts, were to secure adequate camp 
sites; demarcate landing areas, supply depots, and the like; 
and stockpile fodder and materiel. But even a soldier-diplomat 
must be a full diplomat at times and this D'Hilliers was not. 
He was demanding and offensive in his mode of requisitioning 
and in his interference with internal matters of the Turkish 
government. On one occasion, he even threatened to break 
off relations with the Porte when his demands were not 
satisfied. For a time Canning was as much engaged in keep­
ing peace between the Porte and the French ambassador as 
formerly he had been in striving for peace between Turkey 
and Russia. Underneath the French brusqueness he saw 
hidden an intense jealousy of the position he and, through 
him, England had already secured in the councils of the 
Seraglio. 
Nevertheless, France was preparing and England was not, 
neither so far as a definite policy for the future was concerned 
nor for the immediate needs of a gathering army. Whereas 
France sent out a general and a staff of militarily skilled 
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men, the English government, without even the formality of 
definite instructions, left to their Ambassador, who had never 
been in an army uniform, all the details necessary to provide 
for an army that was beginning its long march from home. 
"I completed my treaty for the reception of the Allied armies 
last night,' he wrote to Lady Stratford on March 13, 1854, 
" twelve hours passed at Reshid Pasha's! I went out 
at 8 [in the evening] and returned after 9 this morning—no 
bed, no dressing, and I have scribbled ever since."7 
Stanley Lane-Poole describes the burdens of the sixty-seven­
year-old statesman in a passage that is worth quoting at 
length: 
When it was known at Constantinople that England and 
France had declared war against the Czar and were pre­
paring an expedition for the succour of the Sultan, Lord 
Stratford discovered that he had suddenly changed his pro­
fession. For many months he was no longer to be the diplo­
matist, the statesman, the guide of the faltering Turks, and 
the no less hesitating English ministers. He was now ap­
parently Commissary-General, head of the Intelligence De­
partment, Quarter-Master-General, Director of Transports, 
and provider-in-chief of everything that the British war 
departments had forgotten to supply for the use of the ex­
pedition. He was even credited with the function of Surgeon-
General to the Forces. Such at least is the impression 
produced by a study of the various demands made upon him 
by officials of every rank and description. At one time it 
is the Duke of Newcastle, who wants Lord Stratford to 
find boots to go over the trousers of 30,000 British soldiers, 
and who apparently expects that the bazaars of Stambol will 
furnish an admirable supply of Wellingtons. Then it is 
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Lord Raglan, who depends upon him, not only for reinforce­
ments of Turkish infantry and artillery, but for planks for 
the hutting of the troops, and warm winter clothing for their 
comfort. Or again it is the London newspapers, who angrily 
ask why the ambassador has not had the forethought to store 
up a sufficient quantity of lint and physic and bedclothes for 
the sick and wounded at Scutari. 
As one reads these multifarious demands, one wonders 
whether an ambassador is supposed to be a man or a god, 
that he should do all these things. One who has served his 
country in the strict career of diplomacy, who 
has guided nations with his pen, but has not once controlled 
a busy executive department,—is suddenly called upon to 
supply every deficiency that a notoriously defective public 
service has overlooked. The British army goes forth to the 
Crimea, practically in the clothes it stands up in, and when 
the men are shivering for want of blankets and huts, and 
the wounded are lying on bare floors for want of beds, and 
the investing lines before Sevastopol are exposed on their 
flank for want of reinforcements, a universal cry arises 
and Lord Stratford is to find the clothes and boots and 
blankets and huts and beds and reinforcements without a 
moment's delay. And if it chance that the markets of Stam­
bol and Brusa and Adrianople and Salonica do not possess 
the articles required there goes forth a general groan 
of indignation against the callous Elchi who has the mis­
fortune to own but one brain and two hands with which to 
do the work of fifty experienced army officers . It 
was not till the middle of 1855, when the war was almost 
over, that Lord Stratford obtained the valuable assistance 
of General Mansfield as military adviser; and till then the 
same staff which hardly sufficed to carry on the ordinary 
work of the Embassy in time of peace . was expected to 
add to their labours the work of saving the British 
army from the consequences of the blunders of an unpre­
pared War Office and Horse Guards! 8 
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The foregoing is not a flight of literary fancy; it is but a 
brief summary of the miserable and deplorable conditions 
under which England went to war. It naturally brings up 
the question of how this came about. The answer is not only 
a fact of history—for the past is finished and unalterable—it 
also points to the duty of a peace-loving government to keep 
a military apparatus in being and to provide it with skilled, 
competent, and trained leadership. The tragedy of the 
Crimea, no less than the failure of diplomacy, is the tragedy 
brought about by the delusion that peace and goodness are 
served by a mere desire for them. 
1. Kinglake, op. cit., I, 292. 
2. Tyrrell, op. cit., I, 56-57. 
3. Kinglake, op. cit., I, 293. 
4. Austrian intentions were sufficiently clear to Russia to force the 
Czar eventually to evacuate the principalities. And the subsequent engage­
ment entered into by Austria with the Porte explicitly states: "His 
Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, engages to exhaust all the means of 
negotiation and all other means to obtain the evacuation of the Princi­
palities by the foreign army which occupies them, and even to employ, 
in case they are required, the number of troops necessary to obtain this 
end" (Article I, Austrian-Ottoman Convention, June 14, 1854, m Kinglake, 
op. cit., I, Appendix III). Some Russian historians credit Russia's military 
defeat in the Crimea to the necessity of keeping her main armies on 
guard against Austrian attack (cf. Vernadsky, op. cit., p. 155). 
5. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 341-42­
6. Ibid., p. 345­
7. Ibid., p. 343­
8. Ibid., pp. 350 ff. 
XXVI

THE first elements of a completely inefficient English army 
had begun to filter through Gibraltar even before the declara­
tion of war, and they began to reach the environs of the 
Turkish capital about the first of April. However, as noted 
above, there had been precious little arrangements made for 
receiving them. Above the regimental level there was no 
organization or over-all command until the first general officers 
started to arrive upon the scene. These men, unfortunately, 
had last witnessed large-scale operations in the closing days 
of the Napoleonic Wars, forty years earlier, and none had 
ever seen active service above the lowest commissioned grades. 
Some had been under fire in various Indian campaigns, but 
those experiences hardly fitted them to lead untrained troops 
in a major European war. Though they tried to whip the 
growing mass of men into brigade and divisional order, they 
had to occupy themselves chiefly with procuring basic supplies 
of food and shelter—and the small transport which were 
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needed to move any such supplies they might lay their 
hands on. 
By the time Lord Raglan, the designated British com­
mander-in-chief, and his French counterpart, Marshal St. 
Arnaud, reached the area at the beginning of May, confusion 
was widespread and sickness had already begun to take its 
toll of the gathering forces. A plan of action had been agreed 
upon, meanwhile, and it called for removal of "combat-ready"' 
troops to the Danubian theatre where it was hoped they 
would deliver a quick and stunning defeat to the Russian 
armies. Units already riddled by camp illnesses were crowded 
aboard transports and warships, where the fevers rapidly 
spread under ideal conditions for contagion. With even less 
planning they were disgorged at Varna, in Bulgaria, where 
the summer heat was turning the whole Danube estuary into 
a steaming marshland. There they were marched inland to 
higher ground in the hope that the fevers would abate in a 
better climate, but the marching under full knapsacks in the 
heat weakened the disease-struck ranks even more, and the 
military cemeteries grew almost as rapidly as encampments 
for the living.1 The ill-used troops were not even to have the 
opportunity for the glory of quick victory, for on June 
24, Czar Nicholas, bowing to Austrian demands, announced 
that he would withdraw his troops from the Danubian 
principalities. 
The major threat to Turkey was thus removed, and it 
should have been the ideal time to reopen negotiations. But 
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the war hysteria had reached a fever pitch in London and 
in Paris. The lust for martial glory demanded far more than 
such a disappointing climax to the gathering of the legions. 
Even if the most foolhardy seeker after glory recognized the 
impossibility of a full-scale invasion of European Russia, 
there was still an inviting target nearby. All eyes turned 
toward the Russian naval base at Sebastopol in the Crimea. 
That was the arrow continually pointed at the heart of the 
Ottoman Empire. The decision was made in London that 
the Czar's Black Sea stronghold had to be destroyed. 
Accordingly, the weakened soldiers in Bulgaria were 
marched back to the coast during the latter half of July and 
the first part of August and packed anew aboard ship. More 
thousands of newly arrived contingents were sailed up from 
Gallipoli, and a vast armada grew and waited about the 
mouth of the Danube until final orders and arrangements 
were made. Illness was rampant in the over-crowded vessels, 
and the only bright spot was the adamant refusal of the 
British naval commander to allow his warships to be used 
for transport. It was not only the fear of plague that deterred 
him, for he also saw the inviting target presented to the 
Russian Black Sea fleet which, if it had moved, might have 
made a terrible shambles of the unmanageable mass of ships. 
In spite of all obstacles, the unwieldy fleet of some five 
hundred vessels of all types—sail, steam, barges under tow, 
and what have you—was shepherded in a great arc across the 
Black Sea to the Crimea. The landings commenced on the 
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fourteenth of September. Even here there was confusion, as 
the original landing orders had called for disembarkation at 
a point not far north of Sebastopol. En route, however, Lord 
Raglan had overruled the reconnaissance surveys made of 
the Crimean coast and, for fear of Russian opposition to the 
landing, had selected a new point some thirty miles to the 
north near the town of Eupatoria. It is true that there was 
a better beach at that point, but the allied armies had then to 
face the barrier of three rivers flowing from east to west. 
Notwithstanding this tactically dangerous change of orders, 
the landings were accomplished in good order and with an 
efficiency remarkable under the circumstances. About twenty-
five thousand English, an equal number of French, and some 
eight thousand Turkish troops were put ashore in three days, 
together with horse and artillery. A Russian field army under 
the command of the quondam diplomatist, Prince Menshikov, 
issued forth from Sebastopol to meet them, and the first major 
battle of the war was fought at the River Alma on the 
twentieth of September. A bloody day-long battle ended in 
a sound defeat for the Russians, even though they had the 
advantage of defensive positions along the higher southerly 
bank of the Alma. In the latter part of the day Menshikov 
broke off from the fight and withdrew his forces. 
At this point another tragic element was added. Intelligence 
reports indicated that Prince Menshikov, instead of falling 
back toward the defenses of Sebastopol, had pulled away to 
the northeast, toward the center of the Peninsula. Sebastopol 
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was not guarded by permanent fortifications on trie north side 
and lay open to an assault. Menshikov's retreat testified to 
his belief that he could not hold the base in the face of a 
determined attack, but unaccountably the allies rested on 
their arms while the leaders pondered the next move. St. 
Arnaud was dying and Raglan hesitated to assume an over-all 
command. When he did finally make a decision, it was 
illogical in the extreme. Instead of following up the initial 
victory, he moved the army in a wide sweep around the city 
and decided to invest the bastion from the southern side. 
Even then Menshikov did not move, convinced that an assault 
from this quarter could not be effectively resisted. The west­
ern allies did not attack, however, but began to construct 
siege lines paralleling the southern defences of the city. The 
siege was to last for almost a whole year and was to involve 
the useless slaughter of thousands upon thousands of men on 
both sides. 
When the Russians, to their own amazement, perceived 
the intentions of their foe, they began to make feints from 
the interior and to send reinforcements back into the city. 
One of these feints was made in some force and resulted 
in the small battle of Balaclava, dubiously glorified by the 
inane charge of the Light Brigade. It was followed on the 
fifth of November by the murderous, fog-covered Battle of 
Inkerman, and that was the last open field battle of the war. 
Both armies retired to their lines and siege warfare began. 
The allies were exposed on the rocky heights while the 
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Russians were protected by more permanent fortifications in 
Sebastopol. 
On November 14, a tremendous hurricane lashed the 
southern Crimea and almost entirely destroyed the pitiful 
accumulation of supplies available to the besiegers, as well 
as sinking most of the supply ships anchored in the harbor 
of Balaclava or en route to that port. Clad in the summer 
uniforms in which they went to Bulgaria, without huts or 
tents, without even a supply of natural firewood in the area, 
the allied soldiers were left to face their greatest enemies, 
winter and disease. 
In Constantinople, meanwhile, the aging Ambassador was 
righting his own battles. The Embassy was the acting com­
missariat for the army. The Ambassador himself had to func­
tion as military and political liaison officer with the Turks. 
He had to battle growing French intrigue which was con­
triving to replace British influence at the Porte with French 
predominance. Furthermore, he had to plead with his own 
government and with the French to forcibly restrain Athens 
from sabotaging whatever war effort the Porte might effec­
tively make, for revolts by Orthodox nationalities had broken 
out all over the Balkans, instigated by the Russians and openly 
abetted by the government of King Otho in Athens. 
When the wretched survivors of plague and fever bid fair 
to overwhelm the inadequate army medical facilities around 
Constantinople, everyone looked to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe 
for a miraculous solution. He had already secured the Turkish 
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barracks at Scutari for a base hospital, as well as many other 
buildings, but when the battlefield wounded were added to 
the typhus, dysentery, and cholera victims, the situation 
become chaotic. When the magnitude of the mismanage­
ment finally dawned upon the English public, it was Lord 
Stratford de Redcliffe who bore the brunt of blame for what 
the army and home government had failed to provide for 
their men. 
Newspapers railed at the British Embassy with total disre­
gard for facts and circumstances. Miss Florence Nightingale, 
too, with equal disregard for reality, added her recriminations 
to the unjust attacks, even though she and her ladies had 
been the beneficiaries of much of his personal efforts. For all 
her good intentions, and in spite of all her great work, the 
heroine of the nursing services was an imperious woman who 
brooked no competition. When other groups of women, 
independent of her jurisdiction, arrived to lend their help, 
she would tolerate none of their "interference"' and was quite 
prepared to see them sent away from Constantinople despite 
the crying need for their services. It was the Elchi who 
stepped in and quietly secured buildings from the Turks 
where other less publicized hospitals were organized and 
where other groups labored just as heroically to alleviate 
the suffering of the soldiers.2 
The grossest of these charges were subsequently laid to 
rest and their injustice revealed later on, but at the time they 
threw a tremendous cloud over Canning's world. The London 
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politicians were content to let him be the scapegoat for all 
that had gone wrong, and his future relations with his home 
government were never restored to their rightful position. 
The Porte, too, took advantage of his apparent downfall and 
resisted his continuing efforts to implement the Tanzimat 
and the goals of Gulhane. The opportunity for effecting 
reform was golden, but under the circumstances it could not 
be grasped. 
The most herculean efforts were made by all concerned to 
bring order out of chaos, but they were too late, and a whole 
British army disintegrated during the winter of 1854-55. The 
charge was made in Parliament in January that of the fifty-
four thousand British troops that went out in 54, a bare 
fourteen thousand remained in the trenches before Sebastopol. 
The Cabinet could not gainsay the evidence, and the Aber­
deen ministry resigned in February. After several attempts to 
find leadership more suitable to herself, the Queen was forced, 
finally, to send for Palmerston, and he became the new 
Prime Minister on February 8, 1855. 
The advent of Palmerston was the symbol of a new order 
of things, but it was months before the necessary corrections 
could be made. Meanwhile the war continued on its tragic 
course. Nicholas I died in March, Lord Raglan succumbed 
to dysentery in June. Even civilians like the administrator of 
the Times Fund, Mr. Stowe, fell victim to disease. 
It was midsummer of 1855 before Britain had finished with 
muddling through and had finally forged a respectable army 
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and supplied it with effective weapons for siege warfare. The 
weight of new levies and new weapons finally carried the 
field, and Sebastopol fell on the night of September 8-9 after 
a terrible price had been paid. 
The fall of Sebastopol should have been, in Canning's 
opinion—and most of the Cabinet agreed with him—merely 
a prelude to a vigorous prosecution of the war to the end of 
bringing Russia to her knees. Only in that way, it was 
thought, could an effective and enduring peace be secured; 
and to accept anything less was to betray those who had 
fallen. But Napoleon III had his military glory, and the 
strain of the war was telling on France. He made it quite 
clear to London that he was anxious to conclude a peace with 
the new Czar of Russia, Alexander II, and that if England 
chose to pursue the war she might have to fight on alone. 
The Allied armies, therefore, did not follow after the retreat­
ing Russian forces but remained in Sebastopol methodically 
wrecking the remaining installations, and a virtual armistice 
came into effect. No real measures were taken to assist the 
Turks who were giving way to the Russians in the Caucasus, 
and the Russians, thereby, were able to balance the loss of 
Sebastopol with important gains elsewhere.3 In short, Russia 
was not yet reduced to the straits considered necessary to 
throttle her as a disturber of the East. 
The posture assumed by Canning was not motivated by 
a desire for crushing humiliation for its own sake. But since 
a price had already been paid he thought it only logical that 
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the peace to be secured should be permanent. He felt that a 
Russia contained behind a chain of independent buffer states 
was a necessity. So he hoped that the peace to come would 
erect a chain of states beginning with a restored Poland, and 
including Serbia, Montenegro, and the Danubian princi­
palities, along with some permanent arrangement in the 
Caucasus. These provisions together with an effective pacifi­
cation of the Black Sea he felt were essential. As for the 
Ottoman Empire, the long-sought reform was to come first, 
to be followed by a sincere admission of the Porte to the 
councils of Europe on an equal footing with the other great 
powers. 
He had been for such an arrangement consistently, espe­
cially after the war had begun. But the terms of peace being 
bruited about in the European capitals in the fall of 1855 fell 
far short of what he considered minimum guarantees. Indeed, 
they were little more severe than the Four Points of the 
second Vienna Note rejected by Russia in August of 1854, 
after Russia had evacuated the principalities. These points 
were advanced by Austria with the approval of the allies and 
included abolition of the Russian protectorates in Serbia and 
the principalities, the free navigation of the Danube, the 
closing of the Straits to ships of war in time of peace and 
restrictions on Russian naval power in the Black Sea, and, 
finally, the substitution of a collective European guarantee 
for the Porte's Christian subjects in place of any exclusive 
Russian privilege. In February of 1855, with Lord Russell 
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sitting in Vienna as plenipotentiary for the Palmerston Cabi­
net, these same terms were again offered to Russia but again 
were rejected. 
Now, with Sebastopol finally conquered, with a vigorous 
military machine at England's disposal, all was about to be 
thrown away by an ineffective peace. Canning's influence 
was on the decline at this time, however, both at home and 
at the Porte. He could not forestall the convening of the 
Conference of Paris nor could he do much about the terms 
of peace, for he was neither invited to attend the conference 
nor consulted about its provisions. 
The Treaty of Paris was concluded in March of 1856, and 
ratified by the signatories in April of the same year.4 Terri­
torily, no change was effected, as all such arrangements 
reverted to the status quo ante helium. The Sublime Porte, 
according to Article VII, was admitted to participate in the 
advantages of the public law and system of Europe,'' and its 
integrity was guaranteed by the powers. The Black Sea was 
neutralized and both Turkey and Russia were forbidden to 
maintain "arsenals'" on its littoral. The Straits were closed to 
foreign warships in time of peace and the Straits Convention 
of 1841 was reaffirmed. Serbia was removed from Russian 
protection and placed under a joint guarantee of the signatory 
powers (England, France, Russia, Turkey, Austria, Prussia, 
and Sardinia). The Danubian principalities were to be 
similarly guaranteed, but their constitution was left in abey­
ance pending further discussions and a plebiscite among the 
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inhabitants to determine whether they were to be united into 
one domain or were to continue as two separate states. As for 
the protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte—the basic 
and enduring "question"—that was thought to be taken care 
of by Article IX of the Treaty. 
Article IX referred to the only matter in which Lord 
Stratford had a direct part in the peace. He had secured, in 
February of 1856, a new hattihumayun5 which reaffirmed 
the reforms of Gulhane, and theoretically solved the question. 
But, in taking note of their satisfaction with this decree, the 
signatory powers went on to declare specifically: "It is clearly 
understood that it cannot, in any case, give to the said Powers 
the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the 
relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in 
the internal administration of his Empire.'' To anyone who 
knew the Turkish mentality such self-exclusion on the part 
of the European powers was tantamount to signing a death 
warrant for the Tanzimat. Reform, Canning knew, was dead 
for the foreseeable future. 
The organization of the Danubian principalities into the 
separate state of Rumania was not finalized during his tenure 
of active service, but he was strongly opposed to the idea of 
uniting the two provinces. In this instance it seems evident 
that he did not examine the issues impartially, for neither 
union nor separateness was a matter of great moment, 
certainly not as important as maintaining a Franco-British 
accord with regard to the East. Canning seems to have been 
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against union because it was a French idea more than for 
any other reason. He saw union as a symbol of French rather 
than British ascendancy and, at the age of seventy, he regarded 
it as another defeat. True, he was able to forestall it for the 
time being, but it came about shortly thereafter anyway. 
Canning's pique at the French was understandable. Ever 
since the alliance of 1854 between England and France had 
united the two countries in war, the French had been working 
to destroy the position and influence of the British Ambassador 
in Constantinople. All during 1856 and 1857 there had been 
a tug of war between opposing factions at the Porte. The 
pro-British faction, represented by Reshid Pasha, to whom 
the Elchi looked as the best hope of internal reform despite 
his disappointment with the Turkish minister, was engaged 
in a continuing exchange of ministries with the French 
faction, led by the younger Ali and Fuad Pashas. 
The British government also treated its Ambassador rather 
shoddily, even to the point of sending his obvious successor 
to the Porte in a separate capacity, thus detracting from the 
Ambassador's prestige. It was unfortunate that his long and 
valuable career was allowed to close in shadows of this kind, 
but he can be forgiven for trying to the last to achieve a 
goal that he had pursued ever since 1842. 
When Lord Palmerston, whom Stratford felt had been 
personally loyal to him during all these trials and who had 
publicly defended him in Parliamentary debate, suffered a 
Parliamentary censure in February of 1858 and resigned from 
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office, Canning submitted his resignation as Ambassador to 
the Porte. His resignation was accepted by Lord Derby, 
although he was reappointed so that he could go back and 
take proper leave of the Sultan and the host of friends he had 
at the Golden Horn. (Canning had been home on leave when 
the Palmerston Cabinet fell.) It was a strained situation, for 
his successor was already resident at the Embassy, and the 
Elchi was enjoined to take a ceremonious leave of the Sultan 
and to come away. He was not to interfere with any of the 
ordinary matters of the Embassy. 
Reshid had died before this final departure of the Elchi, 
and Abudul Medjid was but a shadow of his former self. 
The Sultan was destined to die within three years, and it 
must have seemed to Canning that all his hopes were dying 
as well. To the Sultan and to Ali Pasha he upheld the ideals 
of the new Hatti-Humayun, but he must have seen the 
emptiness of his words. Time was to prove him right about 
so many things, but defeat surrounded his last days in 
Constantinople. 
On October 19, 1858, Lord Stratford laid the cornerstone 
in the foundation of the Memorial Church which stands on 
Pera Hill to the memory of the British dead in the Crimea. 
Then he boarded a frigate and departed from Constantinople 
forever. 
1. The reader who wishes to pursue a detailed account of the military 
history of the Crimean War has ample material at his disposal. Alexander 
Kinglake's voluminous history, The Invasion of the Crimea, is, of course, 
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a most detailed account. Kinglake was a friend of the family of Lord 
Raglan and wrote in answer to critical accounts of the British command, 
especially those of the famous correspondent of the London Times, W. H. 
Russell. One should, then, also peruse Russell's The British Expedition 
to the Crimea (rev. ed.; London: G. Routledge and Co., 1958) for a 
balance. 
Either of these works will consume a considerable amount of time, but 
there are two contemporary works which have summarized (with the 
usual disadvantages of summarization) the campaign. One is Cecil 
Woodham-Smith's The Reason Why (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1953), 
which, as its title implies, focuses its attention on the Battle of Balaclava, 
and to that extent is somewhat particularized. More general in its account 
of the military campaign is Gibb's The Crimean Blunder (New York: 
Henry Holt, i960). Gibb's short description of the historical background 
of the war is, however, most unreliable. 
I have also found interesting sidelights in George Palmer Evelyn, 
A Diary of the Crimea, ed. Cyril Falls (London, 1954). Evelyn, a 
descendant of the famous diarist John Evelyn, was an Englishman who 
held a commission in the Turkish army and saw much service in the war. 
Finally, there was a "Brady" of the Crimea, the photographer Roger 
Fenton, and a number of his fine photographs together with his letters 
were published in an edition by Helmut and Alison Gemsheim entitled 
Roger Fenton: Photographer of the Crimean War (London: Seeker and 
Warburg, 1954). 
2. Cf. Lane-Poole, op. cit., II, 374 ff., for a discussion of the medical 
problems at Constantinople. 
3. The situation in the Caucasus was going badly for the Turks. 
Again Lord Stratford was attacked for failing to see that the British 
liaison officer there did not get better supplies and reinforcements. I have 
passed over this in the text because it was a military problem rather than 
a diplomatic one, and because the Elchi was completely vindicated in 
Parliament by Lord Palmerston and in a subsequent Blue Book. The only 
censure laid against the Ambassador was that he failed to answer some 
unimportant letters from the officer, General Williams, a year previous to 
the campaign in question. 
4- Cf. Hurewitz, op. cit., I, 153-56. 
5. Ibid., pp. 149-53. 
XXVII

THE last two years of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's 
official diplomatic service were clouded over by the confusion 
born of war, misunderstanding, and bitter personality clashes 
between himself and other participants in the great drama. 
Largely they mark a period of anticlimax, for his great work 
in diplomacy ended in January of 1854 with the entrance of 
the allied fleets into the Black Sea. From that moment on he, 
no less than all the others, was carried along in the vortex of 
war, and the forces unleashed were beyond the control of a 
single individual or even of a single nation. 
The scope of this present work is limited to an assessment 
of Stratford Canning's major diplomatic accomplishments and 
therefore is not concerned with anticlimactic details. Never­
theless, something should be said about the aftereffects of the 
Peace of Paris. If it is true that Canning's misgivings over 
the terms of the peace and the many arrangements dictated 
by it were colored to a great extent by personal bitterness and 
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disappointment, it is also true that these doubts were not 
solely motivated by these factors. He was to live to see the 
questionable Treaty unilaterally abrogated by Russia in 18701 
when the western European powers were enmeshed in the 
uncertainties of the Franco-Prussian War. He was still alive 
in 1876 when Russian aggression was once more directed at 
the Ottoman Empire, again under the pretext of succoring 
Balkan Orthodoxy. He saw the European powers refuse to 
sanction the harsh terms imposed by Russia on the Turks in 
the Treaty of San Stefano which ended that war. He saw 
the Congress of Berlin convened to modify that Treaty and 
to discuss the age-old question of Ottoman reform and the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire.2 All these things might 
have been effectively disposed of by a stronger peace settle­
ment in 1856 and history supported the core of his reserva­
tions on the terms of the Peace of Paris. 
The 'might-have-been's,'' therefore, are inextricably inter­
woven in the pattern of conclusions to be drawn from a study 
of Stratford Canning's diplomatic labors. To attempt such an 
assessment assuredly exposes the practitioner to arguments 
based on probabilities and improbabilities. To avoid mean­
ingful conclusions on those grounds, however, would seem 
to reduce the study of history to an art of abstraction without 
lessons for future generations. 
From 1842 to the close of his diplomatic career in 1858, 
Stratford Canning was motivated by two major, closely con­
nected goals. The first was the preservation of the Ottoman 
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Empire, which he saw as necessary for the welfare of the 
millions living within its social structure as well as for the 
peace of Europe. Had there been effective internal reform 
after the Decree of Gulhane, or even after the Peace of Paris 
in 1856, the pretexts for outside interference would have 
disappeared. Because the powers of Europe bypassed suc­
cessive opportunities to demand real reform in Turkey, die 
Eastern question remained as a factor disruptive of European 
peace. There is little to be gained from debating the question 
of who or what was the prime mover in the movement for 
internal reform. What is important is that Stratford Canning 
perceived the fundamental necessity of reform and became, 
certainly, the chief and most persevering European exponent 
of reform. He never claimed for himself the title of "Reformer 
of Turkey'' mistakenly given to him by contemporary ad­
mirers. Indeed, he had all but lost hope of seeing effective 
reform accomplished under the Ottoman framework. This is 
why, in 1876, when he was still able to rise in the House of 
Lords and was still a prolific contributor to learned reviews, 
he failed to advocate a new British intervention on behalf of 
the Turk. He felt that they had made no effort to help 
themselves. The reforms he supported, although they were 
initiated and promulgated by successive sultans, were never 
really implemented until the whole Ottoman structure was 
torn asunder by the revolution of Kemal Ataturk after the 
First World War. Reform, however, was hindered not only 
by the internal barriers of immemorial custom (adet) but by 
outside interference as well. To impose reform upon un­
363 THE GREAT AMBASSADOR 
willing religious fanatics, the sultans, even had they been 
most sincere in their professed ideals, needed undisturbed 
peace and freedom from aggression. To protect them from 
external aggression had been his second goal. 
Historically, in his lifetime, the greatest single external 
threat to the Ottoman Empire was the pressure of Russian 
expansionism. For this fact Stratford Canning cannot be 
blamed. He was no more anti-Russian than he would have 
been anti-Austrian had the accidents of history substituted 
one threat for the other. The Russian drive was there; it 
was undeniable, whatever may have motivated it. It may 
have been economic, it may have been political, it may have 
been a mystical, neo-Byzantine messianism, or a mixture of 
all diree, but it was there. It might change its direction and 
its emphasis temporarily, as it did after Adrianople, but it 
never wholly desisted or disappeared. The Russian drive 
used the internal corruption of Turkey, it used the threat 
of Mehemet Ali and the Egyptians, it used the dispute of 
the Holy Places, but they were all means for establishing 
Russian rule and hegemony. The relendess pressure con­
tinued after his career ended and after his life came to a 
close. So Leon Dennen could write in 1945: "For the 
moment one thing seems obvious: The Crimean War between 
Britain and Russia, to paraphrase Georges Clemenceau, has 
not ended; it has merely changed its form."3 
As for the Crimean War itself, undoubtedly it was the 
climax of Canning's diplomatic career. Not that he sought 
war, but he knew the Russian drive must be thwarted. He 
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had been instrumental in thwarting the Czar before that, 
and without major war. He had been able to block Russian 
aims during the Greek Revolution and during the refugee 
crisis, and his viewpoint had been adopted by Palmerston 
in the final years of the Turco-Egyptian struggle. All these 
potential conflicts terminated without major war because he 
had the benefit of strong support at home. In 1853-54, t m  s 
strength was non-existent. The failure of the Aberdeen 
government to adopt a clear, forthright policy has been suffi­
ciently mentioned, and because of this there was no over-all 
European unity against Russia. Had the original diplomatic 
unity effected by Canning after the Menshikov ultimatum 
was delivered to the Turks been preserved and carried over 
to a martial unity there is every reason to believe that war 
would have been averted. Despite Napoleon Ill's dreams of 
glory, and Nicholas' conviction of his "divine mission," col­
lective security for peace might have been a fact in 1853 
instead of being an ideal still eluding mankind today. 
1. See Hurewitz, op. tit., I, 173-74. 
2. Ibid., pp. 189-91. 
3. Dennen, op. tit., pp. 14-15. 
EPILOGUE

VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE returned to 
England in 1859 and began a life of "honourable retirement.1' 
In no sense, however, was it a withdrawal from the world of 
men, for he exercised his privilege of speaking out in the 
House of Lords whenever he felt the need to comment on 
questions of the day. Though his preoccupation was naturally 
with matters of foreign policy, his views on domestic issues 
were no less explicitly stated. 
As time went on the high points of his service stood out in 
bold relief, and the wisdom of his basic views was attested 
time and again. The bitterness and misunderstanding of 
the war years receded, and he came to be looked upon as a 
Nestor on foreign affairs. When he was past ninety years 
of age, he wrote a perceptive series of papers which were 
published under the title of The Eastern Question. He last 
addressed the House of Lords in 1873, speaking vigorously 
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on the Turco-Persian boundary issue. He was then in his 
eighty-seventh year of life. 
The respect that grew with the years was marked in 1869 
by bestowal of the Garter, and, as a prominent figure of the 
day observed, it was a rare instance of the high honor being 
given as recognition of service to the state rather than to a 
party. 
In the late seventies, when his growing physical infirmities 
made the cherished visits to Lords impossible, he moved 
to his country home at Frant in the Kentish country of 
Tunbridge Wells. There, on August 14, 1880, he passed 
away serenely. He was buried simply, in the village church­
yard, to the accompaniment of a simple hymn sung by the 
village children. 
The public tributes to him were many and came from all 
sides. The Dean of Westminster, Dr. Stanley, paid perhaps 
the greatest tribute when he testified to what the Ambassador 
meant to individual men: 
In his incorruptible integrity, in his magnificent liberality, 
in his unshaken firmness, no one could hear his influence 
spoken of by Christian or Musulman, Protestant or Catholic, 
Greek or Turk, without feeling that in him each man knew 
that there was a terror to evildoers which no one could con­
front with impunity, a refuge for the destitute and op­
pressed which none could seek in vain.1 
Four years later the first statue ever placed in Westminster 
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Abbey in honor of a diplomatist was unveiled to the memory 
of Stratford Canning. It bears the everlasting tribute com­
posed by Lord Tennyson: 
Thou third Great Canning stand among our best

And noblest, now thy long day's work hath ceased;

Here silent in our Minster of the West

Who wert the voice of England in the East.
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Nesselrode, Count Charles; Nich­
olas I; Petersburg Conference; 
Seymour Correspondence; Vienna 
Note 
Safti Pasha, 160, 183, 184 
St. Arnaud, Marshal Jacques, 346, 
349 
St. Petersburg Journal, 275 
Salamis, Bay of, French Fleet in, 
252, 268 
San Stefano, Treaty of, 361 
Sarim Effendi, 160, 162 
Schonbrunn, Treaty of, 27 
Scutari, 343; military hospital at, 
351 
Sebastopol, siege of, 347, 348, 349, 
352, 353 
Selim III, 17, 22, 106, 182 
Seraglio, the, 39 
Seraskier, 39 
Seymour, Sir Hamilton, 252, 266, 
304, 324; messages to London, 
248; Seymour Correspondence, 
274-89 
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Spain: American colonies of, 79;

British operations in, 19; Strat­

ford's mission to, 144-45; Strat­









Stanley, Lord Edward G. S., 146,

187, 192, 275; approaches Strat­

ford on future foreign secretary­

ship, 227; nominates Stratford to

peerage, 229; Prime Minister,

228; reappoints Stratford ambas­











Stratfords of Baltinglas, 4

Sublime Porte; see Constantinople; 
Grand Council; Ottoman Empire 
Suleiman Nejib Effendi, 138

Suleiman the Magnificent, 21

Switzerland: Congress of Vienna 
and, 69; neutrality of, 71; pre-
Napoleonic organization of, 67; 
religious strife in, 196-98; Strat­
ford minister to, 66; Stratford's

mission to, 196; Swiss Confedera­













Temperley, H. W. V., 302
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United States: Canadian bound­

aries of, 77, 80; foreign policy

of, 76; Stratford's mission to, 73;

Stratford's opinions on Congress

of, 81; Stratford's travels in, 82

Varna, port of, 346

Victoria, Queen, 148, 239, 303

Vienna, Conference of: Buol initi­

ates, 308, 309; derogates from

Concert of Ambassadors, 310;

endorses Stratford's Protocol of

December, 1853, 333; reasons for

failure of, 321, 324; submits
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Vienna Note to Nicholas I for 
prior approval, 310; suppresses 
Turkish ultimatum, 310-11 
Vienna, Congress of, 69, 70, 77, 
85, 94, 193; contrast with Con­
ference of Vienna, 321; Stratford 
officially accredited member of, 
69 
Vienna Note, 309; submitted to 
Nicholas I and Sultan, 310; 
see also Clarendon, Earl of; 
Grand Council; Nesselrode, Count 
Charles; Nicholas I; Reshid 
Pasha; Westmoreland, Earl of 
Vogordies, Stefanaki, 135, 136, 137 
Wagram, Battle of, 27 
Wallachia, 17, 129, 203; see also 
Danubian principalities 
Wanstead, 6 
Washington, George, 76 
Wellesley, Henry, 12, 187; ambas­
sador to Paris, 226 
Wellesley, Marquis of (Richard 
Colley), 35, 36, 57, 59, 60 
Wellesley, Richard, 20, 32 
Wellington, Duke of (Sir Arthur 
Wellesley), 9, 34, 61, 69, 70, 
104, 194, 200, 240, 279; Prime 
Minister, 115; views on Annex to 
Protocol of March, 1829, 128 
Wellington Protocol, 104, 105, 110 
Westminster Abbey, 367 
Westmoreland, Earl of (John Fane), 
286; advises Stratford of Claren­
don's approval of Vienna Note, 
314 
Whig party, 9, 191, 192 











Other books on the Middle East . . . 
Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958, by Gordon H. Torrey 
addition to a detailed picture of Syria's place in the history of the 
liddle East, its people and culture, and the geographical forces to 
"lich it is subject, Mr. Torrey offers a careful analysis of the complex 
litical and military maneuvers for power on the part of conservative 
id radicals, civilians and the military, and pro-Western and pro-Soviet 
ements in the government, between the establishment of independence 
1945 and union with the United Arab Republic in 1958. ("Publi­
tions of the Graduate Institute for World Affairs of the Ohio State 
diversity,'- No. 3) . $7.00 
he Military in the Middle East: Problems in Society and Government, 
Jited by Sydney Nettleton Fisher. Eight essays fhat range from a 
cussion of the United States State Department's policy-planning in 
Middle East, through a carefully conceived analysis of general 
ends in Middle Eastern politics, to scholarly treatments of the 
political-military situations in individual countries. Contributors include 
)ankwart A. Rustow, Sydney Nettleton Fisher, Majid Khadduri, 
jrdon H. Torrey, George Kirk, J. C. Hurewitz, John C. Campbell, 
William R. Polk. ("Publications of the Graduate Institute for 
arid Affairs of the Ohio State University," No. 1), $4.75 
Ohio State University Press 
164 West Nineteenth Avenue 
Columbus, 43,210 
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